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ABSTRACT 
 
FACULTY OF LAW, ART & SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
THREE EMPIRICAL ESSAYS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND INSURANCE  
 
By Wan Azman Saini Wan Ngah 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three independent essays, all of which are empirical treatments 
of different determinants of economic growth.  
 
The first essay, which is in Chapter 2, evaluates the role economic freedom plays 
in  mediating  the  effect  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  on  growth.  It  tests  whether 
countries with sufficiently high level of economic freedom can exploit FDI more efficiently. It 
uses cross-country observations from 84 countries for the 1976-2005 period. It applies a 
threshold  regression  which  is  flexible  enough  to  accommodate  the  possibility  that  the 
impact of FDI on growth ‘kicks in’ only when the level of economic freedom exceeds some 
unknown threshold. The results show that FDI has no direct (linear) effect on output growth. 
Instead, its impact is conditional on the level of economic freedom in the host countries. 
Only  countries  whose  level  of  economic  freedom  has  exceeded  the  threshold  level  of 
economic freedom benefited from FDI inflows. In countries below the threshold level, FDI 
deliver  no  beneficial  effects.  The  findings  are  robust  to  several  sensitivity  checks  and 
consideration of endogeneity.   
 
The second essay (Chapter 3) tests the channels and magnitude of R&D spillovers 
from developed countries to East Asian countries (China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand). It examines three possible spillover channels - imports, inward FDI, and outward 
FDI - using panel data for the period 1984-2005. It uses a novel panel estimator which 
allows  for  cross-sectional  dependence  and  provides  country-specific  estimates  of  R&D 
effects. There are several important conclusions emerge. First, both domestic and foreign 
R&D are important for productivity improvements. Second, imports are the most important 
channel  of  spillovers  while  spillover  effects  via  FDI  in  uncertain.  Third,  there  is  some 
evidence that domestic R&D helps to increase the incidence of R&D spillovers, especially 
via  import  channel.  Fourth,  the  U.S.  is  a  relatively  stronger  provider  of  spillovers  than 
Japan.    iii 
Chapter  4,  which  is  the  final  essay,  examines  the  impact  of  insurance  sector 
development on output growth, capital accumulation and productivity improvement. It uses 
panel data from 52 countries for the period 1981-2005, and applies a recent generalized-
method-of  moments  (GMM)  dynamic  panel  estimator.  The  results  show  that  the 
development  of  insurance  sector  is  important  for  long-run  output  growth,  capital 
accumulation and productivity growth. For developing countries, insurance affects growth 
predominantly  through  capital  accumulation  while  in  developed  countries  it  enhances 
productivity growth. The findings are robust to biases introduced by unobserved country-
specific effects, simultaneity, weak or numerous instruments. It remains valid even after 
controlling for bank and stock market developments. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Ever since the publication in 1776 of Adam Smith’s seminal work, An Inquiry into the Nature 
and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations,  understanding  economic  growth  has  been  at  the 
forefront  of  the  research  agenda.  Throughout  history,  economists  have  inquired  into  the 
causes of growth and on the policies that countries can implement to maintain and promote it. 
However, explaining why some countries grow faster than others is a complex matter, and the 
literature on the subject is filled with controversies, either technical or ideological in nature. 
Nevertheless  an  overwhelming  number  of  recent  studies  identify  more  than  sixty  different 
variables (put forward by theorists) that empirically contribute to our understanding of long 
term economic growth (Durlauf et al., 2005, Sala-i-Martın, 1997).  
For example, there is little agreement amongst researchers concerning the impact of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth, despite a strong theoretical prediction 
theoretical prediction that FDI contributes to economic growth through the diffusion of superior 
technologies.  There  is  however  substantial  empirical  support  for  the  positive  effects  of 
technological improvements on economic growth through its positive impact on productivity. 
There  is  also  broad  empirical  support  for  the  positive  contribution  of  financial  markets 
development  in  sustaining  and  promoting  it.  However, there  is  a  difference between  both: 
financial  markets  exert  an  indirect  influence  on  growth  rates,  mainly  by  improving  the 
efficiency of investment allocations. 
This  dissertation  contributes  to  the  empirical  literature  by  deepening  our 
understanding  on  the  three  growth-related  factors  mentioned  in  the  previous  example.  In 
chapter 2, economic freedom is shown to condition the impact of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) on output growth. Chapter 3 examines the impact of foreign research and development 
(R&D)  activity  on  domestic  productivity.  Chapter  4  studies  the  effect  of  insurance  sector 
development on economic growth. 
Chapter  2  is  inspired  by  recent  empirical  findings  pointing  towards  an  ambiguous 
effect of FDI on growth. Although FDI has been traditionally understood as making a superior 
technology available, economists have yet to empirically agree on the benefits of attracting 
more  FDI. One key explanation for this mixed finding is that the existing research fails to 
account for contingency effects in the FDI-growth relationship. Several recent models suggest 
that the diffusion of knowledge depends on other intervening factors, broadly defined as the   2 
absorptive capacity of the recipient country. In the current context, absorptive capacity refers 
to  factors  that  help  FDI  recipients  to  optimize  the  absorption  and  internalization  of  FDI-
generated  externalities.  Several  factors  have  been  put  forward  as  essential  to  absorptive 
capacity: financial markets, human capital, and recipient countries’ trade policy. In line with 
this view, this paper takes a step forward by proposing economic freedom as an additional 
channel through which FDI enhances output growth. The main insight is that in economically 
freer societies, economic agents have more incentive to carry out productive activity. Also, in 
such environment many obstacles that limit the efficient diffusion of knowledge have been 
abolished.  To  provide  empirical  support  for  this  hypothesis,  this  paper  uses  a  regression 
model based on the concept of threshold effects.  
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it provides the first 
empirical evidence on the significant role of economic freedom in moderating the impact of 
FDI on output growth. Second, it departs from the existing literature from a methodological 
standpoint by explicitly allowing for the possibility that the impact of FDI on growth is nonlinear 
and can be characterized by threshold effects. Most studies on absorptive capacity have used 
interaction  specifications  which  restrict  the  impact  of  FDI  on  growth  to  be  monotonically 
dependent  on  absorptive  capacity  indicators.  Threshold  regression  is  more  flexible  and 
provides  a  better  way  of  understanding  the  links  between  absorptive  capacity  and  FDI 
spillovers. In particular, it can accommodate the economically meaningful possibility that FDI 
‘kicks in’ on growth only after host countries reach a certain level of economic freedom.  
Chapter 3 examines empirically the impact of foreign R&D on the productivity of East 
Asian countries. Economic theory predicts that innovative activity such as R&D is one of the 
most important sources of productivity growth. However, only a few developed countries being 
responsible for a large fraction of world’s total R&D expenditure. Since the benefits of R&D 
cannot be completely internalized, third countries can benefit from their effort in R&D through 
economic interactions. Two important channels through which R&D spillovers may spread are 
imports and FDI. A large body of the literature empirically confirms that cumulative foreign 
R&D is an important determinant of productivity growth in the home country. However, most of 
the  studies  have  focused  on  spillovers  within  developed  countries  (especially  OECD 
countries).  Little  is  known  about  how  OECD  R&D  activities  affect  the  productivity  of  less 
developed countries. This chapter constitutes an attempt to fill this gap by assessing R&D 
spillovers  from  G-5  countries  to  East  Asian  countries.  East  Asian  countries  were  chosen 
because of their remarkable growth performance over the past three decades; furthermore 
they are increasingly open to both trade and FDI. Taking advantage of recent developments in 
nonstationary  panel  data  techniques,  a  dynamic  seemingly  unrelated  regression  (DSUR) 
estimator is implemented to generate consistent estimates of the impact of R&D stocks (i.e.   3 
both domestic and foreign) on total factor productivity (TFP). Specifically, this chapter answers 
the following questions: 
 
(i)  What are the channels of R&D spillovers from G-5 countries to East Asian 
countries? 
(ii)  Does absorptive capacity help to increase the incidence of spillovers? 
(iii)  For East-Asian countries, does R&D spill over more from Japan or from the 
United States?   
 
This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  addressing  North-South  R&D  spillovers.  In 
particular, it is in the spirit of Coe et al. (1997) or Madden et al. (2002) extending the literature 
along the following dimensions. First, in addition to the trade channel that they analyze, two 
additional  channels  are  simultaneously  considered:  inward  and  outward  FDI.  Second,  this 
study  uses  R&D  data  provided  by  the  United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) which is harmonized, i.e. the data is not subject to potential biases 
arising from differences in the R&D definition adopted by each country. Third, it examines how 
important  absorptive  capacity  is  for  international  R&D  spillovers.  Finally,  it  exploits  recent 
developments in nonstationary panel data techniques by applying the DSUR panel estimator, 
which has the advantages of (i) taking into account cross-sectional dependence in estimation 
and of (ii) generating one cointegrating vector for each country. 
 
Chapter 4 re-examines the finance-growth literature from the perspective of financial 
intermediaries other than banks. Well-functioning financial markets are important for long-run 
economic growth, contributing to the economic development process through their role in the 
efficient allocating of scarce funds among productive activities, including investment in new 
plant and equipment, working capital for firms, etc. This role has been thoroughly researched 
and is well documented in the empirical literature. Ang (2008) provides an excellent up-to-date 
overview  of  the  vast  empirical  literature  that  finds  support  for  financial  development  as  a 
robust  explanation  of  cross-country  differences  in  economic  growth.  Nevertheless,  the 
aforementioned literature has almost exclusively focused on the role of banks, while other 
important intermediaries such as insurance institutions have been largely ignored. The main 
objective  of  this  chapter  is  thus  to  show  that  the  rapid  development  of  this  sector  can 
significantly contribute  to  understand  the  overall  finance-growth  nexus.  More  precisely,  we 
examine  empirically  the  effect  of  insurance  sector  development  on  economic  growth, 
exploiting longitudinal data for 52 countries over the period 1981-2005. We take advantage of 
recent econometric estimation methods (GMM panel estimator) particularly suited to answer 
the following important questions:   4 
 
(i)  Does insurance sector development promote output growth? 
(ii)  What  are  the  channels  of  the  insurance  effect  on  growth?  Is  it  capital 
accumulation, productivity improvement, or both?  
(iii)  Do the effects vary across developed and developing countries? 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several important aspects. First, it 
provides panel evidence on the insurance-growth nexus. Second, it does so by disentangling 
the  relative  importance  of  the  two  main  channels:  capital  accumulation  and  productivity 
growth. Evidence is also provided on the relative importance of each of the channels across 
developed and developing countries. Finally, recent dynamic panel data techniques (the GMM 
estimator) are implemented to account for country-specific effects and simultaneity biases, 
which are pervasive problems when estimating growth equations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   5 
2.  FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  THE 
ROLE OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM  
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The  impact  of  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  on  economic  growth  has  been  debated 
extensively in the literature. The rising interest in this area of research is consistent with the 
shift in emphasis of policy makers towards attracting more FDI. Since the early 1980s, many 
countries have progressively lifted restrictions on foreign capital flows.
1 As a result, global FDI 
inflows rose from $57 billion in 1982 to $1271 billion in 2000 and the growth rate of world FDI 
has exceeded the growth rates of both world trade and GDP (UNCTAD, 2001). The motivation 
for increased efforts to attract more FDI stems from the expectation of an overall positive 
impact of FDI resulting from productivity gains, transfers of new technology, the introduction of 
new  processes,  management  techniques,  and  know-how  in  the  local  market,  employees’ 
training and international production networks. 
 
Although economic models (e.g. Findlay (1978); Wang and Blomstrom (1992)) predict 
that FDI inflows are important for economic development, empirical evidence on the impact of 
FDI  on  output  growth  is  far  from  conclusive.  Some  studies  find  that  FDI  exerts  a  positive 
growth effect, while others find no evidence or even a negative effect (Gorg and Greenaway, 
2004).  A  possible  explanation  behind  this  mixed  finding may  be  the  failure  to account  for 
contingency  effects  in  the  relationship  between  FDI  and  growth.  A  number  of  economic 
models suggest, for instance, that the relationship between FDI and growth may be contingent 
on absorptive capacity.
2 For example, Lapan and  Bardan’s (1973) model  emphasizes that 
technology  spillovers  from  developed  to  developing  countries  require  the  latter  to  have 
sufficient  investment  in  capital-intensive  projects.  The  models  by  Griffith  et  al.(2003)  and 
Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1989)  predict  that  by  investing  in research  and  development  (R&D) 
activity, firms (or countries) are more able to absorb technologies developed by others. These 
models suggest that FDI spillovers are a complex process and not a granted consequence of 
the  presence  of  foreign  capital.  It  requires  that  sufficient  absorptive  capacity  of  advanced 
technologies is available in the host country. Several elements of absorptive capacity have 
                                                 
1 According to UNCTAD (2002), 208 changes in FDI laws were made by 71 countries in 2001. Of these changes, 194 
(93 per cent) created a more favourable climate in an effort to attract more FDI.  
2 Cohen and Levinthal (1989) have offered the most widely cited definition of absorptive capacity. They view it as the 
firm’s ability to value, assimilate and apply new knowledge.   6 
been highlighted in the literature, such as the quality of human capital, the development of 
financial markets, and trade policy.   
 
In an effort to further understand the nature of the FDI-growth relationship, this paper 
takes  its  cue  from  the  recent  literature  that  emphasizes  the  importance  of  institutions  in 
economic development (Demetriades and Law, 2006, Rodrik et al., 2004). In particular, it aims 
to highlight the importance of economic freedom in mediating the impact of FDI on growth and 
to formally test whether countries with higher level of freedom can exploit FDI more efficiently. 
Enhancing economic freedom is expected to reduce obstacles that hinder the efficient transfer 
of technology from multinational corporations (MNCs) to domestic firms. There are several 
reasons to believe why countries that promote freedom of economic activity will benefit from 
FDI inflows. It is generally agreed that more freedom (i.e. less regulation) in general will be 
good for growth. For example, when financial markets are not excessively regulated, firms 
may find it easier to access external funds in order to finance new expensive technologies. 
Access  to  external  finance  has  been  highlighted  as  an  important  pre-condition  for  FDI 
spillovers (Alfaro et al., 2004). Employment laws may also have implications for FDI spillovers. 
If the laws for the hiring and firing of employees are less restrictive, spillover effects through 
labor  mobility  are  more  likely  to  occur  because  workers  who  have  previously  worked  with 
MNCs  are  more  able  to  transfer  their  knowledge  and  experience  of  new  technologies  to 
domestic firms (Fosfuri et al., 2001). The model by Acemoglu et al. (2006) shows that firms 
that have a strong incentive for innovation are very selective of managers that can achieve 
their goal. Other things being equal, reducing constraints that limit freedom of employment 
may  ease  the  selection  process  and  lead  to  greater  labour  mobility  between  firms.  
Competition in local market may also affect technology spillovers via backward linkages. The 
model by Lin and Saggi (2005) implies that competition with local rivals is expected to push 
MNCs  for  a  greater  transfer  of  technology  to  local  suppliers  of  intermediate  goods.  The 
transfer  of  technology  is  needed  in  order  for  MNCs  to  secure  intermediate  inputs  at  a 
competitive price. In turn, local production of more specialized inputs allows the production of 
more complex goods (i.e., goods that use specialized inputs with high intensity) at competitive 
costs which benefit downstream sector (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).
3 The protection of property 
rights  is  another  integral  element  of  economic  freedom.  Countries  that  provide  better 
protection of property rights are expected to benefit more from MNCs presence because they 
can not only attract FDI of a higher technological content (Javorcik, 2004) but are also more 
likely to encourage MNCs to expand their R&D  activities locally (Nunnenkamp and  Spatz, 
2003). Freedom of exchange across borders may help domestic firms penetrate international 
markets for exporting purposes (Aitken et al., 1997). One may argue that FDI spillovers could 
                                                 
3 The model by Rodriguez-Clare (2001) is particularly novel as it formalizes both backward and forward linkages. In 
this model the backward linkages is a necessary condition for forward linkages to materialize.   7 
be negatively related to the level of economic freedom because MNCs may be more willing to 
transfer technology if the level of competition in the industry in which they operate is low (i.e. 
low  level  of  economic  freedom).  However,  whether  economic  freedom  helps  to  foster  FDI 
spillovers is an empirical matter and this is precisely the question that we attempt to answer.   
 
This paper contributes to the literature in two important aspects. First, it provides the 
first empirical evidence on the significant role of economic freedom in mediating the impact of 
FDI flows on growth. Second, it departs from the existing literature from a methodological 
standpoint by explicitly allowing for the possibility that the impact of FDI on growth is nonlinear 
and characterized by threshold effects. More specifically, our model allows the impact of FDI 
on  growth  to  be  regime  specific,  with  the  level  of  economic  freedom  acting  as  a  regime 
switching  trigger.  In  this  way,  our  econometric  specification  is  able  to  accommodate  the 
possibility that the impact of FDI on growth “kicks in” only when the level of economic freedom 
exceeds  a  certain  unknown  threshold.  Furthermore,  the  model  allows  the  data  to 
endogenously determine whether the threshold effects exist or not.  
 
Our main findings suggest that economic freedom increases the positive impact of FDI 
on output growth. The impact is characterized by threshold effects in that only countries whose 
level of economic freedom has exceeded a given level (threshold) benefit from FDI inflows. 
These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  views  that  only  in  countries  promoting  freedom  of 
economic activity, firms are more able to absorb and internalize new foreign technologies. By 
doing so, many market frictions that hinder the efficient transfer of technology are abolished. 
These findings are robust to different sample periods (1981-2005) and endogeneity concerns.  
 
The  rest  of  this  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2.2  reviews  the  existing 
literature.  Section  2.3  explains  the  model  specification.  Section  2.4  outlines  the  estimation 
procedures. Section 2.5 highlights the data set. Section 2.6 reports the empirical results and 
their interpretation. Conclusions are presented in section 2.7.  
 
 
2.2  Review of the literature 
 
In most countries, FDI is considered to be an important element of development strategy and 
policies are  designed  accordingly to attract more FDI. The provision  of incentives and the 
adoption  of  FDI-stimulating  policies  are  motivated  by  the  expectation  that  FDI  bring   8 
tremendous  benefits  to  the  recipient  countries.  MNCs  have  been  linked  to  superior 
technologies, patents, trade secrets, brand names, management techniques and marketing 
strategies (Dunning, 1993). MNCs are known to be among the most technologically advanced 
firms as they are responsible for a large part of world’s R&D expenditures (Borensztein et al., 
1998). They also hire a large number of technical and professional workers (Markusen, 1995). 
Once a multinational has set up a subsidiary, some of these advantages may not be totally 
internalized and thus spill over to domestic firms.  
 
There  is  at  least  five  channels  through  which  spillovers  can  occur.  First, 
demonstration/ imitation is probably the most evident spillover channel (Das, 1987, Wang and 
Blomstrom,  1992).  New  technology  may  be  too  expensive  and  risky for  domestic  firms to 
adopt  due  to  high  acquisition  cost  and  uncertainty  of  the  results  that  may  be  obtained. 
However, if a technology is successfully used by MNCs, domestic firms will be encouraged to 
adopt it. The second channel is labour mobility which is related to the possibility that workers 
who have previously worked for MNCs join domestic firms. These workers are able to apply 
their knowledge and experience of new technology in the domestic firms (Fosfuri et al., 2001). 
The  third  channel  is  associated  with  export  promotion.  MNCs  are  known  for  having  well-
established  international  distribution  networks.  By following  the  export  processes  of  MNCs 
(through imitation or collaboration), domestic firms may reduce the entry costs into foreign 
markets  (Aitken  et  al.,  1997).  This  may  have  favorable  implications  for  the  productive 
efficiency  of  domestic  firms.  The  fourth  channel  is  competition.  The  competitive  pressures 
exerted  by  MNCs  may  force  domestic  firms  to  improve  their  efficiency  (Markusen  and 
Venables,  1999, Wang and  Blomstrom,  1992).  In  order  to  stay  competitive  in  the  market, 
increased competition may encourage domestic firms to adopt new technology earlier than 
what  would  otherwise  have  been  the  case  (Blomstrom  et  al.,  1994).  The  final  channel 
concerns  the  relationship  that  MNCs  establish  with  domestic  firms.  MNCs  may  create 
backward and forward linkages with domestic suppliers and customers of intermediate inputs 
produced by MNCs (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). In the case of backward linkages, MNCs may 
give  technical  assistance  to  domestic  suppliers  in  attempts  to  maintain  a  certain  quality 
standard for the inputs supplied to them. Regarding the forward linkages, the most evident link 
is observed in the MNCs’ supply of higher quality inputs and at a lower price to domestic 
producers of final consumer goods (Markusen and Venables, 1999).  
 
Despite the numerous benefits linked to FDI flows, economists have yet to reach a 
consensus on the usefulness of FDI. In a survey on firm-level studies on productivity spillovers 
in the developing, developed and transition economies, Gorg and Greenway (2004) reported   9 
that only six out of 25 studies find some positive evidence of spillovers running from foreign-
owned to domestic-owned firms. This finding is further supported by Crespo and Fontoura 
(2007)  who  point  out  that  FDI  spillovers  depend  on  many  factors  but  frequently  with 
undetermined effects. One possible explanation for these mixed results may be due to model 
misspecification induced by the failure to account for the host country’s absorptive capacity. 
This issue has been highlighted by a number of theoretical models. For example, Lapan and 
Bardhan (1973) argue that developing countries need a certain level of absorptive capacity 
before they can benefit from technologies developed by others. Similarly, the model by Cohen 
and  Levinthal  (1989)  emphasized  the  importance  of  absorptive  capacity  for  technology 
spillovers. Their model postulates that the research and development (R&D) activities help to 
increase the incidence of spillovers by enhancing the firm’s capacity to identify, assimilate, and 
exploit  outside  knowledge.  They  find  strong  evidence  supporting  the  idea  that  more  R&D 
intensive firms are more successful when it comes to absorbing R&D spillovers. The model 
presented by Griffith et al. (2003) predicts that by engaging in R&D, countries increase their 
ability to assimilate and understand the discoveries of others. 
 
 Several studies on FDI spillovers have tested the absorptive capacity hypothesis. For 
instance Blomstrom et al.(1994) find that FDI has a stronger positive growth-effect in countries 
with a higher level of development (i.e. when the country is sufficiently rich in terms of per 
capita income). Balasubramanyam et al. (1996)  assess the impact of FDI given the trade 
policy of recipient countries. They find that the effect of FDI on growth is stronger in countries 
with a policy of export promotion than in countries that pursue import substitution. In fact, the 
effect of FDI on growth is non-existent in the case of developing countries that pursue import 
substitution policies. They argue that these policies reduce the efficiency of FDI by distorting 
the social and private return to capital.   
 
Borensztein et al.(1998) argue that the adoption of new technologies requires workers 
that are able to understand and work with the new technology. The authors find that FDI have 
only a marginal direct effect on growth but the conditional effect is substantial (when FDI is 
interacted with a proxy of human capital). However, the conditional effect is insignificant in the 
case of domestic investment (i.e., interaction between domestic investment and human capital 
proxy), which may reflect the nature of technological differences between FDI and domestic 
investment.  Since  developed  countries  have  a  higher  level  of  human  capital,  they  are 
expected  to  receive  more  benefits  from  FDI  than  developing  countries.  This  has  been 
supported by Xu (2000) who find that technology transfer by the U.S. MNCs contributes to the 
productivity growth in developed countries but not in developing countries. However, Ram and 
Zhang (2002) and Alfaro et al. (2004) find that human capital is unimportant in facilitating the   10 
effect  of  FDI  on  growth.  Instead,  Alfaro  et  al.  (2004)  provide  financial  development 
explanation.  
 
A number or recent papers have assessed the impact that the financial markets have 
on FDI spillovers. For instance, Hermes and Lensink (2003), Alfaro et al.(2004), and Durham 
(2004)  find  that  the  success  of  technology  spillovers  requires  well-functioning  financial 
institutions.  A  more  developed  financial  system  positively  contributes  to  the  process  of 
technology diffusion associated with FDI. Financial markets reduce the risks inherent in the 
investment made by domestic firms seeking to imitate the MNCs’ technologies or to upgrade 
the qualifications of their employees. They find that both well functioning banks and stock 
markets are important pre-conditions for FDI to have a positive impact on growth. 
 
Most of the studies that explored the impact of absorptive capacity on the relationship 
between FDI and growth have relied on the use of a linear regression model augmented with 
interaction terms
4.  A major limitation of this type of specifications is that they impose à priori 
restrictions on the effect of FDI on growth. The interaction term restricts the effect of FDI on 
growth  to  increase  (or  decrease)  monotonically  with  absorptive  capacity.
5  One  major 
implication from this specification is that the presence of significant and positive interaction 
terms  implies  that  all  countries  benefit  from  FDI  inflows  but  with  different  magnitude, 
depending on the level of absorptive capacity. Although this specification can greatly expand 
our understanding of the effect of FDI, it rules out a more dynamic possibility where a certain 
level of absorptive capacity is required before FDI can have any effect on output growth. World 
Bank (2001) points out that only countries with the greatest absorptive capacity will benefit 
from foreign capital. In contrast, the benefits is muted (or non-existence) in countries with low 
absorptive  capacity.  This  implies  that  a  minimum  level  of  absorptive  capacity  is  required 
before host countries can benefit from FDI-generated externalities. In other words, the positive 
effect of FDI on growth is likely to ‘kick in’ only after a minimum required level of absorptive 
capacity has been attained.  
 
Although  the  documented  link  between  FDI  and  growth  is  weak,  evidence  on  the 
effect of institutional development on growth is more convincing. Institutions can be defined as 
the rules of the game in a society by which the members of a society interact and shape the 
economic behaviour of agents (North, 1990). A number of recent papers provide empirical 
                                                 
4 Some studies, including Blomstrom et al. (1994) and Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), have used exogenous sample 
splitting in which sample is divided into sub-sample according to some perceived proxies for absorptive capacity. 
Hansen (2000) demonstrates that this procedure can run into serious inference problems.  
5 In the linear specification, an interaction term constructed as a product of FDI and absorptive capacity indicator is 
added as an additional regressor in growth regression. The importance of absorptive capacity in mediating FDI effect 
on growth is established when the interaction term is positive and statistically significant.     11 
evidence that confirms the importance of institutions for economic development. For instance, 
Demetriades and Law (2006) show that better institutions are more important than financial 
developments in explaining output per capita in low-income countries. Rodrik et al. (2004)  
show that quality of institutions overrides geography and integration (international trade) in 
explaining  cross-country  income  levels.  Easterly  and  Levine  (1997)  note  that  conventional 
factors,  such  as  physical  and  human  capital  and  labor  supply,  do  not  explain  completely 
growth in Africa and instead emphasize institutional explanations. Knack and Keefer (1995) 
find a positive and significant relationship between institutional development (i.e. bureaucracy, 
property rights, and political stability) and economic growth.  
 
Recently, a number of papers have examined the links between economic freedom 
and growth. Economic freedom can be defined as the ‘absence of government coercion or 
constraint on the production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the 
extent  necessary  for  citizens  to  protect  and  maintain  liberty’    (HeritageFoundation,  2004). 
Economists agree that economic freedom, along with political freedom and civil liberties, is 
one  of  the  pillars  of  a  country's  institutional  structure.  Since  the  time  of  Adam  Smith, 
economists have recognized that the freedom to choose and supply resources, competition in 
business, free trade with others and secure property rights are key elements for economic 
development. Economic freedoms are a reflection of institutional arrangement, which makes 
business  operations  and  the  realization  of  business  ideas  easier  for  entrepreneurs  and 
managers. A large number of papers suggest that economic freedom is important in explaining 
cross-country differences in economic performance [see de Haan et al. (2006) for a survey]. 
However, the effect may differ across various components of economic freedom (Heckelman 
and Stroup, 2000, Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2002). 
 
The argument for the importance of economic freedom for economic growth is not 
without criticism. One popular criticism is that why China and more generally several other 
developing nations, have high growth rates but relatively low level of economic freedom. China 
started with very high poverty and very low economic freedom. In 2007, China's economic 
freedom measures just 54 percent. But in 1977, the measure would have been near zero. By 
quietly setting aside Maoist dogma in 1978, the introduction of property rights for small farmers 
by Deng Xiaopeng initiated a revolution in economic freedom. This reform had has dramatic 
and  positive  effects  on  the  Chinese  economy.  Over  the  past  30  years,  China's  economic 
freedom has grown by 1 or 2 percentage points every year, and the economy grew along with 
it. Output growth may slow if the reforms do not continue.
6 
                                                 
6 Other criticisms relate to the way the index is constructed and the inclusion of dubious variables. Refer to de Haan et 
al. (2006) for a detailed discussion on these issues. Despite these criticisms, the index has been a popular choice 
among researchers because literature has not come up with a better alternative.    12 
 
With  this  backdrop,  this  study  makes  a  novel  contribution  to  the  FDI  literature  by 
exploring  the  impact  of  economic  freedom  as  a  channel  via  which  FDI  impacts  economic 
growth.  This  is  achieved  through  the  use  of  a  flexible  nonlinear  econometric  specification 
which explicitly allows the data to dictate the presence of economic freedom induced threshold 
effects in the relationship linking FDI and growth.   
 
2.3  Model specification 
 
The following specification is motivated by the models developed in Borensztein et al. (1998) 
and Ram and Zhang (2002) and forms the basis for the empirical models that are estimated in 
this paper 
 
( ) i i i i i i i o i FDI EF LIFE Y I GPOP RYPC GROWTH ε + α + α + α + α + α + α + α = 6 5 4 3 2 1 / 76      (2.1) 
 
where, GROWTH is the growth rate of real GDP over the period 1976-2005, RYPC76 is the 
logarithm  of  real  GDP  per  capita  at  the  beginning  of  1976  (initial  income),  GPOP  is  the 
population growth rate, I/Y is investment-output ratio, LIFE is life expectancy (i.e. a proxy for 
human capital), EF is the index of economic freedom, and FDI is the FDI inflows-output ratio.  
 
 
2.4  Estimation procedures 
 
2.4.1  Interaction specification 
  
In  order  to  assess  the  impact  of  economic  freedom  on  the  relationship  between  FDI  and 
growth we initially follow the recent literature on absorptive capacity (e.g. Borenzstein et al., 
1998; Alfaro et al., 2004; Durham, 2004) and proceed by introducing a simple interaction term 
to a specification such as 2.1. The interaction term is given by the product of FDI and EF and 
to ensure that the interaction term does not proxy for FDI or the level of economic freedom, 
both variables are also included in the regression. The model may be written as follows: 
 
( ) + β + β + β + β + β + β + β = i i i i i i o i FDI EF LIFE Y I GPOP RYPC GROWTH 6 5 4 3 2 1 / 76  
           i i i EF FDI ε + × β ] [ 7                        (2.2) 
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With this specification, we rely on  7 β  to establish the contingency effect of FDI/Y on 
growth. The total effect of FDI on output growth will be given by  i EF 7 6 ˆ ˆ β + β . Since the effect 
of FDI on growth is a function of  i EF , the presence of a significant and positive  7 ˆ β implies that 
FDI is beneficial for all countries but its impact on growth differs across countries depending 
on the level of economic freedom. In other words, the higher the level of economic freedom 
the greater will be the impact of FDI on growth. Clearly, this specification forces the impact of 
FDI  on  growth  to  take  a  particular  functional  form  such  that  it  increases  (or  decrease) 
monotonically with economic freedom. However, this specification is unable to capture a more 
dynamic FDI-growth relationship where the impact of FDI on growth exists only after a certain 
level of economic freedom has been attained, and this is precisely the type of phenomenon 
that we are interested in.  
 
 
2.4.2  Threshold regression 
 
In this paper we argue that a model that is particularly well suited to capture the presence of 
contingency effects and to offer a rich way of modeling the influence of economic freedom on 
the dynamics of FDI and growth is the following threshold specification:  
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where EF (i.e. economic freedom index) is the threshold variable used to split the sample into 
regimes or groups and  γ is the unknown threshold parameter. This specification allows the 
role of FDI to be different depending on whether EF is below or above some unknown level  γ . 
The impact of FDI on growth will be 
1
5 θ (
2
5 θ ) for countries in low (high) regime. Obviously, 
under the hypothesis 
2 1 θ = θ  the model becomes linear and reduces to (2.1).  The model 
such as (2.3) has been used in the analysis of trade-growth nexus (Khoury and Savvides, 
2006), finance-growth nexus (Deidda and Fattouh, 2002), knowledge spillovers (Falvey  et al., 
2007), among others. 
 
The starting point of our investigation is to formally test the null hypothesis of linearity 
2 1 : θ = θ o H  against the threshold model in (2.3). This is a non-standard inference problem 
since  under  o H   the  threshold  parameter  γ   is  unidentified  and  thus  the  Wald  or  LM  test 
statistics will not have their conventional chi-square limits (see Hansen, 1996; Hansen, 2000).   14 
Instead, inferences are conducted by computing a Wald or LM statistic for each possible value 
of  γ and  subsequently  basing  inferences  on  the  supremum  of  the  Wald  or  LM  across  all 
possible  γ ’s.  The limiting distribution of this supremum statistic is non-standard and depends 
on  numerous  model  specific  nuisance  parameters.  Since  tabulations  are  not  possible 
inferences are conducted via a model based bootstrap whose validity and properties have 
been established in (Hansen, 1996). It is also worth pointing out that the estimation of (2.3) is 
performed via conditional least squares since given  γ  the model is linear in its parameters. 
Once an estimate of  γ  has been obtained (as the minimiser of the residual sum of squares 
computed across all possible values of  γ ) estimates of the slope parameters follow trivially as 
( ) γ θ ˆ ˆ .  
 
To sum up, our goal here is to first test for the presence of threshold effects and if the 
latter are supported by the data to estimate (2.3) so as to assess the statistical significance of 
1
5 θ  and 
2
5 θ .  
 
 
2.5  Data set 
 
The data set consists of cross-country observations for 84 countries over the 1976 – 2005 
period.
7  FDI  figures  represent  the  net  inflows  of  foreign  investment  to  acquire  a  lasting 
management interest (i.e. 10 percent or more of voting stock) in domestic enterprises, and is 
expressed as a ratio to GDP.  
 
There  are  two  main  sources  of  economic  freedom  indices.  The  Fraser  Institute 
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2006) and the Heritage Foundation. Both indices quantify aspects 
such  as  government  intervention,  distortion  in  the  economy,  the  degree  of  openness,  and 
various aspects of market regulations. In many respects the index of the Heritage Foundation 
is similar to the Fraser institute (Holmes et al., 1998). However, the index from the Heritage 
Foundation is available only for a shorter period of time. For this reason, we employ the index 
from  the  Fraser  Institute.  The  index  is  based  on  three  key  notions:  individual  choice  and 
voluntary transaction, free competition, personal and property protection. The index has five 
underlying  components,  namely  government  intervention,  legal  structure  and  security  of 
property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade with foreigners and regulation of 
credit, labour and business. The first component indicates the extent to which countries rely on 
individual choice and market rather than political mandate in the allocation resources, goods 
                                                 
7 Refer to Appendix 2.1 for a list of countries.    15 
and services. The second component measures the protection of persons and their rightfully 
acquired  assets.  It  consists  of  several  measures  such  as  rule  of  law,  security  of  property 
rights, an independent judiciary and an impartial court system. The third component measures 
an access to sound money. This is particularly important for economic agents as the absence 
of sound money may undermine gains from trade. A high and volatile rate of inflation distorts 
relative prices and makes it difficult for individuals and business to plan for the future. The 
freedom of exchange across national boundaries is an important element of EF, and the fourth 
measure is the freedom to exchange internationally. Finally, the fifth component measures 
various  regulatory  restraints  that  limit  freedom  of  exchange  in  credit,  labour  and  product 
markets. The index is scaled from 0 to 10 with 10 representing the highest level of freedom. 
Table 2.1 provides the summary of data sources.  
 
 
Table 2.1: Sources of Data  
 
Variables  Sources  Unit of Measurement 
     
Foreign Direct Investment  World Development Indicators  % of GDP 
Real GDP  Penn World Table  PPP price 
Real GDP per capita  Penn World Table  PPP price 
Life expectancy   World Development Indicators  Years 
Population   World Development Indicators  Growth rates 
Investment ratio  Penn World Table  % of GDP 
Economic Freedom  Fraser Institute  Index ( 0 – 10 scale ) 
     
 
 
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for the three key variables in this analysis: FDI 
(over GDP), growth rates of real GDP and the index of economic freedom. Statistics are based 
on data averaged over the 1976-2005 period. One apparent feature of these statistics is that 
there  is  considerable  variation  in  the  share  of  FDI  in  GDP  across  countries,  ranging  from 
0.06% in Japan to 5.32% in Trinidad and Tobago. GDP growth also shows similar levels of 
variation, ranging from -1.23% for the Dem. Rep of Congo to 6.32 % for Malaysia. Finally, the 
economic freedom index ranges from 3.71 (Dem. Rep of Congo) to 8.01 (United States of 
America).  
 
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
         
FDI/Y  1.541  1.095  0.060  5.327 
Growth rates  2.925  1.374  -1.233  6.320 
Economic Freedom Index  5.861  0.968  3.710  8.010 
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2.6  Empirical results 
 
This section discusses our empirical results which are presented in Tables 2.3–2.7. Table 2.3 
reports  a  preliminary  analysis  of  the  effects  of  FDI  and  EF  on  output  growth.  Table  2.4 
presents coefficient estimates obtained from the interaction specification. Table 2.5 reports the 
estimated coefficients obtained using our threshold specification in which economic freedom is 
used  as  a  threshold  variable.  Table  2.6  reports  the  estimated  coefficients  obtained  using 
instrumental variable threshold regression. Finally, Table 2.7 presents the results of testing the 
threshold effects using each of the index components.  
 
The first step of our analysis is to estimate Equation (2.1). The results are presented 
in Table 2.3. As shown in the table, FDI alone has no direct effect on output growth as the 
estimated coefficient is insignificant at the usual level.
8 This finding is consistent with Alfaro et 
al. (2004) and Durham (2004) who also find that FDI has no direct impact on output growth.
9 
This  nicely  summarizes  the  problem  that  exists  in  the  literature:  although  various  models 
provides strong basis for expecting FDI to positively affect growth, empirical evidence shows 
that such impact is  non-existent. This ambiguity is what forms part of the motivation for this 
paper. Additionally, the coefficient on economic freedom is positive and significant at the 5 
percent  level.  This  is  consistent  with  the  previous  literature  as  surveyed  in  de  Haan  et 
al.(2006). However, the estimated coefficient on investment ratio is insignificant, in contrast to 
the findings reported in previous literature (see Durlauf et al., 2005). One possible explanation 
may  be  due  to  the  potential  effect  of  outlier  observations.  As  we  will  show  later  (in  the 
discussion on the robustness of the interaction specification), the coefficient on investment 
ratio turns out to be significant when the outliers are removed (see Appendix 2.2).
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 We have tested various configurations and the findings remain robust.  
9  An  alternative  explanation  is  provided  by  Blonigen  and  Wang  (2005)  who  argue  that  inappropriate  pooling  of 
developed countries and developing countries is responsible for producing insignificant estimated effect of FDI on 
output growth. The authors find that FDI only works in developing countries but requires a certain level of human 
capital. Nevertheless, they find that the direct effect of FDI on growth is non-existence which is consistent with our 
empirical results.   
10 However, the variable is insignificant in models that include private credit. This may be due to a high correlation 
between investment and private credit as most investment would require external financing (measured by private 
credit).   17 
Table 2.3: FDI and Growth 
 
  Coefficient  S.e.  p-value 
       
Initial Income  -0.012  0.002  0.000 
Population growth  0.450  0.204  0.031      
Investment ratio   0.032  0.028  0.258     
Life expectancy  0.058  0.012  0.000      
FDI  0.062  0.132  0.641     
Economic Freedom   0.004  0.001  0.030      
Constant  -0.147  0.046  0.002     
       
       
R
2  0.47     
Number of observations  84     
       
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1976–2005). Initial income is the log of percapita income 
in 1976. All other regressors are the average values over 1976-2005 period. Life expectancy is in the logarithmic form.  
 
 
 
2.6.1  Interaction specification 
 
The next step of our analysis involves estimating the relevant specification 2.2. It is worth 
noting that the addition of an interaction term may lead to multicollinearity problems as the 
interaction term tends to be strongly correlated with the original variables used to construct 
them  (Darlington,  1990).  In  order  to  alleviate  this  problem,  the  interaction  term  is 
orthogonalised using the following two-step procedure: First, the interaction term FDIxEF is 
regressed on the FDI and EF variables. Second, the residuals from the first step regression 
are used to represent the interaction term (Burill, 2007). As shown in Table 2.4, the estimated 
coefficient  on  FDI  remains  insignificant.  However,  the  interaction  term  is  positive  and 
statistically significant at the 5% level ( 293 . 0 ˆ
7 = β ). This suggests that the marginal impact of 
FDI on growth is increasing in the level of economic freedom. This finding is consistent with 
other studies who also find that the growth-effect of FDI depends on other intervening factors 
(Alfaro et al., 2004, Borensztein et al., 1998). 
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Table 2.4: Linear interaction model 
 
  Coefficient  S.e.  p-value 
       
Initial Income  -0.012  0.002  0.000     
Population growth  0.445  0.185  0.019      
Investment ratio   0.027  0.026  0.308     
Life expectancy  0.060  0.011  0.000      
FDI  0.055  0.122      0.650     
Economic Freedom (EF)   0.004  0.001  0.031       
FDI x EF  0.293  0.112  0.011      
Constant  -0.157  0.042  0.000     
       
       
R
2  0.51     
Number of observations  84     
       
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1976–2005). Initial income is the log of percapita income 
in 1976. All other regressors are the average values over 1976-2005 period. Life expectancy is in the logarithmic form. 
Interaction term is orthogonalised to remove multicollinearity effect. S.e. denotes heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
error.   
 
 
We  perform  several  sensitivity  analyses  to  ascertain  the  robustness  of  the  above 
results (see Appendix 2.2). First, the possible effect of outlier observations on the estimation 
results is assessed. It is worth noting that a single or a small group of observations which is 
significantly  different  from  others  can  make  a  large  difference  in  the  estimation  results. 
Following a strategy advocated by Besley et al. (1980), the so-called DFITS statistic is used to 
flag countries with high combinations of residual and leverage statistics. The test suggests 
Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  Cyprus,  Gabon,  Haiti,  Jamaica,  and  Rwanda  are  potential 
outliers.
11 Interestingly, the exclusions of outliers did not alter our results. The coefficient on 
FDI remains insignificant but the ones on EF and FDIxEF retain their statistical significance 
and signs. This provides further support to the importance of economic freedom for output 
growth. A second issue of robustness concerns is the interaction between FDI and financial 
market indicator since this was shown to have a significant positive effect on output growth in 
earlier research.
12 For this purpose, an interaction term constructed as a product of FDI and 
private  sector  credit  (PRC)  is  added  to  the  estimated  model.  PRC  is  used  because  it 
accurately reflects the efficiency of banking sector in the allocation of funds and it has been a 
preferred measure of financial development (Beck et al., 2000).
13 The results show that while 
PRC registers significant positive effect on growth, the interaction between the two does not. 
Importantly, adding private credit does not change the significance of EF and FDIxEF. As a 
final  robustness  check,  the  interaction  between  FDI  and  life  expectancy  is  added  to  the 
                                                 
11 Refer to Appendix 2.3 for the calculation of DFITS statistic.  
12 For example Alfaro et al. (2004) and Hermes and Lensink (2003).  
13 PRC measures the value of credit issued by financial intermediaries to the private sector and is expressed as a ratio 
to GDP. PRC isolates credit issued to the private sector, as opposed to credit issued to governments, government 
agencies, and public enterprises. Furthermore, it excludes credit issued by the central bank.   19 
estimated  model  since  previous  studies  showed  that  human  capital  is  important  for  FDI 
spillovers.
14 Although life expectancy remains strongly correlated with growth, the interaction 
with  FDI  shows  no impact  on  output  growth.  However, this  paper  uses  a  different  human 
capital proxy for a slightly different time period and therefore the finding may not be completely 
comparable with previous findings. The overall findings suggest that there is robust evidence 
suggesting that the level of economic freedom in the host country is an important pre-condition 
for FDI to affect growth. 
 
The results of our interaction specification presented above suggest that the effect of 
FDI on output growth is conditional on the level of freedom. However, the interaction term 
restricts  the  impact  of  FDI  on  growth  to  be  monotonically  increasing  (or  decreasing)  with 
economic  freedom.  This  finding  implies  that  all  countries  benefit  from  FDI  inflows  but  its 
magnitude differs across countries depending on the level of economic freedom. The higher 
the level of economic freedom, the greater is the impact of FDI on growth. However, it may be 
the case that a certain level of economic freedom is needed before FDI can have any impact 
on growth. This suggests the need for a different modelling strategy, and threshold regression 
provides an excellent alternative to consider.  
 
 
2.6.2  Threshold regression 
 
Before we formally test for the threshold effects, there is one issue that need to be addressed 
here. One problem faced by empirical economists when estimating a model like (2.3) is that 
the theory  is not explicit enough about what variables should be allowed to switch across 
regimes. For example, some studies allow all variables to switch (e.g. Deidda and Fattouh, 
2002) while others allow only the variable on interest to switch (e.g. Falvey et al., 2007). To 
deal  with  this  uncertainty,  we  rely  on  model  selection  process  to  determine  the  optimal 
specification. As Kapetanios (2001) point out, this approach provides a clear-cut solution as 
one  model  is  always  accepted  as  the  preferred  specification  at  the  end  of  the  selection 
process.  
 
For this purpose, we utilize information criterion due to Gonzalo and Pitarakis (2002). 
The authors propose a sequential model selection approach for threshold model where the 
selection of the ‘best’ model is made via the minimization of a penalized objective function. 
The function has two components. The first component is a monotonic function of the model 
                                                 
14For example Borensztein et al. (1998) and Xu (2000).   20 
dimension and the second component penalizes the changes in the first component caused by 
the increase in the model dimension. The objective function is given as follows: 
 
 
k
N
S IC T
λ
+ = log                             (2.4) 
 
 
where,  T S is the concentrated sum of square errors, λ is a deterministic function of the sample 
size,  N  is the number of cross-section, and k is a number of estimated parameters. It is clear 
that  an  increase  in  the  number  of  regime  will  lead  to  a  reduction  in  T S .  However,  this 
reduction  will  be  penalized  due  to  the  resulting  increase  in  the  number  of  estimated 
parameters.  
 
To  find  the  ‘best’  model,  we  calculate  the  information  criterion  (2.4)  for  various 
possible  specifications,  ranging  from  a  model  that  allows  all  regressors  to  switch  across 
regimes (i.e. Equation [2.3]) to a model that allow only FDI to vary. We also evaluate several 
linear  models  and  models  with  smaller  number  of  regressors.  In  total,  162  models  were 
estimated (see Appendix 2.3). Based on the AIC and SBC,  λ  is set to equal 2 and lnN, 
respectively. The AIC results indicates that Equation (2.3) is the optimal specification while the 
SBC point to a linear model that includes initial income, life expectancy, and FDI. However, 
the latter is mis-specified as far as FDI-growth specification is concerned as it omits two core 
regressors, i.e. investment ratio and population growth. Therefore, based on the AIC results, 
we use Equation (2.3) as a basis for testing the threshold effects.  
 
We  next  examine  the  threshold  regression  model  (2.3).  Our  goal  is  to  determine 
whether the impact of FDI on growth can be characterized as a nonlinear process where the 
impact of FDI on growth could be positive, negative, or neutral depending on some unknown 
critical level of economic freedom. The significance of the threshold parameter  γ ˆ  is evaluated 
using  bootstrap  methods  with  1000  replications  and  10%  trimming  percentage.  Results  in 
Table 2.5 show that the threshold estimate of EF is 5.6517 with a p-value of 0.024. Thus, the 
sample can be split into two EF groups (i.e. low-EF and high-EF groups).
15 For the high-EF 
group,  the  coefficient  on  FDI  is  positive  and  significant  while  for  the  low-EF  group  it  is 
negative. This suggests that there exist a nonlinear pattern in which FDI affect growth. The 
effect “kicks in” only after the level of economic freedom exceeds the threshold level of 5.6517. 
For countries below this critical level, FDI exerts a negative effect on growth. This finding is 
consistent with the view that freedom of economic activity promotes the diffusion of technology 
                                                 
15 Refer to Appendix 2.1 for countries classification into high- and low-EF groups.   21 
from MNCs to domestic firms. It is worth noting that population growth and investment ratio on 
output  growth  also  display  threshold-type  nonlinearities.  Both  variables  are  found  to  be 
positive and significant only in the high-EF regime. These findings exemplify that freedom of 
economic activity does not only facilitate FDI spillovers but also the efficiency of domestic 
inputs. This is consistent with de Haan et al. (2006) who argue that market liberalisation that 
foster freedom of economic activity enhances efficient allocation of resources. 
 
 
Table 2.5: Threshold regression (1976-2005) 
 
  Low-EF (EF≤5.6517)    High-EF (EF>5.6517) 
  Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat    Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat 
               
Initial income  -0.011  0.002  -6.249     -0.009  0.004  -2.422 
Population Growth  -0.235  0.379  -0.618     0.946  0.223  4.250 
Investment ratio  -0.028  0.027  -1.058     0.133  0.026  5.172 
Life Expectancy  0.069  0.013  5.180     0.036  0.022  1.674 
FDI  -0.379  0.175  -2.160     0.350  0.106  3.320 
               
Threshold estimate   5.6517          
LM-test for no threshold  
(p-value) 
29.145 
(0.024) 
 
 
     
 
               
Number of countries  40        44     
R
2  0.52        0.62     
               
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1976–2005). Initial income is the logarithm of per capita 
income at the beginning of 1976. All other regressors are the average values over 1976-2005 period. Life expectancy 
is in the logarithmic form. EF is economic freedom index used as a threshold variable.  p-value was bootstrapped with 
1000 replications and 10% trimming percentage. Standard errors (s.e) are corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 
Several  sensitivity  checks  are  implemented  to  gauge  the  robustness  of  the  above 
findings. First, the LM test is used to verify whether each group (i.e. high EF and low EF 
groups) can be split further into sub-groups. For both groups, the split produced insignificant p-
values of 0.162 and 0.573 respectively for low- and high-EF groups (see Appendix 2.5). Thus, 
there is reasonably good evidence for two-regime specification. Second, the sensitivity of the 
p-values is assessed using different trimming percentage and bootstrap replications. The p-
values  are  re-calculated  for  different  combinations  of  trimming  percentages  and  bootstrap 
replications. Interestingly, our results show that the null of no threshold can be consistently 
rejected (see Appendix 2.6). Third, we assess the sensitivity of the results to different time 
period. We choose the 1981-2005 period because most countries began to ease restriction on 
FDI flows in the early 1980s. This may well capture the period during which FDI flows is an 
important element of globalization. The test results show that the threshold effects remain 
intact as the null of no threshold can be rejected at the 1% level of significance (see Appendix   22 
2.7).  Interestingly,  we  find  that the  estimate  of the threshold  parameter  γ ˆ   is  quite  similar. 
Fourth, the growth rates of the EF index is used as a threshold variable as some studies show 
that changes in EF also matters for output growth. Our results show that there is no difference 
in the impact of FDI across high- and low-growth groups (see Appendix 2.8). The coefficients 
on FDI are positive and significant in both groups. Finally, we replicate the analysis using the 
economic freedom index from the Heritage Foundations and find that the threshold effects of 
FDI on output growth remain intact (see Appendix 2.9). In short, there is strong support for the 
importance of economic freedom in fostering the impact of FDI on output growth, where only 
countries that have exceeded the threshold level of economic freedom benefited from FDI-
generated externalities.  
 
 
2.6.3  Endogeneity Issue 
 
It  should  be  highlighted  that  one  important  underlying  assumption  of  the  Hansen’s  (2000) 
methodology  is  that  all  regressors  are  exogenous.  However,  this  assumption  is  rather 
restrictive  for  FDI  because  FDI  itself  may  be  influenced  by  innovations  in  the  stochastic 
process  governing  growth  rates.  For  instance,  any  omitted  variables  that  raise  the  rate  of 
return on capital will also increase both the growth rate and the inflow of FDI simultaneously. 
This suggests a possible  correlation between FDI and the error term, which could lead to 
biased estimated coefficients. Therefore, it could be that the strong impact of FDI on growth 
that we found for the high-EF group is due to an endogenous determination of FDI.  
 
To deal with this problem, we deploy an instrumental variables threshold regression 
due to Caner and Hansen (2004). This estimator is similar to Hansen’s (2000) procedure in 
many aspects except that the instrumental variables are used to remove endogeneity bias. 
One  limitation  of  this  estimator  is  that  the  theory  for  deriving  p-values  for  testing  the 
significance  of  the  threshold  parameter  γ ˆ   has  not  yet  been  developed.  The  estimation 
involves three important steps. The first step is to estimate the predicted values of FDI using 
instrumental  variables  by  least  square  estimation.  Following  Alfaro  et  al.  (2004)  and 
Borensztein et al. (1998), the lagged values of FDI (i.e. average of FDI over the 1971-1975 
period) and total GDP are used as instrumental variables.
16 
17 Next, using the predicted values 
                                                 
16 The fundamental problem with instrumental variable regression is that there are no ideal instruments available. A 
good  instrument  would  be  a  variable  which  is  highly  correlated  with  FDI  but  not  with  the  error  term  in  these 
regressions. We use lagged FDI is because many studies (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992) show that FDI is a self-
reinforcing, i.e. existing stock of foreign investment is a significant determinant of current investment decisions. We 
include total GDP as instrument because it represents the effect of market size. The growth-driven FDI hypothesis 
emphasizes the importance of market size for attracting FDI (Markusen et al., 1996). Other things being equal, a 
country market size (as measured by GDP) rises with economic growth and thus encouraging MNCs to increase their 
investment.    23 
of FDI in the first step plus all other regressors, we obtain  γ ˆ  as a minimiser of the residual 
sum  of  squares  computed  across  all  possible  values  of  γ .  Finally,  we  estimate the  slope 
parameters  by  two-stage  least  square  estimator  on  the  split  samples  implied  by  γ ˆ .
18  The 
results of these exercises are summarized in Table 2.6. Although the threshold parameter  γ ˆ  is 
slightly lower than the one produced by the Hansen’s (2000) method, the previous conclusions 
remain unchanged as the coefficient on FDI is positive and significant only for the high-EF 
group. These results suggest that the strong link between FDI and growth for the high-EF 
group is not due to simultaneity bias and can be interpreted as the effect of the exogenous 
component of FDI on output growth.  
 
 
Table 2.6: Instrumental variables threshold regression 
 
  Low-EF (EF≤5.1817)    High-EF (EF>5.1817) 
  Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat    Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat 
               
Initial income  -0.006  0.003  -2.188    -0.013  0.002  -5.049 
Population Growth  -1.401  0.830  -1.687    0.487  0.208  2.339 
Investment ratio  -0.001  0.034  -0.024    0.134  0.026  5.077 
Life Expectancy  0.025  0.007  3.465    0.025  0.006  4.459 
FDI  0.512  0.884  0.580    0.320  0.177  1.805 
               
Threshold estimate   5.1817         
               
Number of countries  23        61     
               
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1976–2005). Initial income is the log of percapita income 
in 1976. All other regressors are the average values over 1976-2005 period. Life expectancy is in the logarithmic form. 
The lagged values of FDI and a log value of total GDP are used as instruments for FDI. 
 
 
 
2.6.4  Threshold regression using EF index components 
 
Our final analysis is to examine which components of economic freedom index are important 
in  linking  FDI  and  growth.  The  use of  an  aggregate  index,  which  is constructed  using  40 
independent variables, may be less useful for policy formulation purposes. These variables, 
however, can be grouped into five major components namely, government size (GOVT), legal 
structure  and  security  of  property  rights  (LEGAL),  access  to  sound  money  (SMONEY), 
freedom to trade with foreigners (TRADE) and market regulations (REGULATIONS). The next 
                                                                                                                                             
17 It is also worth pointing out that this procedure relies on the assumption that the threshold variable is exogenous. 
Theoretically, it is possible that the level of economic freedom increases with higher growth and thus suggesting 
potential endogeneity of the threshold variable. However, the theory for the case of endogenous threshold variable 
has not been developed. Future works in econometrics would certainly fill this gap. 
18 Alternatively, one can use generalized method-of-moments estimator.    24 
logical step is therefore to examine which index components are important in the FDI-growth 
relation. The finding on the interplay between FDI, growth and different aspects of freedom 
should be more useful for policymakers in devising specific policies to facilitate FDI spillovers. 
Table 2.7 presents our empirical results and the upshot of this analysis is that GOVT, LEGAL, 
SMONEY and REGULATIONS are found to be important intervening factors for FDI to have 
positive impacts on growth. The LM tests of no threshold suggest that there are threshold 
effects. The coefficients on FDI for the high-EF group are positive and significant while for the 
low-EF group they are either negative or insignificant. In the case of TRADE, the LM test 
reveals that the null cannot be rejected at the usual level. Our findings are consistent with 
others [e.g. Heckelman and Stroup (2000), Carlsson and Lundstrom (2002)] who reveal that 
economic freedom has different effects across components.  
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Table 2.7: Threshold regression by components 
 
  Low-EF (EF≤ γ )    High-EF (EF>γ ) 
  Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat    Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat 
Panel A: EF = GOVT 
Initial income  -0.008  0.002  -3.572    -0.014  0.003  -5.446 
Population Growth  0.255  0.210  1.213    0.426  0.312  1.367 
Investment ratio  -0.007  0.029  -0.231    0.097  0.030  3.201 
Life Expectancy  0.071  0.016  4.333    0.042  0.013  3.366 
FDI  -0.217  0.174  -1.247    0.293  0.128  2.282 
               
Threshold estimate   5.3131          
LM-test (p-value)  21.312 (0.097)         
               
Panel B: EF = LEGAL 
Initial income  -0.011  0.002  -5.430    -0.017  0.003  -5.774 
Population Growth  0.337  0.360  0.936    0.749  0.185  4.056 
Investment ratio  0.001  0.028  0.045    0.050  0.027  1.819 
Life Expectancy  0.065  0.015  4.240    0.096  0.018  5.381 
FDI  -0.479  0.239  -1.998    0.221  0.095  2.327 
               
Threshold estimate   4.4595          
LM-test (p-value)  30.750 (0.034)         
               
Panel C: EF= SMONEY 
Initial income  -0.008  0.001  -5.358    -0.022  0.003  -6.752 
Population Growth  0.017  0.333  0.050    0.395  0.181  2.183 
Investment ratio  0.020  0.039  0.511    0.073  0.017  4.342 
Life Expectancy  0.048  0.013  3.702    0.119  0.018  6.754 
FDI  -0.406  0.186  -2.183    0.289  0.089  3.248 
               
Threshold estimate   6.7769          
LM-test (p-value)  35.796 (0.002)         
               
Panel D: EF= TRADE 
Initial income  -0.011  0.002  -4.966    -0.013  0.003  -4.630 
Population Growth  0.076  0.268  0.284    0.837  0.184  4.542 
Investment ratio  -0.006  0.028  -0.203    0.108  0.039  2.798 
Life Expectancy  0.065  0.012  5.596    0.009  0.029  0.310 
FDI  -0.006  0.153  -0.041    0.198  0.155  1.276 
               
Threshold estimate   6.7684          
LM-test (p-value)  16.899 (0.351)         
               
Panel E: EF = REGULATIONS 
Initial income  -0.012  0.003  -3.635    -0.010  0.002  -4.409 
Population Growth  -0.654  0.702  -0.932    0.762  0.226  3.364 
Investment ratio  -0.013  0.035  -0.359    0.077  0.030  2.544 
Life Expectancy  0.085  0.017  4.946    0.053  0.015  3.579 
FDI  -0.986  0.295  -3.337    0.174  0.101  1.718 
               
Threshold estimate   4.9220          
LM-test (p-value)  28.511 (0.055)         
               
 
Notes: p-values were bootstrapped with 1000 replications and 10% trimming percentage. Standard errors (s.e) are 
corrected  for  heteroskedasticity.  GOVT=government  size,  LEGAL=legal  structure  and  security  of  property  rights, 
SMONEY=access to sound money, TRADE= freedom to trade with foreigners REGULATIONS=market regulations. 
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2.7 Conclusions  
 
The ambiguous effect of FDI on growth has been largely documented. One key explanation of 
this ambiguity appears to be the failure to accommodate the absorptive capacity of the host 
country  in  the  FDI-growth  specification.  It  has  been  widely  recognized  that  FDI  spillovers 
require sufficient absorptive capacity of new technologies to be available in the host countries. 
Although absorptive capacity may embody different institutional and economic factors, in this 
paper we considered a broader indicator, that we called “economic freedom”. It presents the 
advantage of encompassing those advanced in the literature, and we show that the impact of 
FDI  on  host  countries’  growth  is  contingent  on  it.  Our  explanation  is  that  many  obstacles 
limiting the efficient diffusion of new technologies have been removed in countries that have 
promoted  enough  freedom  of  economic  activity.  Methodologically,  the  contribution  of  this 
paper consists in adopting a regression model based on the concept of threshold effects. This 
novel estimator allows FDI to exert a non-linear effect on output growth and is flexible enough 
to accommodate the possibility that FDI affects growth only once a certain level of economic 
freedom has been attained. Based on cross-country observations from 84 countries over the 
1976-2005 period, two important conclusions emerge. Firstly, FDI has no direct (linear) effect 
on output growth. Secondly, there are threshold effects in the FDI-growth relationship which 
are induced by economic freedom. More precisely, we find that only countries whose level of 
economic  freedom  has  exceeded  a  given  threshold  have  benefited  from  FDI-generated 
externalities. In countries below this critical level, FDI inflows have no beneficial effects on 
growth  (and  might  even  be  negative  in  some  cases).  This  finding  is  consistent  with  the 
growing  view  that  only  countries  with  a  sufficient  absorptive  capacity  benefit  from  MNCs 
presence. Firms which operate in countries that sufficiently promote economic freedom appear 
to be more able to absorb and adopt new technologies as well as other benefits associated 
with  FDI  inflows.  The  findings  are  robust  different  sensitivity  tests  as  well  as  to  potential 
endogeneity considerations.  
 
Our findings indicate that economic freedom mediates the positive impact of FDI on 
growth  and  thus  becomes  an  integral  element  to  a  country’s  absorptive  capacity.  FDI 
spillovers require active efforts by the government to stimulate technology diffusion. Therefore, 
it is essential for policymakers to weigh the cost of policies aimed at attracting FDI versus 
those seeking to improve the level of economic freedom. The adoption of policies pro-FDI 
should  go  hand  in  hand  with,  not  precede,  the  policies  that  aim  at  promoting  economic 
freedom.  However,  institutional  reform  towards  greater  freedom  of  economic  activity  is  a 
difficult process and requires a long-term commitment. It may be politically difficult in the short 
run, but the long-run economic benefits appear to outweigh short-run costs.     27 
3.  RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPILLOVERS: EVIDENCE FROM 
EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
It  is  now  widely  accepted  that  factor  accumulation  (including  human capital)  alone  cannot 
adequately  explain  differences  in  growth  performance  across  countries.  Productivity 
differences appear to be one of the key explanations in the recent literature, and technology 
plays a key role in determining productivity (Easterly and Levine, 2001, Hall and Jones, 1999). 
The neoclassical model treated technological progress as exogenous but recent endogenous 
growth  models  have  provided  novel  ways  of  dealing  with  technological  progress  (Romer, 
1990,  Grossman  and  Helpman,  1991,  Aghion  and  Howitt,  1992).  These  models  view 
innovation efforts, such as research and development (R&D), as a major source of productivity 
growth. Other factors, such as macroeconomic shocks, can affect productivity in the short and 
medium term but only improvements in technology can affect economic growth permanently in 
the long term.  
 
Investment in R&D has been highlighted as a major source of productivity growth. 
However, R&D has performed disproportionately across countries as only a handful of rich 
countries are responsible for the most of the world’s total R&D investment.
19 The variations in 
R&D  investment  across  countries  explain  a  large  part  of  cross-country  differences  in 
productivity, and countries are said to benefit enormously from international spillovers (Klenow 
and  Rodriguez-Clare,  2005).  In  fact,  the  major  source  of  productivity  growth  for  many 
countries came from abroad (Keller, 2004). This implies that a less developed country that 
lags behind the technology frontier and hardly invests in R&D can increase its productivity by 
interacting with R&D leaders. The theory suggests various channels by which technology can 
be transmitted across countries. Technology is embodied in capital and intermediate goods 
and the direct import of these is but one of the possible channels of transmission (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991, Caselli and Wilson, 2004, Eaton and Kortum, 2001). The theory also 
emphasizes  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  as  a  potential  channel  for  the  international 
transmission of technology (Findlay, 1978, Wang and Blomstrom, 1992). However, technology 
                                                 
19 The G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States) account for about 77% percent of 
the world's R&D spending in 2005. 
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diffusion  is  a  complex  process  and  may  require  the  recipients  to  have  a  certain  level  of 
absorptive capacity (Griffith et al., 2003).  
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the channels and magnitude of R&D 
spillovers from developed countries to East Asian countries. Most empirical studies of R&D 
spillovers  have  focused  on  the  R&D  effects  across  OECD  countries  and  relatively  little 
attention has been paid to whether less developed countries benefit from developed countries’ 
R&D.
20  East  Asian  countries  are  known  for  their  outward  orientation  policies.  The  trade 
promotion policies were first initiated in the 1970s, and during the 1980s these policies were 
launched on a full scale (Sakurai, 1995). As a result, trade openness (i.e. the ratio of exports 
plus imports to GDP) has increased from 37% in 1970 to 108% in 2005.
21  At the same time, 
many  East  Asian  economies  have  made  their  rules  and  regulations  surrounding  FDI  less 
restrictive  in  an  effort  to  attract  more  foreign  investment.  In  the  first  half  of  the  90s,  nine 
leading East Asian economies had attracted together more than US$ 200 billion in FDI flows 
(Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006).
22 The main investors in the region are the United States, Japan, and 
the European Union. Recently, outward FDI from Asian countries has been growing steadily 
as well. Asian multinational corporations (MNCs) have grown in size and have made their 
presence  abroad  strong  (UNCTAD,  2006).  Policy  reform  towards  greater  openness  has 
significantly contributed to the growth performance of these countries. In 1950, the average 
real GDP per capita of the East Asian countries was far below the world average as well as 
below the average of Latin-American economies, but it surpassed the world average by 1978, 
Latin America’s by 1983. In the mid-1980s, they began to grow faster relative to other regions, 
becoming the most dynamic region in the world (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006).  
 
This study is related to Coe et al. (1997) and Madden et al. (2001) who examine R&D 
spillovers from developed to developing countries via import channels. The work by Coe et al. 
(1997) examines 77 developing countries while Madden et al. (2001) evaluate R&D spillovers 
to six Asian countries. This study differs from the aforementioned surveys in several crucial 
aspects. First, in addition to the import channel that they analyze, two additional channels are 
examined here: inward and outward FDI. For East Asian countries, FDI has been an important 
element in their development strategy, so we cannot neglect it as one of the potential channels 
of knowledge transmission. Second, unlike Madden et al. (2001) who use R&D data for Asian 
countries from national statistical records, this study uses an R&D database compiled by the 
United  Nations  Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization  (UNESCO)  and  which  is 
harmonized across countries (the data is not subject to potential bias arising from differences 
                                                 
20 Keller (2004) provides an in-depth survey of the existing empirical evaluations of international R&D spillovers. 
21 Author’s own calculations using WDI data for China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and 
Thailand.  
22 These are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.   29 
in the R&D definition adopted by each country). Moreover, our sample of Asian countries is 
different  from  Madden  et  al.  (2001).  Thirdly,  we  formally  test  the  absorptive  capacity 
hypothesis, i.e. whether domestic R&D helps to increase the incidence of spillovers. Finally, 
for the first time the impacts of R&D spillovers are examined  by  exploiting cross-sectional 
dependence. Specifically, we use a dynamic seemingly unrelated regression (DSUR) panel 
estimator proposed by Mark et al. (2005) which is also able to provide country-specific effects 
of R&D.  
 
 Our  main  findings  are  that  (i)  both  domestic  and  foreign  R&D  are  important  for 
productivity growth in East Asian countries (ii) imports are the main spillover channel of foreign 
technology  to  the  region,  (iii)  investment  in  domestic  R&D  increases  the  incidence  of 
spillovers, and (iv) although the U.S. is a relatively stronger spillover provider, our empirical 
results also suggest that close economic cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN member 
countries has contributed to significant spillover effects.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of the 
literature. Section 3.3 highlights our model specification. Section 3.4 explains the construction 
of  our  TFP  and  R&D  data.  Section  3.5  outlines  the  econometric  estimation  methodology. 
Section 3.6 discusses the empirical findings and section 3.7 concludes.  
 
 
3.2  Review of the literature 
 
Empirical research on R&D spillovers has been inspired by the theoretical models presented 
in Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). Romer’s 
(1990) model predicts that an expansion of the range of available inputs raises total factor 
productivity. Thus, investment in the development of new inputs raises the stock of knowledge 
and  results  in  lower  future  R&D  costs.  This  suggests  that  there  are  spillover  effects from 
current to future R&D activities. In an international setting these spillovers imply that R&D of 
one country impacts not only the future R&D costs of domestic firms but also those of foreign 
firms. The degree to which domestic firms benefit from these spillovers may depend on the 
economic interaction between the countries such as their bilateral trade and characteristics of 
the traded products.  
 
The quality ladder models by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) assume that consumers are willing to pay a premium for high-quality products. As a 
result,  firms  always  have  an  incentive  to  improve  the  products  quality  through  R&D.  One   30 
important assumption of this model is that every successful innovation allows all firms to study 
the attribute of the newly invented product and improve upon it. Patent right restricts other 
firms from producing the products invented by others but not the use of knowledge that is 
embodied in that product. Consequently, as soon as the product is created, its production 
knowledge  becomes  available  to  other  firms.  This  allows  other  firms  to  begin  their  own 
improvements from a higher level of quality. Naturally, these knowledge spillovers apply to all 
firms  (both  domestic  and  foreign)  and  the  extent  to  which  foreign  firms  can  improve  the 
domestic product will depend on the bilateral economic relations between the two.   
 
Much of the earlier policy debate about R&D effects is based on the presumption that 
a country’s productivity depends on domestic investment in R&D. In line with this emphasis, 
earlier empirical work focused on the impact of domestic R&D on productivity growth. The 
analysis has been performed at all levels of aggregation– business units, firms and industries 
– and for many different countries (especially the United States). All these studies reach the 
conclusion that cumulative domestic R&D is an important determinant of productivity. Indeed, 
they find that the estimated elasticity of output with respect to R&D is high, varying from 10% 
to 30% (see the survey of the earlier literature by Nadiri (1993)).  
 
As a result of globalization, the productivity growth of a country does not depend only 
on  domestic  R&D  but  also  on  foreign  R&D,  through  economic  interactions  with  foreign 
economies.  Several  recent  papers  have  addressed  this  issue  by  estimating  the  impact  of 
foreign  R&D  on  domestic  productivity.  This  is  typically  done  by  regressing  total  factor 
productivity (TFP) on the stock of both domestic and foreign R&D. The pioneering work of Coe 
and Helpman (1995) (henceforth, CH) assessed R&D spillovers across 21 OECD countries 
plus  Israel  and  provides  empirical  evidence  of  a  positive  relationship  between  R&D 
expenditures and TFP. The authors find that not only domestic R&D contributes significantly to 
productivity  growth  but  also  (trade-embodied)  foreign  R&D.  Trade  can  boost  domestic 
productivity  by  making  available  products  that  embodies  trading  partners’  state  of 
technological knowledge.  By enabling  a country to  employ a larger variety  of intermediate 
products and capital equipment, trade enhances the productivity of resources at home. Trade 
also  improves  domestic  productivity  by  making  available  useful  information  that  would 
otherwise  be  costly  to  acquire  (through  imitation).  These  findings  have  inspired  several 
subsequent  papers  [see  for  example,  Lichtenberg  and  van  Pottelsberghe  (1998),  Kao  et 
al.(1999), van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg (2001), and Lee (2005) among many others].
23 
 
                                                 
23 See Keller (2004) for a recent survey.   31 
Although  research  on  international  R&D  spillovers  has  been  growing,  it  remains 
limited  particularly  with  respect  to  North-South  spillovers.  Most  of  the  literature  discussed 
above  focuses  on  spillovers  across  developed  countries  and  only  a  few  studies  have 
addressed the North-South spillovers including Coe et al.(1997) and Madden et al. (2001). 
Following a similar strategy as in CH, Coe et al. (1997) have estimated the impact of foreign 
R&D on the TFP of 77 developing countries. Coe et al. (1997) assume that less developed 
countries R&D is negligible and thus is ignored in their specification. This assumption is largely 
due to the unavailability of R&D data. They regress TFP on the import-weighted foreign R&D 
and find that R&D spillovers to less developed countries are substantial. On average, a 1% 
increase in R&D capital stock in developed countries contributes to a 0.06% increase in the 
productivity of developing countries. However, in the case of Asian countries the estimated 
elasticity is 0.11%. Among the developed countries, the United States contributes the most to 
the productivity of developing countries because of: (i) its large trade share with developing 
countries, and (ii) its huge R&D capital stock as compared to other developed countries. Also, 
the spillover effect emanating from Japan is weak. However, the assumption of a negligible 
investment  in  R&D  by  less  developed  countries  is  clearly  unrealistic  for  some  East  Asian 
countries. For instance, Korea’s R&D expenditures (as a proportion of GDP) had reached 2.6 
percent by 2002, surpassing many of Western European countries (Mahadevan and Suardi, 
2008).  Therefore,  omitting  domestic R&D  suggests a possible  omitted  variable  bias  in  the 
estimated elasticity. Madden et al. (2001) correct this potential bias by adding domestic R&D 
in their specification for a selected group of Asian economies.
24 Using a generalised least 
square estimation technique, they find that domestic R&D has a large impact on productivity 
growth but that foreign R&D has no clear pattern as only three (out of six) Asian countries 
benefit from foreign R&D. However, the use of R&D data from individual country statistical 
publications to capture domestic R&D may have led to biased results due to differences in the 
R&D definitions adopted by each country.  
 
Although  Coe  et  al.  (1998)  and  Madden  et  al.  (2002)  have  made  important 
contributions  to  the  literature  on  North-South  spillovers,  several  problems  remain.  For 
instance, Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1997) criticize the CH’s method of constructing 
foreign R&D capital stock, which was also adopted in Coe et al. (1998). They argue that the 
method is subject to aggregation bias. They show that the foreign R&D capital stock increases 
when the trading partners are hypothetically merged although the trading flows between them 
are unchanged. They propose an alternative measure of foreign R&D stock that is theoretically 
less biased and find a stronger impact of foreign R&D on domestic productivity. Moreover, the 
                                                 
24  The  six  Asian  economies  are  Chinese  Taipei,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea,  Singapore  and  Thailand.  The  OECD 
countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the US.    32 
explanatory power of the estimated model (indicated by the adjusted R
2) is higher than the 
one based on CH’s specification.
25 
 
Several  studies  such  as  Kao  et  al.(1999)  and  Lee  (2005)  criticize  the  use  of 
inappropriate estimation techniques in analyzing R&D spillovers. CH first show that both TFP 
and R&D exhibit clear time trends, and are non-stationary. By applying the panel unit root test 
of Levin at al. (2002)
26 to the residuals of the estimated model, CH subsequently establish that 
TFP and R&D capital stocks are cointegrated. This prompts them to estimate the impact of 
R&D on TFP by applying conventional OLS techniques to the pooled cointegrating regression. 
This estimation strategy was also adopted in Coe et al. (1997). The difficulty with the above 
research is that the properties of panel data estimators under the presence of unit roots and 
possibly cointegration were not very well known during the early to mid 90s. Although applying 
OLS (or  its  variant  such  as  generalised  least  square  estimator)  could  have  been  fine,  for 
instance in terms of obtaining consistent estimators, inferences would have been misleading 
under the likely presence of endogeneity. Recently, several techniques (e.g. Fully Modified 
OLS (FMOLS), Dynamic OLS (DOLS)) aiming to bypass these difficulties have been proposed 
in the literature (see Kao and Chiang, 2000; Pedroni, 2000). Both FMOLS and DOLS aim to 
render  N(0,1)  based  inferences  valid  for  the  t-ratios  of  the  panel  cointegrating  regression 
despite  of  the  presence of  endogeneity.  Applying  the  DOLS  estimator  of  Kao  and  Chiang 
(2000), Kao et al.(1999) reject the existence of positive spillovers across OECD countries.
27 
However, using a newly improved manufacturing industry data set for 17 OECD countries and 
the FMOLS estimator of Pedroni (2000), Lee (2005) finds that the positive spillover effects via 
imports are significant.
28  
 
Advances  in  panel  data  econometric  techniques  have  provided  more  reliable 
approaches for analyzing cointegrated variables.
29 It should be emphasized however that the 
DOLS  and FMOLS estimators discussed above  have two major  limitations, at least in the 
present  context.  First,  they  assume  that  all  cross-sectional  units  are  independent.  This 
assumption is clearly unrealistic in many applications based on multi-country data sets such 
as R&D spillovers. There is no reason to believe that the spillover process across countries is 
independent. For instance, MNCs’ decision to invest in a particular country inevitably affects 
the  amount  of  FDI  flows  to  other  countries.  In  this  respect,  the  dynamic  SUR  (DSUR) 
                                                 
25 Using an alternative weighting scheme, Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1998) show that the R&D capital stock 
changes only marginally.    
26 CH refer to working paper versions of this paper dated 1992 and 1993. 
27 Kao et al. (1999) refers to the working paper version of Kao and Chiang (2000). 
28 Lee (2005) also uses DOLS and FMOLS within-dimension estimator proposed by Kao and Chiang (2000) and finds 
that the international R&D spillover effect remains robust, in contrast to the finding by Kao et al. (1999). He attributed 
this finding to the improvement in the quality of the data used.  
29 Breitung and Pesaran (2008) provide a summary of recent panel cointegration literature.    33 
estimator  proposed  by  Mark  et  al.  (2005)  provides  an  excellent  alternative.  The  estimator 
accounts  for  cross-sectional  dependence  by  exploiting  the  information  in  the  variance–
covariance matrix of residuals. The second limitation of the DOLS and FMOLS is that they 
provide one cointegrating vector for all countries and the slope estimates are interpreted as 
average long-run effects. This notion of ‘one size fits all’ may be restrictive in the present 
context because many studies have highlighted the diverse impacts of R&D on productivity 
across countries. For instance, CH show that domestic R&D had a larger impact on the TFP of 
G-7 countries than on other smaller OECD countries. Moreover, Madden et al. (2001) shows 
that some countries benefits from foreign R&D while others do not.
30 In contrast to DOLS and 
FMOLS, the DSUR estimator computes one cointegrating vector for each single equation and 
thus allows us to evaluate country-specific effects of R&D.    
 
Another limitation of Coe at al. (1998) and Madden et al. (2002) is that they consider 
imports as the only channel through which new knowledge may spill over to other countries. 
Over the past few decades, FDI by multinational corporations (MNCs) has grown substantially. 
The growth rate of world FDI has exceeded the growth rates of both world trade and GDP 
(UNCTAD, 2001). Since MNCs are responsible for a large share of global R&D expenditure, 
FDI by MNCs could be an important channel via which less developed countries gain access 
to  technologies  available  at  the  world  frontier.  van  Pottelsberghe  and  Lichtenberg  (2001) 
extend CH’s work by incorporating inward and outward FDI channels. They analyze only 13 
out of 22 countries covered in CH’s study and find that foreign R&D spills over across borders 
via imports and outward FDI channels but not through inward FDI. They argue that outward 
FDI  is  a  more  effective  channel  than  inward  FDI  in  gaining  access  to  world  technology, 
because the former involves ‘total immersion’. By setting up production and research facilities 
in  countries  that  have  accumulated  substantial  scientific  and  technological  capabilities,  a 
technology  follower  can  have  better  access  to  leading  technologies.  The  finding  that 
technology  diffuses    via  outward  but  not  inward  FDI  is  consistent  with  Dunning’s  (1994) 
paradigm where companies prefer to invest abroad in order to take advantage of their own 
technology base instead of diffusing it internationally. However, several recent works provide 
empirical support to inward FDI as a channel for R&D spillovers, e.g.  Bitzer and Kerekes 
(2008), Zhu and Jeon (2007) or Savvides and Zachariadis (2005).  
   
A number of economists are sceptical about the benefits of outward FDI for domestic 
economy. One central argument is that outward FDI substitutes foreign activities for domestic 
activities and thus domestic investment is reduced when MNCs shift part of their investment 
abroad (Herzer and Schrooten, 2008). Using the U.S MNCs data, Feldstein (1994) shows that 
                                                 
30 They differentiate the effects across countries using dummy variables interacted with each country’s R&D capital 
stocks.   34 
FDI outflows reduce domestic investment on dollar-for-dollar basis. Another argument relates 
to potential substitution between FDI and exports as a method for serving foreign markets. 
Therefore, an increase in outward FDI may result in lower exports and for export-driven East 
Asian countries this can dampen their growth performance.  
 
  Several models predict that R&D can have a dual role. Apart from generating new 
information, R&D also develop firm’s absorptive or learning capacity, i.e. the ability to identify, 
assimilate,  and  exploit  knowledge  from  the  environment  (Cohen  and  Levinthal  (1989).
31 
Investment in R&D is a crucial determinant of technical competence of the labor force. They 
find strong evidence supporting the idea that more R&D intensive firms are more successful 
when  it  comes  to  absorbing  R&D  spillovers.  Griffith  et  al.’s  (2003)  model  predicts  that  by 
engaging in R&D, countries increase their ability to assimilate and understand the discoveries 
of  others.  In  the  present  context,  domestic  R&D  is  not  only  important  in  generating  new 
information which directly contributes to productivity growth, but also in facilitating international 
R&D  spillovers  from  developed  countries  (both  domestic  and  foreign  embodied  R&D  are 
complements).  
 
With this background, this study contributes to the literature by examining both imports 
and  FDI  as  potential  channels  via  which  R&D  activities  in  developed  countries  affect  the 
productivity  of  East  Asian  countries.  It  also  examines  the  role  of  absorptive  capacity  in 
mediating R&D spillovers. Moreover, it tests whether the United States or Japan is the most 
important  source  of  R&D  spillovers.  This  is  achieved  by  utilizing  the  DSUR  estimation 
approach of Mark et al. (2005) which has numerous advantages over other estimators when it 
comes to analyzing R&D spillovers.  
 
 
3.3  Model specification 
 
This study uses a generalized version of the model employed by Coe and Helpman (1995), as 
modified  by  Lichtenberg  and  van  Pottelsberghe  (1998)    and  van  Pottelsberghe  and 
Lichtenberg (2001). This model can be used to test whether trade and FDI serve as channels 
for the international diffusion of technology.  Equation (3.1) provides the  basic econometric 
model.  It  states  that  the  domestic  total  factor  productivity  of  a  country  is  a  function  of  its 
domestic R&D capital stock and of different types of foreign R&D capital stocks:  
 
it it it i it e SF SD TFP + β + β + β = 2 1               (3.1) 
                                                 
31 Crespo and Fontoura (2007) provide a summary of absorptive capacity literature.    35 
 
where  i  is an index of Asian countries (China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand).  
TFP is the total factor productivity, SD is the stock of domestic R&D, and SF is the stock of 
foreign R&D. All variables are in logarithmic form.  i β  is a country-specific intercept,  1 β is the 
elasticity of TFP with respect to domestic R&D,  2 β  is the elasticity of TFP with respect to 
foreign R&D, and e  is the random error term.  
 
Following  van  Pottelsberghe  and  Lichtenberg  (2001), we  use  three  procedures  for 
constructing different foreign R&D capital stocks. The import-weighted R&D capital stock 
fm
i S  
is constructed as follows: 
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where  j  is an index of G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United 
States),   ij m  is the flow of imports of goods and services of country  i  from country  j , and  j y  
is country  s ' j GDP.  
 
The  inward  FDI-weighted  foreign  R&D  capital  stocks  ff S   is  computed  using  the 
following formula: 
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where  ij f  is  the flow of FDI from country  j  towards country  i , and  j k  is the gross fixed 
capital formation of country  j , both expressed in constant dollars.  
 
Finally,  we  construct  the  outward  FDI-weighted  foreign  R&D  capital  stock 
ft S   as 
follows: 
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where  ij t are the FDI flows of country  i  towards country  j . It states that foreign R&D capital 
stock of country i  corresponds to the sum of all its outward FDI embodied in the R&D capital 
stock of the target countries.  
 
We would also like to test the absorptive capacity hypothesis suggested by Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989) and Griffith et al. (2003). They predict that investment in R&D increases 
the incidence of technology spillovers by enhancing the firm’s capacity to identify, assimilate, 
and  exploit  outside  knowledge.  In  the  present  context,  investment  in  domestic  R&D  is 
expected  to  improve  technical  competence  of  the  workforce  and  this  will  facilitate  R&D 
spillovers  from  the  G-5  countries.  To  conduct  an  empirical  test  of  this  hypothesis,  an 
interaction  term  is  included  (constructed  as  a  product  of  domestic  R&D  and  foreign  R&D 
capital stock) as an additional regressor in Equation (3.1) as follows: 
 
it it it it it i it SD SF A SF A SD A A TFP ε + × + + + = ) ( 3 2 1                           (3.5) 
 
In this specification, if the coefficient  3 A is positive and significant, this would imply 
that knowledge spillovers from the G-5 countries is conditional on the level of domestic R&D. 
This will be interpreted as evidence supporting the absorptive capacity hypothesis. 
 
Finally, we examine whether R&D spills over more from Japan or from the United 
States. For this purpose, we estimate a variant of Equation (3.1) as follows:
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where j= Japan or the United States, and all other variables are as defined above. 
 
 
3.4  Estimation procedures 
 
Our  empirical  analysis  involves  three  important  stages.  First,  we  evaluate  the  stationarity 
properties  of  both  dependent  and  independent  variables.  Second,  we  test  whether  these 
variables  are  cointegrated.  This  typically  translates  into  testing  whether  the residuals  from 
Equation (3.1) are stationary. Finally and most importantly, our objective is to obtain reliable 
estimates of the slopes in Equation (3.1) and to test their statistical significance. The following 
section explains the econometric methodology used in this paper.    
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3.4.1  Panel unit root tests 
 
Im  et  al.  (2003)  (hereafter  IPS)  propose  the  t -statistic  for  panel  unit  root  test  under  the 
assumption of cross-sectional independence. They consider a panel specification of the form:  
  
t , i
p
j
j t , i ij t , i i it
i
y y y ε + ∆ φ + β = ∆ ∑
=
− −
1
1     , ,.... 1 N i =   T t ,..... 1 =                (3.7) 
         
where  1 − − = ∆ t , i it it y y y ,  i p is the required degree of lag augmentation to whiten the residuals. 
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root may be written as,  
 
0 = β = i o H  for  all i                         (3.8) 
 
While the alternative hypothesis is given by: 
 
0 1 < β = i H ,  , ,..., 2 , 1 1 N i =   0 1 = β = i H ,  . ,...., 2 , 1 1 1 N N N i + + =             (3.9) 
 
The  formulation  of  the  alternative  hypothesis  is  more  flexible  than  the  homogeneous 
alternative hypothesis, namely  0 < β = βi for alli  which is implicit in the testing approach of 
Levin et al.(2002). This condition allows  i β  to differ across countries and only a fraction of 
panel member is required to be stationary under the alternative.   
 
The  t -statistic is computed as an average of individual t-statistics from a standard 
ADF specification as follows:  
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where  iT t is the  individual t-statistic for  i β  from the individual ADF regressions. Then, the 
standardized statistic is given by: 
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where  ( ) 0 | = i T t E β   and  ( ) 0 | = i T t Var β   are  the  common  mean  and  variance  of  tiT  for 
i=1,2,…,N, obtained under the null, βi=0. As discussed in IPS, this test has a standard normal 
distribution when  ∞ → N . When N is fixed as in the present study, the sample distribution of 
NT t  is non-standard. As a result, the critical values and p-values could not be obtained from 
the  standard  normal  distribution.  However,  this  can  be  solved  by  using  simulations  as 
discussed in IPS. IPS tabulate simulated critical values for different magnitudes of N and T, 
and for models containing either intercepts, or intercepts and linear trends.   
 
The assumption of cross-sectional independence of the IPS test is however a rather 
restrictive, particularly in the context of cross-country regression. Pesaran (2007) shows that 
the  IPS  test  tends  to  over-reject  the  null  when  the  cross  sections  are  highly  correlated. 
Pesaran proposes the modified version of the IPS test (known as CIPS test) which control for 
cross-section  dependence  induced  by  an  unobserved  common  factor.  Pesaran  suggests 
augmenting Equation (3.7) with cross-section averages of lagged levels and first-differences of 
the individual series as follows:   
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j
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where  t y  is the cross-sectional mean of  it y . Pesaran notes, that under certain assumptions, 
the cross-sectional averages in (3.12) are shown to act as proxies for unobserved common 
factor. Then, the CIPS test is calculated as an average of t-statistics of the OLS estimate of 
i b ( i b ˆ ) from individual regression (3.12).  
 
 
3.4.2  Panel cointegration tests  
 
Pedroni  (1999)  suggests  two  types  of  test  statistics  for  the  models  with  heterogeneous 
cointegrating vectors under the assumption cross-sectional independence. These are (i) the 
‘’panel  statistics”  that  is  equivalent  to  the  unit  root  test  statistic  against  homogeneous 
alternatives, and (ii) the ‘group mean statistics’ that is analogous to the panel unit root tests 
against  heterogeneous  alternatives.  Let  e ˆ   denote  the  OLS  residual  of  the  cointegrating 
regression (3.1), the test statistics are defined as follows:   
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Panel t-Statistic (non-parametric): 
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Panel t-Statistic (parametric):  
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Group ρ-Statistic: 
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Group t-Statistic (non-parametric): 
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Group t-Statistic (parametric): 
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where,  i ˆ λ   is  a  consistent  estimator  of  the  long  run  variance, 
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Westerlund (2007) shows that the Pedroni’s test statistics tend to over-reject the null 
and thus are unreliable when the cross section units are correlated. Alternatively, the author 
proposes four new tests based on error-correction model and uses a bootstrap method to 
account for cross-sectional dependence. In this study we use only two tests namely, panel and   40 
group  mean  τ -statistics  which  are  more  robust  to  cross-sectional  correlation.  Following 
Westerlund (2007), the error-correction model for Equation (3.1) is given as follows:  
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where 
'
t d is a vector of deterministic components,  ) SF , SD ( x = is a vector of regressors,  i α is 
the error-correction parameter which forms the basis of the tests. Within this framework, the 
test statistics are designed to test the null on no-cointegration by inferring whether the  i α  is 
equal zero. Therefore, testing the null of no cointegration is equivalent to testing of no error-
correction. The  τ -statistics are defined as follows: 
 
Panel  τ -Statistic: 
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Group  τ -Statistic: 
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where SE( α ˆ ) is the standard error of  α ˆ . To preserve the cross-sectional correlation structure 
of  it ε , Westerlund (2007) proposes a bootstrap approach to derive the distribution of the  τ -
statistics.
33 Simulation evidence shows that these bootstrapped test statistics maintain good 
size accuracy and are more powerful than the Pedroni’s test statistics when the cross sections 
are correlated. 
 
 
3.4.3  Dynamic seemingly unrelated regression estimator 
 
Once  the  cointegrating  properties  are  examined,  the  next  step  is  to  generate  long-run 
coefficient estimates for Equation (3.1) and test their statistical significance. For this purpose, 
we  use  the  DSUR  estimator  due  to  Mark  et  al.  (2005)  which  allows  for  heterogeneous 
cointegrating vectors and cross-sectional dependence in the residuals. The DSUR estimator 
applied to Equation (3.1) can be written over i (i=1,…,5) as follows:  
 
                                                 
33 See Westerlund (2007) for the details of the bootstrap procedure.    41 
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where  p  is  the  number  of  leads  and  lags  of  the  first  difference  to  correct  for  possible  
endogeneity of the errors. From Equation (3.23), it is clear that endogeneity in equation i is 
corrected by incorporating leads and lags of the first difference not only of the regressors of 
equation i but also of the regressors of all the other equations in the system. However, this 
results in a proliferation of leads and lags in the system which reduces degrees of freedom. 
Consequently, the DSUR estimator is only applicable for samples where N is substantially 
smaller than T. Due to the limitations of our sample size and for the purpose of  preserving 
degree of freedom,  we set p=1.
34 The DSUR  accounts for cross-sectional  dependence by 
exploiting the off-diagonal elements of covariance matrix  ( ) '
it it E ε ε = Ω . Mark et al. (2005) show 
that  the  DSUR  estimator  achieves  significant  efficiency  gains  over  non-system  estimators 
such as DOLS when heterogeneous sets of regressors enter into the regressions and when 
errors are correlated across cointegrating regressions.  
 
 
3.5  Data set 
 
This  study  focuses  on  R&D  spillovers  from  the  G-5  countries  (France,  Germany,  Japan, 
United  Kingdom  and  United  States)  to  a  group  of  East  Asian  countries  (China,  Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand) for the period 1984-2005. R&D data were collected 
from two sources. Data for the G-5 countries were collected from the OECD’s Main Science 
and Technology Indicators. Data for East Asian countries were collected from the UNESCO 
Institute  for  Statistics.  Both  databases  adopt  a  common  definition  of  R&D  which  is  total 
intramural expenditure on R&D on the national territory. It includes R&D performed within a 
country and funded from abroad but excludes payments made abroad for R&D. The database 
provides information on R&D expenditures and personnel for 115 countries (including OECD 
countries). The data are further classified into sectors - business enterprises, government, 
universities, and non-profit private institution. However, sectoral data are less complete than 
the aggregate data. At present, it covers the period 1996-2006 but for some countries the data 
are  not  available  over  the  full  period.  Since  R&D  data  for  East  Asian  countries  are  not 
available over our full sample period, we extrapolate the data using real GDP and investment 
series (Coe and Helpman, 1995).  
                                                 
34 Mark et al. (2005) point out that there is no standard method for selecting p. The ad hoc rule by Stock and Watson 
(1993) that sets p=1 for T=50, p=2 for T=100,  and p=3 for T=300 is commonly used in many  Monte Carlo and 
empirical studies.  
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It should be pointed out that the R&D definition adopted by both OECD and UNESCO 
excludes  R&D  activity  by  domestic  firms  performed  in  foreign  countries.  Recently,  many 
developing  countries  have  established  R&D  centers  in  other  countries  -  especially  in 
developed countries – to have better access to leading technology. For instance, Chinese 
firms  make  substantial  investment  for  establishing  R&D  centers  in  the  United  States. 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2005), as of 2002, Chinese firms 
had established 646 R&D centers or affiliates in the United States. Ideally, this aspect of R&D 
investment should be included in constructing domestic R&D stocks because it reflects more 
precisely  a  country’s  level  of  investment  in  R&D.  However,  this  is  not  an  option  due  to 
restricted data availability.  
 
Bilateral  data on  imports and  FDI  (both  inward and  outward)  were  taken  from  the 
IMF’s Direction of Trade database and the OECD database, respectively. A glance at the data 
reveals that FDI flows are highly volatile and some observations are missing. To deal with 
these  problems,  FDI  series  were  computed  within  a  four-year  moving  average  (i.e.  the 
average of current and three preceding years). Moreover, due to restricted availability of FDI 
outflow series, the sample used to examine spillover effects via outward FDI is limited to three 
countries (Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore) covering the period 1991-2005.  
 
R&D  capital  stocks  (S )  were  computed  using  the  perpetual  inventory  method  as 
follows: 
 
t t t R S S + δ − = −1 ) 1 (                           (3.21) 
 
where  δ is  the  depreciation  rate,  which  is  assumed  to  be  5  percent  and  R denotes  R&D 
expenditures.
35 The benchmark (i.e. initial capital stock) for  S  was calculated following: 
 
) /( δ + = g R S o o                                      (3.22) 
 
where  g  is the average annual logarithmic growth of R&D expenditures over the period for 
which published R&D data were available,  o R is the R&D expenditure at the beginning of the 
sample period, and  o S , is the benchmark R&D capital stock. 
 
                                                 
35 In the literature, values for the depreciation rate range between 0% and 10 % but the 5% is commonly used (see 
Keller 2004).  
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The TFP series of each Asian country was obtained from: 
 
β − β =
1 / L K Y TFP                          (3.23) 
 
 where  Y is the final output (base  year  2000), L is the total labor force, K is the stock of 
physical capital, and  β  is the share of capital income in GDP which is set to 0.4, following 
Chenery et al. (1986). All the data for the construction of TFP were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators. The stocks of physical capital were constructed using gross fixed 
capital  formation  series  following  the  perpetual  inventory  method  with  a  5%  depreciation 
rate.
36  
 
Our measure of TFP has been a subject of intense debate in the literature. Many 
economists have identified problems, of both concept and measurement associated with this 
measure.  For  instance,  Griliches  (1987)  outlines  the  following  problems  linked  to  the 
production  function  approach  of  TFP  measure:  (1)  a  relevant  concept  of  capital,  (2) 
measurement  of  output,  (3)  measurement  of  inputs,  (5)  the  place  of  R&D  and  public 
infrastructure,  (5)  missing  or  appropriate  data,  (6)  weight  for  indices,  (7)  theoretical 
specifications of relations  between  inputs, technology, and  aggregate production functions, 
and (8) aggregation over heterogeneity. Moreover, Diewert (1987) show that very restrictive 
assumptions  have  to  be  satisfied  to  generate  the  indices  of  output  and  input.  Lipsey  and 
Carlaw (2004) point out that this approach requires a very strong assumption that such that 
the production functions remain stable over long period of time.  
 
An  alternative  to  the  production  function  approach  is  the  index  number  approach 
where the TFP is measured as a ratio of output index to input index. This approach is very 
similar  to  the  production  function  approach  but  does  not  require  an  aggregate  production 
function. Nevertheless, it involves other similar problems associated with production function 
approach (Lipsey and Carlaw, 2004). One application of the index method approach is data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), which makes a strong claim of being able to separate TFP into 
two  parts,  one  due  to  increased  efficiency  in  resource  use  and  one  due  to  technological 
change. The method uses a Malmquist index and compares ratios of outputs with input across 
units. However, it requires a strong assumption that all units being compared have identical 
production  functions.  This  assumption  is  clearly  not  credible  in  our  heterogeneous  set  of 
countries.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  why  China  and  Korea  have  similar  production 
functions.  
                                                 
36 Alternatively, one can use estimated residuals from the standard Cobb-Douglas production function. These two 
approaches of measuring TFP and other alternative methods are discussed in Lipsey and Carlaw (2004).   44 
 
Another  approach  to  TFP  measurement  is  based  on  econometric  models  that 
measure TFP using output and input volume. It avoids many shortcomings associated with the 
production  function  or  index  number  approach  and  may  allow  for  adjustment  cost  and 
variations  in  capacity  utilisation.  It  also  allows  investigation  of  different  form  of  technical 
change other than Hicks-neutral formulation implied by the other approaches. An example can 
be found in Nadiri and Prucha (2001). However, all these advantages come at a cost. A full-
fledged model raises complex econometrics issues and sometimes put a question mark on the 
robustness of results. Moreover, limited data availability as in our case may have negative 
implication on the degrees of freedom and make this approach not an option.  Furthermore, it 
also suffers from measurement error problems associated with the production function and 
index number approaches.  
 
Figures 1-5 display the trends of these explanatory and dependent variables for each 
country over the sample period. Overall, they increased over the time span but the upward 
trend was neither uniform across countries nor uniform over time. 
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Figure 3.1: TFP and R&D capital stocks for China 
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Figure 3.2: TFP and R&D capital stocks for Korea 
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Figure 3.3: TFP and R&D capital stocks for Malaysia 
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Figure 3.4: TFP and R&D capital stocks for Singapore 
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Figure 3.5: TFP and R&D capital stocks for Thailand 
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3.6  Empirical results 
 
The discussion in Section 3.2 indicates that the assumption of cross-sectional dependence is 
likely to hold in the analysis of R&D spillovers. One way of testing the appropriateness of this 
assumption is to apply the LM test of Breusch and Pagan (1980) on our dataset. The test for 
the hypothesis that all correlation coefficients are jointly 0 is defined as:  
 
∑ ∑
=
−
=
=
N
i
i
j
ij c N LM
1
1
1
ˆ                                       (3.24) 
 
where  ij c ˆ  is the Pearson correlation coefficient. Breusch and Pagan show that the when N is 
fixed the test is distributed as  2 χ   with N(N-1)/2 degree of freedom. When N is  large, the 
normalised  test  n n LM 2 / ) ( −   is  asymptotically  N(0,1)  as  ∞ → T   and  then  ∞ → N .  In  our 
analysis,  the  hypothesis  of  cross  sectional  independence  is  tested  on  the  residuals  of 
individual  series  obtained  by  running  OLS  regression  of  each  series  on  its  own  lag  and 
deterministic components (intercept or intercept plus linear time trend).  We also compute the 
LM  statistic  for  two  variants  of  model  (3.1).  Model  I  features  both  import  and  inward  FDI 
channels  for  all  countries  over  the  1984-2005  period.  Model  II  features  only  outward  FDI 
channel using data from Korea, Malaysia and Singapore for the 1991-2005 period. Table 3.1 
report  the  results  of  no  cross-sectional  dependence  tests.  As shown  in the  table,  the test 
statistics show strong evidence of cross-section dependence in most cases as the null of no 
cross-sectional dependence can be rejected at the 10% level of significance. Two exceptions 
are the tests on  d S  where the correlation matrices are singular and  ft S where the null can not 
be rejected.  
 
 
Table 3.1: Cross-sectional dependence tests 
 
  intercept  Intercept + trend 
     
TFP  82.989 (0.000)  79.196 (0.000) 
S
d  n/s  n/s 
S
fm  72.085 (0.000)  70.887 (0.000) 
S
ff  16.590 (0.083)  16.879 (0.077) 
S
ft  3.592 (0.309)  2.369 (0.499) 
     
Model I: [ TFP, S
d, S
fm, S
ff ]  44.410 (0.000)  50.501 (0.000) 
Model II: [ TFP, S
d, S
ft ]  12.788 (0.005)  14.877 (0.001) 
     
  
Notes: n/s indicates that the test can not be computed because correlation matrix of residuals is singular.  
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3.6.1  Unit root tests 
 
In Table 3.2 we report the results of the panel unit root tests. The IPS and CIPS tests for both 
model with- and without-trend are reported for p≤3. Generally, the results based on the IPS 
test show that the t-statistics are smaller that the critical values (in absolute term), regardless 
of the inclusion or exclusion of a linear time trend. The only minor exceptions are for S
d (p=1) 
in the model with intercept and TFP (p=2) in the model with intercept and trend where the null 
of a unit root can be rejected. However, the results of the CIPS test which control for cross-
sectional dependence suggests that the null of unit root cannot be rejected in all cases. We 
also perform the standard ADF tests on our individual series which indicate that the null of a 
unit  root  can  not  be  rejected  in  most  cases  (see  Appendix  3.1).  Overall,  our  findings  are 
consistent with Coe and Helpman (1995) and others who also find that TFP and R&D series 
are non-stationary.   
 
 
Table 3.2: Panel unit root tests 
 
  IPS test        CIPS test     
  p=1  p =2  p =3    p=1  p =2  p =3 
Intercept               
   TFP  -1.414  -1.358  -1.320    -1.797  -2.071  -2.775 
   S
d  6.767*  1.200  1.584    0.837  0.704  0.840 
   S
fm  -2.057  -1.830  -1.676    -1.203  -1.219  -1.696 
   S
ff  -1.868  -1.583  -1.726    -1.380  -2.047  -2.752 
   S
ft  -1.879  -2.067  -1.720    -1.939  -3.388  -2.748 
               
Intercept + trend               
   TFP  -2.328  -2.871*  -2.296    -2.075  -2.686  -3.359 
   S
d  -0.092  -1.115  -1.004    -1.641  -1.102  0.008 
   S
fm  -2.398  -2.587  -2.097    -2.322  -1.837  -2.390 
   S
ff  -1.382  -1.582  -2.132    -1.423  -1.976  -2.500 
   S
ft  -1.891  -1.760  -1.268    -1.793  -1.629  -1.320 
               
 
Notes: The 5% critical values for the IPS test are -2.19 (intercept) and -2.82 (intercept + trend) taken from Table 2 of 
IPS, while the ones for the CIPS test are -4.35 (intercept) and -4.97 (intercept + trend) taken from Table 1 of Pesaran 
(2007). * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
 
3.6.2  Cointegration test  
 
In order to establish that our fitted regression model is not spurious, we carry out cointegration 
analysis on the series using both Pedroni (1999) and Westerlund (2007) test statistics. Both 
tests  allow  for  heterogeneous  cointegrating  vectors  but  the  one  by  Westerlund  (2007)  is 
flexible enough to accommodate for cross section correlation. The results of these tests are 
reported in Table 3.3. For Model I, six Pedroni’s test statistics indicate that the model with   49 
intercept is cointegrated and all test statistics indicate that the model with intercept and trend 
is  cointegrated  using  a  10%  significance  level.  For  Model  II,  in  five  cases  the  null  of  no-
cointegration is rejected for both the model with intercept and model with intercept and trend. 
However, these results may be spurious if the cross sections are correlated. We therefore 
complement these results with the two test statistics of Westerlund (2007) which were shown 
to be robust under the cross-sectional dependence. We find that there is strong support for a 
cointegrating relationship for Model I as the null of no cointegration can be rejected at the 10% 
level. For Model II, we only find that the variables are cointegrated in model with intercept 
using the  τ P -statistic. In all other cases, the null cannot be rejected. Given that our sample 
size  is  small,  these  results  may  be  unreliable.  Therefore,  we  next  employ the  Johansen’s 
(1991) maximum likelihood procedure to test for cointegration individually. Interestingly, both 
the  trace λ  and  max λ  statistics suggest that the variables of interest are cointegrated for all 
countries (see Appendix 3.2). Overall, our results strongly suggest that that TFP, domestic 
R&D, and foreign R&D are cointegrated. This finding is consistent with van Pottelsberghe and 
Lichtenberg (2001) and others who also find that these variables are cointegrated within a 
group of OECD countries.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Panel cointegration tests 
 
  Model I: [ TFP, S
d, S
fm, S
ff ]  Model II: [ TFP, S
d, S
ft ] 
  intercept  Intercept + trend   intercept  Intercept + trend  
Panel A: Pedroni (1999) 
   ν Z    -1.076 (0.223)  -1.900 (0.065)
 c  -1.928 (0.062)
 c  -2.818 (0.007)
 a 
   ρ Z    1.742 (0.087)
 c   2.703 (0.010)
 b   1.118 (0.213)   1.879 (0.068)
 c 
   t Z    -2.225 (0.033)
 b  -4.330 (0.000)
 a  -1.441 (0.141)  -32.510 (0.000)
 a 
   *
t Z    1.831 (0.074)
 c   2.332 (0.026)
 b  -2.595 (0.013)
 b   -1.484 (0.132) 
   ρ Z
~
    3.105 (0.003)
 a   3.651 (0.000)
 a   2.188 (0.036)
 b   2.745 (0.009)
 a 
   t Z
~
   -2.281 (0.029)
 b  -9.617 (0.000)
 a  -4.539 (0.000)
 a  -48.182 (0.000)
 a 
   * ~
t Z     4.044 (0.000)
 a   4.361 (0.000)
 a  -2.458 (0.019)
 b  -0.5971 (0.333) 
         
Panel B: Westerlund (2007) 
   τ P   -1.214 (0.080) 
c  -1.674 (0.040) 
b       -1.636 (0.074) 
c  2.173 (0.664)      
   τ G   -2.449 (0.020) 
b  -1.362 (0.064) 
c     -0.312 (0.240)  1.310 (0.538)      
         
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are p-values and 
a,b,c indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
Optimal lag lengths were selected based on AIC. Number of bootstraps for  τ P  and  τ G  tests are 500. 
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3.6.3  Analysis of R&D spillovers 
 
Having established that the variables  are cointegrated, we proceed to generate consistent 
estimates of  β  in Equation (3.1). To this end, the DSUR estimator outlined in Section 3.4 is 
used and results are reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. As shown in the Table 3.4, the TFP 
elasticities with respect to domestic R&D and both foreign R&D capital stocks have plausible 
magnitudes, lying in absolute value  between  zero and one. Domestic R&D is found to be 
important for Korea, Malaysia and Singapore but not for China and Thailand. Korea has the 
greatest  benefit  from  domestic  R&D.  The  estimated  elasticity  of  0.28  suggests  that  a  1% 
increase  in  domestic  R&D  will  result  in  0.28%  higher  productivity  growth.  This  finding  is 
consistent  with  Kim  (2003)  who  points  out  that  Korea  depends  on  domestic  firms  for 
technology upgrading due to substantial restrictions on inward FDI. It is interesting to note that 
there is a clear positive relation between the magnitude of domestic R&D effects and the level 
of economic development. This suggests that as countries become more developed, domestic 
R&D becomes more important for domestic productivity growth. This is in line with Coe and 
Helpman  (1995)  who  find  that  higher-income  OECD  countries  benefit  more  from  domestic 
R&D compared to other lower-income countries. With respect to international R&D spillovers, 
there is strong evidence suggesting that imports are a more important channel than inward 
FDI in transmitting the positive effect of foreign R&D. For all countries, the coefficients on the 
import-weighted foreign R&D stock are positive and significant. However, the R&D spillovers 
incorporated in inward FDI is ambiguous as only China and Malaysia benefit from having more 
FDI.  In  the  case  of  Korea,  Singapore,  and  Thailand,  more  FDI  adversely  affects  their 
productivity growth. One possible explanation of this finding is that the benefit of FDI-related 
externalities is outweighed by the negative effect of increased competition from foreign firms. 
FDI inflows may force less productive domestic firms out of business (Aitken and Harrison, 
1999). As presented in Table 3.5, evidence of spillover that passes through outward FDI is 
mixed as only Korea benefit from its investment abroad. Those results are in contrast with van 
Pottelsberghe  and  Lichtenberg  (2001)  who  find  that  outward  FDI  is  one  of  the  important 
channels of R&D spillovers among the OECD countries. One explanation may lie in that the 
positive effects of investing in other countries are outweighed by the effect of lower domestic 
investment. This is consistent with Feldstein (1995) who finds that for each dollar of outward 
FDI, total domestic investment is reduced by approximately one dollar. Additionally, although 
FDI from Asian countries has been growing, a substantial amount of the flow goes to other 
developing  countries  for  other  reasons.  At  present,  the  amount  invested  in  developed 
countries  for  the  purpose  of  technology  sourcing  is  relatively  small  (UNCTAD,  2006).  In 
general, our results are consistent with the survey by Keller (2004) who concludes that trade   51 
(through  imports)  is  a  more  effective  channel  than  FDI  in  transmitting  knowledge  across 
borders.  
 
 
Table 3.4: R&D spillovers via import and inward FDI channels 
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
Domestic RD:           
   S
d  0.021   
(0.034)    
0.284*  
(0.031)    
0.052*   
(0.004)    
0.198*   
(0.013)    
0.010  
(0.007)    
Foreign RD:           
   S
fm (import channel)  0.202*   
(0.027)    
0.089*   
(0.012)   
0.047*   
(0.009)    
0.335*   
(0.009)   
0.323*   
(0.010)   
           
   S
ff (inward FDI channel)  0.068*   
(0.009) 
-0.029*   
(0.010) 
0.042*   
(0.003) 
-0.030*   
(0.007) 
-0.018*   
(0.004) 
           
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * indicates significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: R&D spillovers via outward FDI channel 
 
  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore 
Domestic RD:       
   S
d  0.407*   
(0.129)    
0.146*   
(0.048)    
0.333*   
(0.154)   
Foreign RD:       
   S
ft (outward FDI channel)  0.028*   
(0.011) 
0.052   
(0.068) 
-0.103   
(0.055) 
       
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * indicates significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
The next step of our analysis is to evaluate whether domestic R&D helps increase the 
incidence of R&D spillovers. To this end, Equation (3.5) is estimated focusing only on imports 
and inward FDI. To identify the most effective channel of spillovers, it would be desirable to 
estimate a model which includes both channels. However, our limited sample size impedes 
the implementation of this strategy. Therefore, two separate models are estimated for imports 
and inward FDI, and the results are presented in Table 3.6. As shown in panel A of Table 3.6, 
the coefficients on both domestic and foreign R&D capital stock are all positive and significant, 
except  for  domestic  R&D  of  China.  However,  the  interaction  term  is  only  positive  and 
significant in the case of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. This provides some support for 
the absorptive capacity hypothesis whereby domestic R&D activity helps local firms to improve 
their capacity to exploit outside knowledge. Investment in R&D improves the quality of human   52 
capital and results in better absorption of outside knowledge. Panel B of Table 3.6 presents 
the result of estimating Equation (3.5) using foreign R&D stock weighted by inward FDI. As 
shown in the table, the interaction term is only positive and significant for Malaysia and in all 
other  cases  the  coefficients  are  negative.  This  finding  provides  further  support  to  the 
ambiguous role of FDI in transmitting knowledge across borders. It is also interesting to note 
that the coefficients size on domestic R&D have increased significantly for China, Singapore, 
and Thailand. These coefficients may have reflected the effect of import channel which has 
been omitted (refer to results in Table 3.4).  
 
 
Table 3.6: Absorptive capacity and R&D spillovers 
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
Panel A: Import channel           
  Domestic RD:           
     S
d  0.018    
(0.113)    
0.300*   
(0.047)    
0.051*    
(0.011)    
0.156*    
(0.014)    
0.047*    
(0.015)    
  Foreign RD:           
     S
fm(import channel)  0.316*    
(0.049)    
0.075*    
(0.019)   
0.120*    
(0.010)    
0.275*    
(0.005)    
0.307*    
(0.007)    
  Interaction Effect:           
     S
fm x S
d  0.017    
(0.027) 
-0.025   
(0.019) 
0.038*    
(0.009) 
0.101*    
(0.017) 
0.155*    
(0.021) 
           
Panel B: inward FDI channel           
  Domestic RD:           
     S
d  0.325 *   
(0.019)    
0.320 *   
(0.155)    
0.110 *   
(0.010)    
0.865 *  
(0.077)   
0.841 *   
(0.045)   
  Foreign RD:           
     S
ff(inward FDI channel)  0.112*   
(0.005)   
0.002   
(0.041)   
0.048 *  
(0.008)    
-0.107 *   
(0.028)   
-0.063 *  
(0.013)   
  Interaction Effect:           
     S
d  x S
ff  -0.095 *  
(0.007) 
-0.115 *   
(0.044) 
0.013 *  
(0.004) 
-0.299 *   
(0.045) 
-0.858 *   
(0.061) 
           
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * indicates significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
A number of papers (e.g. van Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg, 2001; Coe, et al., 1997) 
show  that  the  United  States  is  the  largest  contributor  to  the  productivity  of  developing 
countries  while  technology  spillovers  emanating  from  Japan  are  weak.  In  line  with  this 
literature, we examine the main source of spillovers for the East Asian countries. We estimate 
Equation (3.6) and report the results in Table 3.7. Panel A of Table 3.7 presents the estimation 
results of R&D spillovers from Japan while panel B reports the results for the United States. In 
the case of spillovers from Japan, in four cases (except Korea) the coefficients on import-
weighted foreign R&D is found to be positive and significant, while three countries (China,   53 
Korea, and Malaysia) benefit from the inflows of Japanese FDI. In the case of spillovers from 
the United States, all countries benefit from its foreign R&D but only two countries (China and 
Thailand) gain by having more FDI from the United States. Although there is no clear pattern 
whether  Japan  or  the  United  States  is  the  strongest  provider  of  spillovers,  there  is  one 
important conclusion that emerges: imports are the main channel of spillover for East Asian 
countries regardless of their source.  
 
 
Table 3.7: R&D spillovers: Japan vs. United States  
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
Panel A: R&D spillovers from Japan           
  Domestic RD:           
     S
d  0.159*   
(0.003)    
0.297*   
(0.007)   
0.041*   
(0.004)    
0.184*   
(0.006)    
-0.013   
(0.013)    
  Foreign RD:           
    
fm
JPN S (import from Japan)  0.060*   
(0.001)    
-0.004   
(0.004)    
0.052*   
(0.007)    
0.280*   
(0.007)   
0.254*   
(0.011)   
           
    
ff
JPN S (inward FDI from Japan)  0.085*   
(0.001) 
0.018*  
(0.002) 
0.034*   
(0.006) 
-0.011   
(0.007) 
-0.015*   
(0.005) 
           
Panel B: R&D spillovers from the United States 
  Domestic RD:           
     S
d  0.145 *  
(0.040)    
0.445 *   
(0.027)    
0.036 *  
(0.004)    
0.188 *  
(0.010)    
0.200 *  
(0.012)    
  Foreign RD:           
    
fm
USA S (import from the U. S.)  0.180 *  
(0.029)    
0.021 *  
(0.010)   
0.118 *  
(0.006)   
0.337 *  
(0.007)   
0.175 *  
(0.008)    
           
    
ff
USA S (inward FDI from U. S.)  0.040 *  
(0.005) 
-0.025 *   
(0.008) 
-0.002 *   
(0.000) 
-0.066 *   
(0.005) 
0.039 *  
(0.002) 
           
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * indicates significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
Since  imports  are  found  to  be  the  main  spillover  channel,  we  analyze  this  aspect 
further  by  estimating  a  model  that  includes  both  Japanese  and  US  import-weighted  R&D 
capital stocks. This exercise allows us to identify the most effective channel of spillovers to the 
region. Results presented in Table 3.8 show that the overall findings point to the United States 
as  a  stronger  provider  of  R&D  spillover  for  China  and  Korea.  This  is  consistent  with  van 
Pottelsberghe and Lichtenberg (2001) who find that the United States is an important R&D 
spillover generator while spillover from Japan is weak. However, it should be emphasized that 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, which are the members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian  Nations  (ASEAN),  benefit  more  from  the  Japanese  R&D.  Although  Malaysia  and 
Thailand also benefit from the United States R&D (at the 10% significant level), the impact is 
smaller than the impact of the Japanese R&D. This finding could be due to close economic   54 
linkages between Japan and the ASEAN. ASEAN is Japan’s second largest trade partner and 
private investments from Japan to ASEAN member countries have been substantial. Japan 
has  also  assisted  the  economic  and  social  development  of  ASEAN  member  countries  by 
providing  bilateral  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA),  thereby  strengthening  the 
absorptive capacity of Southeast Asian countries for Japanese product.  
 
 
Table 3.8: R&D spillovers via import channel: Japan vs. United States 
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
Domestic RD:           
    S
d  0.261*  
(0.019)   
0.389 *  
(0.016)   
0.057 *   
(0.004)    
0.220  * 
(0.019)    
0.152 *   
(0.027)    
Foreign RD:           
   
fm
JPN S (imports from Japan)  -0.104 *   
(0.006)    
-0.048 *  
(0.007)    
0.080 *   
(0.007)    
0.995 *  
(0.031)   
0.151 * 
(0.017)    
           
   
fm
USA S (imports from the U.S.)  0.325 *   
(0.018) 
0.091 *   
(0.008) 
0.007   
(0.004) 
-0.648 *  
(0.032) 
0.090 *   
(0.008) 
           
 
Notes: All variables are in logarithm. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. * indicates significant at the 
5% level. 
 
 
3.6.4  Robustness checks 
In this paper we established that imports are the main channel of R&D spillovers to East Asian 
countries.  In  order  to  gauge  the  robustness  of  this  finding,  two  sensitivity  analyses  are 
implemented. First, we assess the sensitivity of the findings to a different time period. For this 
purpose, the period 1990-2005 is chosen as these countries experienced massive inflows of 
FDI and also higher levels of imports. This may well capture the period during which these 
countries became more open to both trade and foreign investment. Due to the limitation of our 
sample size two models were estimated - separating imports and inward FDI channels. Our 
results  generally  indicate  that  imports  are  the  main  channel  of  technology  spillovers  (see 
Appendix 3.3). The coefficients on import-weighted foreign R&D are positive and significant 
except for China which is negative. As before, the role of FDI in transmitting knowledge across 
border is uncertain. It is also worth noting that domestic R&D is becoming more important 
during this period. In all cases, the coefficients on domestic R&D are positive and significant. 
Secondly, we evaluate the sensitivity of the estimation results to different rates of depreciation. 
We re-estimate the model using depreciation rates for capital stocks of 7% and 10% and find 
that imports remain as the main channel of R&D spillovers. Moreover, evidence of spillover 
effects via FDI is mixed (see Appendix 3.4). The only minor difference is that the coefficient on 
import-weighted foreign R&D for Malaysia lost its significance in model utilizing the 10% rate.   55 
By and large, the results support that both foreign (import embodied) and domestic R&D are 
important for the productivity growth of the East Asian countries. 
 
 
3.7  Conclusions 
 
Economic theory predicts that innovative activity such as research and development (R&D) is 
a major source of productivity growth. It also predicts that the benefits of R&D may spill over 
across  countries  through  economic  interactions  such  as  imports  and  FDI.  It  has  been 
recognized that only a few developed countries are involved actively in R&D activities and this 
has invoked serious concerns among policymakers regarding the possibility of other countries 
benefiting  from  the  R&D  preformed  by  developed  countries.  A  number  of  studies  have 
addressed this issue by assessing the impact of foreign R&D on domestic productivity. These 
studies, which focused mainly on OECD countries, conclude that foreign R&D activity is an 
important  source  of  domestic  productivity  growth.  Unfortunately,  little  has  been  done  to 
examine the impact of foreign R&D on the productivity of less developed countries. This study 
precisely assesses the extent of R&D spillovers from G-5 countries (France, Germany, Japan, 
United  Kingdom,  and  United  States)  to  a  group  of  East  Asian  countries  (China,  Korea, 
Malaysia,  Singapore,  and  Thailand).  It  exploits  panel  data  over  the  1984-2005  period  and 
relies on the DSUR panel estimator due to Mark et al. (2005) to provide estimates of R&D 
effects on TFP.  
 
There  are  several  important  conclusions  that  emerge.  First,  the  overall  findings 
confirm  the  importance  of  technology,  be  it  developed  locally  or  by  foreign  countries. 
Additionally, some of our TFP elasticity estimates suggest that the impact of domestic R&D on 
productivity is larger in higher income Asian countries, while in other lower income countries 
the  elasticity  is  larger  with  respect  to  the  foreign  R&D  capital  stock.  Thus,  the  strong 
contribution of domestic R&D to productivity does not occur until a country reaches a certain 
level of income. Until then, greater economic interactions with technology leaders are critical 
for technological progress. Secondly, imports are more important as a spillover channel than 
FDI.  This  is  consistent  with  many  studies  that  have  been  conducted  using  samples  of 
developed countries. Thus, foreign R&D may have a stronger effect on domestic productivity 
the more open an economy is to international trade, highlighting the complementarity between 
trade  and  technology.  Third,  there  is  some  evidence  that  domestic  R&D  enhances  the 
incidence of international R&D spillovers. This finding corroborates other existing studies in 
the literature showing that the absorptive capacity of domestic R&D is an  important factor 
determining  economic  performance,  in  the  sense  of  being  able  to  absorb  and  internalise   56 
knowledge  generated  by  foreign  firms.  The  impact  of  new  knowledge  on  productivity  also 
depends on its diffusion, which is determined by the effort of firms on R&D. This underlines the 
importance for governments to keep in mind the diffusion aspect of FDI in the formulation of 
technology policies. Finally, the U.S. is generally a strong provider of technology spillovers, but 
the  strong  spillover  effects  emanating  from  Japan  are  relatively  weaker.  However,  the 
empirical evidence also suggests regional economic cooperation as important in promoting 
R&D  spillovers.  Recent  stronger  economic  cooperation  between  Japan  and  ASEAN’s 
countries  has  actually  generated  greater  technological  spillovers  to  these  countries. 
Development  aid  and  other  kinds  of  assistance  programs  help  also  in  increasing  the 
absorptive  capacity  of  Japanese  products.  It  seems  then  that  governments  can  foster  the 
constant  upgrading  of  technologies  by  promoting  economic  interactions  through  trade, 
investment and beyond, leading ultimately to higher standards of living of their citizens.   
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4.  INSURANCE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The important roles of financial markets in the development process can be traced back to 
Bagehot (1873). The author notes that the financial system performed an important function in 
channelling  resources  to  promote  the  industrial  revolution  in  England.  This  view  was 
supported  by  Schumpeter  (1934)  who  contends  that  the  services  provided  by  financial 
intermediaries  are  important  for  stimulating  technological  innovation  and  economic 
development. Banks are viewed as an important intermediating agent between surplus (i.e. 
lenders)  and  deficit  units  (i.e.  borrowers).  Hence,  well-developed  financial  systems  can 
channel  financial  resources  to  their  most  productive  use,  leading  to  the  expansion  of  the 
economy.
37 
 
The link between financial development and economic growth has been tested using 
different procedures, data sets and time periods and there is overwhelming support for the 
critical role of financial development for economic growth. Financial markets are found to have 
a strong positive impact on output and productivity growth, as well as capital accumulation 
(Yang and Yi, 2008, Demetriades and Law, 2006, Beck and Levine, 2004, Rioja and Valev, 
2004a, Beck et al., 2000).
38 Financial innovations help to reduce transaction and information 
costs while larger and more efficient financial markets help economic agents to hedge, trade 
and  pool  risk,  thus  raising  investment  and  economic  growth.  While  there  is  a  plethora  of 
research on the influence of banks and stock markets on economic growth, the role of other 
intermediaries such as insurance institutions has been largely ignored (Ang, 2008).  
 
The  importance  of  insurance  sector  for  economic  growth  was  first  recognized  by 
UNCTAD (1964), who acknowledged that "a sound national insurance and reinsurance market 
is an essential characteristic of economic growth”. Ward and Zurburegg (2000) persuasively 
argue that insurance markets  can have a positive impact on the economy by facilitating a 
myriad  of  economic  transactions  through  risk  transfer  and  indemnification.  Additionally, 
insurance sector promotes financial intermediation similar to banking institutions. However, it 
is surprising that the impact of insurance on growth has not been analysed as rigorously as 
                                                 
37 Robinson (1952) however argues that that financial development does not lead to higher economic growth but is 
driven by growth. Nevertheless, most empirical evidence is consistent with the Schumpeterian view of finance-led 
growth.  
38 Ang (2008) and Levine (2005) provide recent surveys of the related literature.     58 
the role of banks. A review of the literature suggests only a few studies have examined this 
issue and they find that insurance sector development has a significant impact on economic 
growth (Outreville, 1990, Ward and Zurburegg, 2000, Webb at al., 2002, Kugler and Ofoghi, 
2005, and Arena, 2008).  
 
The  main  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  new  empirical  evidence  on  the 
insurance-growth nexus. This paper contributes to the literature in several important aspects. 
In  particular,  it  provides  panel  evidence  using  data  from  52  countries  using  a  generalised 
method of moments (GMM) estimator that has a number of advantages compared to cross-
section  technique.  In  particular,  this  estimator  controls  for  endogeneity  of  all  explanatory 
variables, accounts for unobserved country-specific effects and allows the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables as regressors, which are typical issues when estimating growth model. 
Most  of  the  few  studies  on  insurance-growth  nexus  have  either  used  cross-section  (e.g. 
Outreville, 1990; Webb et al., 2002) or time series approach (e.g. Ward and Zurburegg, 2000; 
Kugler and Ofoghi, 2005). One exception is Arena (2008) who uses the GMM panel estimator 
on data from 55 countries.
39 However, our study differs from Arena (2008) in two important 
dimensions. Firstly, in addition to examining the impact of insurance on output growth similar 
to Arena (2008), we also evaluate its impact on growth channels: capital accumulation and 
productivity  growth.  To  our  knowledge,  none  of  the  previous  studies  have  examined  the 
impact on insurance on the growth channels. Moreover, we quantify the relative importance of 
these channels for developed and developing countries. Secondly, unlike Arena (2008), we 
rigorously deal with the problem of instrument proliferations. This problem has been ignored 
not only by Arena (2008) but also by most of other studies in the past. However, ignoring 
these problems may lead to spurious conclusions because some of asymptotic results about 
the estimators and related specification test are misleading (Roodman, forthcoming). 
 
Our findings suggest a strong, positive impact of insurance sector development on 
economic  growth.  In  developing  countries,  the  insurance  sector  is  important  for  capital 
accumulation  purposes  while  in  developed  countries  it  is  important  for  productivity 
improvement.  Moreover,  we  find  that  the  proliferation  of  instruments  appears  to  have  a 
significant  impact  on  the  estimated  long-run  insurance  effects.  Ignoring  these  problems 
generally  biases  downward  the  estimates  of  insurance  effects.  Our  findings  are  strongly 
consistent  with  models  that  predict  that  financial  intermediation  ease  information  and 
transaction costs and in so doing improve the allocation of resources and economic growth.  
                                                 
39 After this paper was completed, we discovered the paper by Arena (2008).    59 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of the literature. 
Section 4.3 discusses the estimation procedures. Section 4.4 describes the data set. Section 
4.5 contains the empirical results. The last section concludes. 
 
 
4.2  Review of the literature 
 
A  financial  system  consists  of  banking  institutions,  financial  markets,  other  financial 
intermediaries such as insurance companies and pension funds, and a regulatory body – the 
central bank - which oversees and supervises the operations of financial intermediaries. The 
financial  system  is  the  economic  sector  that  utilizes  productive  resources  to  facilitate  the 
process of capital formation through the provision of a wide range of financial tools to meet the 
different requirements of both borrowers and lenders. Thus, it plays a crucial role in mobilizing 
and intermediating saving, as well as enabling the efficient allocation of these resources to 
productive sectors. 
 
According  to  Levine  (2005),  financial  systems  influence  savings  and  investment 
decisions  and  hence  long-run  output  growth  via  two  primary  financial  functions:  resource 
allocation  and  risk  management.  These  functions  can  be  further  separated  into  five  basic 
functions. In particular, financial system (i) produces information about possible investment 
opportunities;  (ii)  facilitates  the  trading,  hedging,  diversification  and  pooling  of  real  (and 
financial) risks; (iii) exerts corporate control and monitor managers; (iv) mobilise saving; and 
(v)  facilitates  the  exchange  of  goods  and  services.  By  fulfilling  these  functions,  financial 
system improves both the quantity and quality of real investments and thus promoting GDP 
growth. Financial innovation reduce transaction and information costs while larger and more 
efficient financial markets help economic agents hedge, trade and pool risk, thereby  raising 
investment and output growth. 
 
With regard to insurance sector, it may generate a positive impact on the economy by 
improving  the  financial  systems,  both  as  a  provider  of  risk  transfer  and  indemnification 
services and as an institutional investor (Ward and Zurburegg, 2000). CEA (2006) highlights 
six  channels  via  which  insurance  sector  development  may  have  positive  impact  on  the 
economy.  First,  by  providing  insurance  coverage  directly  to  firms,  insurance  companies 
improve the financial soundness of the firms. The absence of insurance protection tends to be 
harmful particularly for small firms that have limited capital and access to external financing. 
Insurance allow firms to expand and take on risks without the need to set aside capital in liquid 
contingency funds. Second, insurance foster entrepreneurial attitude, encourage innovation   60 
and  competition.  Being  innovative  presupposes  the  willingness  to  take  risks.  Insurance 
decreases the risks supported by entrepreneur through mitigating and pooling procedures and 
thus allow them to take additional risks. By protecting entrepreneur against risks, insurance 
companies stimulate innovation  which  is critical for growth of the economy. Therefore, the 
more willingness to take risk is available, the more will be produced. Third, insurance offer 
social  protection  and  thus  releasing  the  pressure  on  the  public  sector  finance.  In  most 
countries (especially developed countries), the population structure is changing with a longer 
life expectancy and low-birth rate. At the same time, people expect to receive a high level of 
healthcare, pensions, unemployment and other social benefits. This situation adds pressure to 
the public sector finance. Innovations in insurance products such as private unemployment 
insurance and funded private pensions can release some of this pressure. Fourth, insurance 
promote sensible risk management by firms and households. Price and policy conditions of 
insurance are based on risk assessment. This will provide the policyholders an indication of 
their risk level. This may encourage them to take action to reduce the risk profile or to reduce 
potential damage, leading to responsible and sustainable use of resources. Fifth, insurance 
fosters stable consumption. Consumption represents almost 80% of GDP and constitutes one 
of the main drivers of economic growth. By offering lifelong insurance protection, insurance 
serve  as  a  security  net  allowing  stable  consumption  throughout  individual’s  life.  Finally, 
insurance  activity  may  also  have  indirect  impacts  on  growth  via  its  positive  effect  on  the 
development of other financial institutions and markets such as banks and capital markets. 
The development of these institutions and markets has been shown to be important for long-
run output growth (see Levine, 2005, for a survey). Insurance companies protect banks and 
their customers against a range of risk, underpinning bank lending by protecting customers 
against risks that might otherwise leave them unable to repay their debts (Rule, 2001). This 
protection services encourages bank borrowing by reducing companies’ cost of capital (Grace 
and Rebello, 1993). For instance, property insurance may facilitate bank lending via credit 
collateralization,  which  would  reduce  bank’s  credit  risk  exposure  (Zou  and  Adams,  2006). 
However, the development of insurance  markets may  also have a negative  implication on 
banking  development  because  of  ‘saving  substitution  effects’.  In  market  for  intermediated 
saving, insurance companies compete and could reduce bank’s market share. In the case of 
capital markets, insurance activity could promote stock and bond markets by investing funds 
(savings)  in  stock  and  bond  markets  (Catalan  et  al.,  2000).  This  process  would  not  only 
develop capital markets but also promote efficient allocation of funds in the economy because 
insurance  companies  would  gather  all  relevant  information  to  evaluate  projects  and  firms 
before  allocating  their  capital  (Skipper,  1997).  Moreover,  increased  level  of  monitoring  by 
insurance companies in projects or firms that they have invested will improve the potential of 
the funded projects (Conyon and Leech, 1994).   61 
 
At  the  theoretical  level,  several  models  emphasize  the  importance  of  financial 
intermediaries for economic growth. These models underlines that well-functioning financial 
intermediaries ameliorate information and transactions costs and therefore promote efficient 
allocation  of  resources,  leading  to  the  expansion  of  the  economy.  For instance, using  the 
simplest endogenous growth setting, i.e., the AK model, Pagano (1993) demonstrates that 
financial  intermediaries  can  affect  growth  through  savings  (i.e.,  the  proportion  of  savings 
channelled to productive investment) and by increasing the marginal productivity of capital. 
The model by King and Levine (1993b) emphasizes on risk diversification as a channel via 
which  financial  intermediaries  can  accelerate  technological  change  and  economic  growth. 
Economic agents are continuously trying to gain market niche through risky innovative activity. 
With  access  to  external  finance,  they  are  able  to  hold  a  diversified  portfolio  of  innovative 
projects. This leads to reduced cross-sectional risk and thus promotes investments in growth-
enhancing innovative activities. The model presented in Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990)  is 
particularly  novel  because  it  formally  models  the  dynamic  interaction  between  financial 
intermediaries and growth. Their model postulates that financial intermediaries produce better 
information about potential investments and therefore improve resources allocation and foster 
economic growth. However, higher output growth means that more individuals are able to join 
financial intermediaries, which improves the ability of financial intermediaries to produce better 
information with positive implications on growth. The model by Bencivenga and Smith (1991) 
show that efficient financial intermediation can boost growth by economizing on monitoring 
costs. On the role of insurance sector, the model by Webb et al.(2002) predicts that insurance 
activity promotes the productivity of physical capital, resulting in higher level of output.  
 
There  are  two  channels  via  which  financial  system  can  spur  growth:  the  capital 
accumulation channel and the productivity channel. The capital accumulation channel relies 
on  the  “debt-accumulation”  hypothesis  of  Gurley  and  Shaw  (1955)  which  focuses  on  the 
financial  sector’s  ability  to  overcome  indivisibility  problems  through  saving  mobilization.  By 
channelling saving to the productive sector, it boosts capital accumulation and output growth. 
On the other hand, the productivity channel is based upon recent endogenous growth models 
(Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990, King and Levine, 1993b) which emphasize on the role of 
financial sector ability in financing innovative activities. In particular, the model by King and 
Levine (1993b) emphasise on the ability of financial markets to finance entrepreneurial activity, 
leading to greater productivity growth. Also, financial markets can facilitate the adoption of 
technologies developed by others. For instance, Alfaro et al. (2004) empirically show that the 
acquisition of new technology linked to FDI inflows requires the presence of well-developed   62 
financial institutions in the host country. Moreover, Alfaro et al.(forthcoming) show technology 
spillovers from FDI contribute to productivity growth and not the accumulation of capital.   
 
Several  models  indicate  that  there  may  be  differences  in  the  relative  important  of 
growth channels for countries at different stages of economic developments. For instance, the 
model by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) predict that risky (but productive) projects with higher 
rates  of  return  are  indivisible  and  have  minimum  size  requirements.  As  a  result,  poorer 
countries  with  limited  available  funds  are  not  able  diversify  across all  available  productive 
projects. Since diversification opportunities are limited, these countries will typically  pursue 
primitive  capital  accumulation  strategy  where  some  funds  are  invested  in  safe  but  less 
productive assets, which  eventually reduce their productivity.  Further theoretical support is 
provided by Acemoglu et al. (2006) who predict that a developing country that is behind the 
technological  frontier  will  typically  pursue  a  capital  accumulation  growth  strategy  (i.e. 
investment-based growth). At this stage of development, there is less incentive to be selective 
of  firms  and  managers  because  this  is  highly  costly.  Hence,  there  exist  a  long-term 
relationship  between  financial  agents  and  firms,  which  result  in  funds  flowing  to  those 
established firms for capital accumulation purpose. In contrast, industrial countries that are at 
the technological frontier have a strong incentive for innovation. At this stage, financial agents 
are very selective of firms and managers that can achieve this goal. Therefore, funds are 
expected to flows to activities with larger productivity gains (i.e. innovation-based growth).  
 
Empirical evidence on the impact of financial developments on economy growth has 
largely  focused  on  the  roles  of  banks  and  stock  markets.  Ang  (2008)  and  Levine  (2005) 
provide  excellent  surveys  of  the  related  literature  which  suggest  that  a  well-functioning 
financial  system  has  a  positive  impact  on  long-run  economic  growth.  The  findings  are 
supported by cross-country regressions (Levine and Zervos, 1998, King and Levine, 1993a, 
King and Levine, 1993b), panel studies (Demetriades and Law, 2006, Rioja and Valev, 2004a, 
Levine  et  al.,  2000),  time  series  analyses  (Yang  and  Yi,  2008,  Abu-Bader  and  Abu-Qarn, 
2008,  Luintel  and  Khan,  1999),  firm-level  (Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic,  1998),  and 
industry-level estimations (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Although banking institutions and stock 
markets  perform  different  functions,  both  boost  output  growth,  capital  accumulation,  and 
productivity  (Rioja  and  Valev,  2004b,  Levine  and  Zervos,  1998,  Beck  et  al.,  2000). 
Furthermore, Rioja and Valev (2004b) find that banking sector development has a greater 
impact on capital accumulation in developing countries than in industrial countries, although 
the effect on productivity growth is stronger in the latter.  
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Despite the importance of the insurance activity for economic growth, relatively little 
research has been carried out on this issue. This topic has not been studied as extensively as 
the role of banks and stock markets. However, ignoring the rapid development of insurance 
markets  may  lead  to  a  significant  underestimation  of  the  overall  impact  of  financial 
development on economic growth. A review of the literature reveals only a handful of empirical 
studies.  For  instance,  using  a  cross-sectional  analysis  Outreville  (1990)  finds  a  positive 
relationship  between  property-liability  insurance  and  GDP  per  capita  in  55  developing 
countries.  Ward  and  Zurbruegg  (2000)  analyse  nine  OECD  countries  and  find  that  the 
insurance  industry  (represented  by  total  insurance  premia)  Granger-causes  real  GDP  in 
Canada  and  Japan.  Causality  is  bi-directional  in  Italy,  but  no  causal  relation  can  be 
established for other countries.
40 Browne et al.(2000) find that non-life insurance consumption 
is associated positively with the income level for a sample of OECD countries over the 1986–
1993  period.  Using  a  sample  of  55  countries  and  an  iterated  three-stage  least  squares 
simultaneous estimation technique, Webb et al. (2002) find that the life insurance penetration 
robustly predicts productivity increases. Kugler and Ofoghi (2005) examined the relationship 
between insurance and GDP growth in the UK under the lens of cointegration analysis. They 
find an overwhelming support for a long run relationship between different insurance sectors 
and  economic  growth.
41  Moreover,  insurance  activity  is  found  to  Granger-cause  economic 
growth in most of the sectors. Recently, Arena (2008) examines the influence of life and non-
life  insurance  on  economic  growth.  Using  data  from  55  countries  and  the  GMM  panel 
estimator, the author finds that both life and non-life insurance activity have a positive and 
significant causal effect on output growth of high-income countries. In the case of developing 
countries, output growth is driven by the development of non-life insurance market. Although 
the  aforementioned  studies  has  made  important  contributions  to  the  literature,  empirical 
evidence on  insurance-growth nexus remains limited in two aspects (i) panel  evidence on 
causal effect of insurance on growth, and (ii) the impact of insurance on the growth channels 
namely, capital accumulation and productivity growth. Therefore, this issue deserves further 
examination.  
 
With this backdrop, we contribute to the literature by examining the causal effect of 
insurance sector developments on  growth, using a panel of 52 developed and developing 
countries  over  25  years  (1981-2005).  Also,  we  assess  the  impact  of  insurance  on  capital 
accumulation and productivity growth across developed and developing countries 
 
 
                                                 
40 Other countries are Austria, Australia, Switzerland, France, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
41 Eight insurance sectors were analyzed: life; motor insurance; accident and health insurance; property; liability; 
pecuniary loss; reinsurance; and marine, aviation, and transport.   64 
4.3  Estimation Procedures 
 
In  this  paper,  we  follow  the  standard  econometric  specification  of  the  finance  and  growth 
literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2000, Levine et al., 2000).
42  This section explains our econometric 
procedures.  The  first  sub-section  explains  the  cross  country  estimation  technique  and 
instrumental variables used to alleviate the endogeneity problems. The second sub-section 
explains the dynamic panel estimator.  
 
 
4.3.1  Cross-section regressions with instrumental variables 
 
Following earlier literature (e.g. King and Levine, 1993a; Levine and Zervos, 1998), the first 
step  of  our  analysis  involves  a  cross-sectional  estimation.  Although  the  cross-country 
estimator does not deal as rigorously as the panel estimators with simultaneity issues, omitted 
variables, and unobserved country-specific effects, it is useful in verifying the consistency of 
panel data findings. Following La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) – henceforth LLSV, we use legal 
origins to control for simultaneity bias. LLSV (1997) argue that a country’s legal and regulatory 
system will fundamentally influence the ability of the financial system to provide high-quality 
financial services. Specifically, it will determine the ability of financial intermediaries to identify 
worthy  firms,  exert  corporate  control,  manage  risk,  mobilize  savings,  and  ease  exchange. 
According  to  Reynolds  and  Flores  (1996),  legal  systems  with  European  origins  can  be 
classified into four major legal families: the English common law countries, and the French, 
German  and  Scandinavian  civil  law  countries.  This  classification  excludes  countries  with 
socialist and Islamic based legal systems. All four legal families descend from the Roman law 
as compiled by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian in the sixth century. In the last four centuries, 
the four legal families have evolved differently. The Scandinavian countries formed their own 
legal codes in the 17
th and 18
th centuries. The French Civil Code was written in 1804 and later 
spread to other countries (especially Latin American and African countries) through occupation 
and colonization. The German Civil Code was completed almost a century later in 1896. It has 
had a great influence on Austria and Switzerland. It also heavily influenced Japanese Civil 
Code which later spread to Korea. Unlike the civil law countries, the English legal system was 
developed  based  on  common  law,  where  the  main  source  of  law  was  jurisprudence,  i.e. 
judges sentences in particular cases. Through colonialism, it was spread to many Asian and 
African countries, North America, Australia, and New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
42 The cross-section and panel studies on finance-growth nexus typically use Barro (1991) regression model and 
augment it with some financial development indicators.    65 
There are two conditions under which the legal origins can be appropriate instruments 
for insurance sector development. First, legal origins must be exogenous to economic growth 
during  the  chosen  sample  period.  Second,  they  must  be  correlated  with  insurance  sector 
development. Regarding the exogeneity, we take the legal origins as exogenous because they 
were spread through colonialism and occupation. Moreover, we provide the specification test 
for checking the validity of these instruments. In terms of the link between legal origins and 
insurance sector development, a growing body of literature has shown that legal origins help 
shaping the development of the financial system. LLSV (1998) show that the legal origins 
materially influence the legal treatment of shareholders, the efficiency of contract enforcement, 
the law governing creditor rights, and accounting standards. Statistically, several studies have 
shown that these legal and regulatory characteristics influence financial sector developments 
(Levine  et  al.,  2000,  Beck  et  al.,  2000).  Although  the  literature  on  the  legal  system  and 
insurance markets development is less developed, Browne et al.(2000) show that a country’s 
legal  system  is  a  significant  determinant  of  demand  for  automobile  and  general  liability 
insurance. 
 
The  cross-sectional  regression  exploits  data  averaged  over  the  1981-2005  period, 
such that there is one observation per country. The basic model can be expressed as follows: 
 
GROWTHi = φ + δINSi + γMi + ei,            (4.1) 
 
where i is the country index, GROWTH is growth rate of real GDP per capita, INS denotes 
insurance variable (i.e. life penetration ratio), M is a vector of other variables hypothesized to 
affect growth, and e is the error term. In order to examine whether cross-country variations in 
the exogenous component of insurance sector development explain cross-country variations 
in economic growth rates, the legal origins are used as instrumental variables for insurance. 
We use a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimator to generate consistent estimate of  δin 
Equation (4.1). In the first stage, the insurance variable is regressed on all of the variables in 
vector M plus the excluded instruments (i.e. legal origins which are assumed in vector Z).  In 
the second stage, Equation (4.1) is estimated as usual, except that the insurance variable is 
replaced  with  its  predicted  values  from  the  regression  in  the  first  stage.  This  estimation 
requires that the variables in vector Z are appropriate instruments which amount to the set of 
orthogonality conditions E(Ze)=0. We test this condition using the Sargan overidentifying test. 
Under the null that the instruments are not correlated with the error terms, the test has a  2 χ  
distribution  with  (J-K)  degree  of  freedom,  where  J  is  the  number  of  instruments  and  K  is 
number of regressors.  
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4.3.2  GMM panel estimator 
 
For panel data analysis, we use a generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel 
estimator which was first proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al.(1988) and subsequently extended by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995),and Blundell and Bond (1998). Consider 
the following growth equation: 
 
t i i t i it t i t i it X INS y y y , , 2 1 1 , 1 , ) 1 ( ε + η + β + β + − α = − − −           (4.2) 
 
where   yis real GDP per capita (in log),  X  represents a set of explanatory variables which 
affect  growth  ,η  is  an  unobserved  country-specific  effects,  and  ε  is  the  error  term. 
Equivalently, Equation (4.2) may be written as: 
 
t i i t i it t i it X INS y y , , 2 1 1 , ε + η + β + β + α = −             (4.3) 
 
Several  studies  show  that  the  country-specific  effects  play  an  important  role  in 
shaping the development of insurance markets and should be controlled for in the analysis of 
insurance-growth  relationship.  For  instance,  Fukuyama  (1995)  highlights  the  importance  of 
culture  in  demand  for  insurance.
43  Moreover,  Angeer  (1993)  points  out  that  a  country’s 
regulation can facilitate as well as constrain insurance activities. In order to eliminate country-
specific fixed effects in Equation (4.3), Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a first-difference 
transformation as follows: 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 , , 1 , , 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 , , − − − − − − ε − ε + − β + − β + − α = − t i t i t i t i t i it t t t i t i t i X X INS INS y y y y     (4.4) 
 
To address the possible simultaneity bias of explanatory variables and the correlation between 
( ) 2 1 − − − t , i t , i y y   and  ( ) 1 , , − − t i t i ε ε , Arellano and Bond (1991) propose that the lagged levels of 
the regressors are used as instruments. This is valid under the assumptions (i) the error term 
is not serially correlated, and (ii) the lag of the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we set the following moment conditions:  
 
( ) [ ] 0 1 = ε − ε ⋅ − − t , i t , i s t , i y E  for  T t s ,...., 3 ; 2 = ≥            (4.5) 
( ) [ ] 0 1 = ε − ε ⋅ − − t , i t , i s t , i INS E  for  T t s ,...., 3 ; 2 = ≥            (4.6) 
                                                 
43 In the high-trust countries such as U.K., U.S., and Japan, insurance markets play important role in transferring risk, 
while in low-trust countries like France and Italy the potential role of insurance is greatly reduced.     67 
( ) [ ] 0 1 , , , = ε − ε ⋅ − − t i t i s t i X E  for  T t s ,...., 3 ; 2 = ≥            (4.7) 
 
Although  the  difference  estimator  above  is  able  to  alleviate  some  of  the  problems 
encountered in estimating dynamic growth model, it nevertheless has one major shortcoming. 
Alonso-Borrego  and  Arellano  (1999)  and  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998)  show  that  when  the 
explanatory  variables  are  persistent  the  lagged  levels  of  the  variables  become  weak 
instruments. They show that weak instruments may lead to biased parameter estimates in 
small samples and larger variance asymptotically. Before, Arellano and Bover (1995) propose 
an  alternative  system  estimator  that  combines  the  difference  Equation  (4.4)  and  the  level 
Equation (4.3). Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this estimator is able to reduce biases and 
imprecision  associated  with difference estimator. Following  Arellano and  Bover (1995), the 
instruments for the regression in differences are the same as above. The regression in levels 
uses lagged differences of the corresponding variables as instruments. This is valid under the 
assumption that there is no correlation between the differences in explanatory variables and 
the country-specific fixed effect. The additional moment conditions for the second part of the 
system (the regression in levels) are given by:  
 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 = ε + η ⋅ − − − − t , i i s t , i s t , i y y E  for  1 = s            (4.8) 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 = ε + η ⋅ − − − − t , i i s t , i s t , i INS INS E  for  1 = s           (4.9) 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 = ε + η ⋅ − − − − t , i i s t , i s t , i X X E  for  1 = s                     (4.10) 
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on two specification tests. The first is 
the Hansen (1982) J test of over-identifying restrictions. Under the null of joint validity of all 
instruments, the empirical moments have zero expectation, so the J statistic is distributed as a 
2 χ   with  degrees  of  freedom  equal  to  the  degree  of  overidentification  (i.e.  number  of 
instruments  minus  the  number  of  independent  variables).  If  the  errors  are  believed  to  be 
homoskedastic, the J-test is the classic Sargan (1958) statistic. The second test examines the 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the error term of the difference Equation 
(4.4) (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Failure to reject the null of both tests provides support to the 
estimated model. 
 
The GMM estimators are typically applied in one- and two-step variants (Arellano and 
Bond,  1991).  The  one-step  estimators  use  weighting  matrices  that  are  independent  of 
estimated  parameters,  whereas  the  efficient  two-step  GMM  estimator  uses  the  so-called 
optimal  weighting  matrices  where  the  moment  conditions  are  weighted  by  a  consistent 
estimate of their covariance matrix. This makes the two-step estimator asymptotically more   68 
efficient  than  the  one-step  estimator.  However,  the  use  of  the  two-step  estimator  in  small 
samples,  such  as  our  study,  has  several  problems.  These  problems  result  from  the 
proliferation of instruments that makes some of asymptotic results about the estimators and 
related  specification  test  misleading  (Roodman,  forthcoming).  The  first  problem  relates  to 
standard errors of the two-step estimators. When instruments are numerous, the asymptotic 
standard  errors  of  the  parameter  estimates  are  severely  downward  biased  because  of 
imprecise  estimate  of  the  optimal  weighting  matrices  (Windmeijer,  2005).  As  a  result,  the 
efficiency  gain  over  the  one-step  estimator  may  be  small  and  this  makes  the  two-step 
estimator  a  poor  guide  for  hypothesis  testing.  Windmeijer  (2005)  devises  a  correction 
procedure for the covariance matrix and consequently  makes the two-step estimator more 
efficient than the one-step estimator, particularly for the system GMM. Before this correction 
procedure became  available, researchers routinely relied  on the  one-step result in  making 
inferences. The second problem is that the instrument proliferations can generate results that 
are invalid yet appear valid because of weakened Hansen overidentification test.
44 In Monte 
Carlo simulations of difference GMM on N = 100 panels, Bowsher (2002) show that the test is 
clearly undersized once T reaches 13 (66 instrument). At T = 15 (91 instruments), it never 
rejects the null of joint validity at 0.05 or 0.10, rather than rejecting it 5% or 10% of the time as 
a  well-sized  test  would.  The  final  problem  is  that  numerous  instruments  can  overfit  the 
instrumented variables and consequently failing to filter out the endogenous component. This 
will result in biased coefficient estimates.
45 In a simulation of difference GMM estimator on an 
8 x 100 panel, Windmeijer (2005) shows that the average bias in the two-step estimates of 
parameter drops by 40% when the instruments count is reduced from 28 to 13. Recently, 
Calderon  et  al.  (2002)  propose  a  novel  approach  that  reduces  the  dimensionality  of  the 
instrumental  variables  matrix  to  alleviates  problems  induced  by  the  proliferation  of 
instruments.
46 However, one problem faced by empirical economists when applying the GMM 
estimator is that the theory is not explicit enough about how many instruments are considered 
‘too many’. Arellano and Bond (1998) show that the approximation of the optimal weighting 
matrix with limited data can be singular when J approaches N. This has contributed to the idea 
that N is a key threshold for safe estimation.  
 
In  this  paper  we  use  several  variants  of  the  GMM  estimator  to  highlight  potential 
problems  induced  by  the  proliferation  of  instruments.  This  is  particularly  important  for  the 
present study given a small size of our sample.  
 
                                                 
44 The Sargan test is not affected by the problem of instrument proliferation because it does not depend on the optimal 
weighting matrix. However, the test is only consistent when the errors are homoskedastic, which is rarely practical.  
45 This problem is not unique to the two-step estimator. It also affects the consistency of the one-step estimate.   
46 Roodman (forthcoming) provide a useful technical explanation of the Calderon et al.’s, (2002) procedure.    69 
4.4  Data set 
 
The data set consists of panel observations from 52 countries for the period 1981 – 2005.
47  
The life insurance penetration ratio, measured by the volume of life insurance premia as a 
share of GDP, is used to proxy for the development of insurance markets. The data was taken 
from the Financial Structure Database of the World Bank.  
 
In this paper, there are three dependent variables of interest namely, output growth 
defined as the growth rate of real per capita GDP, capital growth defined as the growth rate of 
per capita physical capital stock, and productivity growth defined as the rate of growth rate of 
the “residuals” (i.e. Solow residual). The real GDP per capita is PPP-adjusted and taken from 
Heston  et  al.  (2006).  GDP  adjusted  by  PPP  has  the  advantage  of  expressing  income  in 
comparable units in terms of living standards across countries. Capital stock is generated from 
the aggregate real investment series following the perpetual inventory method. It is estimated 
by taking into account the continual additions to and subtractions from the stock of capital as 
new investment and retirement of old capital occurs. Capital stock at time t is given by: 
 
Kt = (1-δ)Kt-1 + It,                           (4.11) 
 
where K is the capital stock, δ is the rate of physical depreciation and I is gross fixed capital 
formation.  Assuming  that capital  and  output  grow  at  the  same  rate, the  initial  level  of  the 
capital stock is determined using the following formula Kt-1 = It /(g +δ ), where δ  is assumed 
to be 7% and g is average growth rate of output measured over 10 years (Beck et al., 2000). 
Per capita capital stock is calculated as the ratio of capital stock to total population.  
 
The  productivity  growth  is  obtained  from  the  following  neo-classical  production 
function: 
 
α α − = 1 L AK Y                           (4.12) 
 
We divide Equation (4.12) by  L  and take log-time derivatives. Following Beck et al. (2000), 
we set the share of capital in GDP, α , to 0.3 yielding the productivity growth rate as follows: 
 
Productivity Growth = Output Growth – 0.3*Capital Growth               (4.13) 
 
                                                 
47 Refer to Appendix 2.1 for a list of countries.    70 
Our approach of calculating TFP has been criticised for conceptual and measurement 
errors.  Several  problems  that  have  been  highlighted  are  incorrect  concept  of  capital, 
measurement  errors  in  input  and  output  variables,  missing  or  appropriate  data,  incorrect 
weight  for  indices,  theoretical  specifications,  and  aggregation  over  heterogeneity  (see 
Griliches, 1987). Several alternatives have been proposed in the literature such as the index 
number and econometric model approaches (see Lipsey and Carlaw (2004), for a discussion). 
Although  the  index  number  approach  is  more  flexible  in  the  sense  that  it  does  require 
production function, it suffers from other similar problems linked to the production function 
approach. Moreover, the DEA approach, which makes a strong claim to be superior, suffers 
from  an  incredible  assumption  that  all  countries  in  the  sample  have  the  same  production 
function. The econometrics approach to TFP measurement which is based on econometric 
models  is  able  to  avoid  many  problems  associated  with  the  production  function  or  index 
number approach. It may also allow for adjustment cost, variations in capacity utilisation and 
investigation of different form of technical change other than Hicks-neutral formulation implied 
by the other approaches. An example can be found in Nadiri and Pruncha (2001). However, a 
full-fledged  econometric  model  raises  complex  econometrics  issues  and  sometimes  put  a 
question  mark  on  the  robustness  of  results.  Moreover,  limited  data  availability  may  have 
negative  implication  on  the  degrees  of  freedom.  Furthermore,  it  also  suffers  from 
measurement  error  problems  associated  with  the  production  function  and  index  number 
approaches. In light of these arguments and for the reason to be consistent with the finance-
growth literature [Beck et al. (2000), Rioja  and  Valev (2004)], we calculate TFP using the 
production approach.   
 
Following  Levine  et  al.  (2000)  and  Beck  et  al.  (2000),  the  remaining  conditioning 
variables are initial  income, life expectancy, government size (government spending/GDP), 
openness to trade ((exports + imports)/GDP), inflation rate, and the black market exchange 
rate  premium. We  include  initial  income  to  account  for  the  “convergence  effect”  while  life 
expectancy is used as a proxy for human capital.
 48 Government size, the inflation rate, trade 
openness and black market exchange rate premium account for country-specific government 
policies.  The  inflation  rate  and  life  expectancy  were  taken  from  the  World  Development 
Indicators database. The index of black market exchange rate premium from Gwartney and 
Lawson (2006) is scaled from 0 to 10, in which 10 means zero premium. The remaining data  
were taken from the Penn World Tables of Heston et al. (2006). All data, except for initial 
income which the logged value of GPD per capita the beginning of each five-year period, are 
averaged over non-overlapping five-year period (i.e. 1981-1985, 1986-1990,……, 2001-2005) 
                                                 
48 Secondary school enrollment in the Barro-Lee dataset is a common proxy for human capital in the literature. Due to 
its unavailability for recent years, we use life expectancy instead.    71 
to factor out the business cycle effect. Data for legal origins are from La Porta et al. (1999) 
who also provide a list of countries with a socialist and Islamic legal system. Table 1 provides 
the summary of data sources.   
 
 
Table 4.1: Sources of data  
Variable  Source  Unit of Measurement 
     
Life insurance penetration ratio  Financial Structure Database  % of GDP 
Real GDP per capita  Penn World Table  PPP price 
Life expectancy   World Development Indicators  Years 
Inflation  World Development Indicators  rate  
Openness  Penn World Table  % of GDP 
Government expenditure  Penn World Table  % of GDP 
Black market premium  Fraser Institute  Index ( 0 – 10 scale ) 
Private credit   Financial Structure Database  % of GDP 
Total share traded  Financial Structure Database  % of GDP 
Legal origins  La Porta et al. (1999)  Dummy variable  
     
 
 
Figure 4.1 displays output growth and the insurance penetration ratio for the sampled 
countries,  averaged  over  the  whole  period  (1981-2005).  It  shows  that  there  is  a  positive 
relationship between the variables, although China (CHN) and South Africa (ZAF) fall relatively 
far from the rest. China has the highest output growth rates (8.14%) but the level of insurance 
sector development is very low (0.8%). In contrast, South Africa has a relatively low rate of 
output  growth  (0.8%)  but  the  insurance  penetration  ratio  is  very  high  (9.28%).  Figure  2.2 
illustrates  a  clear  positive  relationship  between  insurance  sector  development  and  output 
growth. It displays two samples. One that includes all 52 countries and another that excludes 
the two potential outliers, China and South Africa. The figure shows that countries with higher 
level of insurance penetration ratio tend to enjoy faster growth over the 1980-2005 period. This 
relationship becomes more apparent when China and South Africa are excluded.  
   72 
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Figure 4.1 Scatter plot of growth vs. insurance penetration ratio 
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Figure 4.2 Economic growth and insurance sector development 
 
Table 4.2 provides informative descriptive statistics on three growth variables and an 
insurance  proxy  (i.e.  life  insurance  penetration  ratio).  Statistics  are  reported  for  the  whole 
sample and separating developed from developing countries (income groups). Two features of 
the data are worth mentioning. First, there is substantial variance among the countries in the 
growth and insurance indicators. For example, output growth ranges from -0.92% (Venezuela) 
to 8.14% (China) and insurance ranges from 0.04% (Iran) to 9.28% (South Africa). Similar   73 
variation  is also  observed within the two  income  groups. Second, the mean values  of the 
growth  rates  of  output  and  capital  and  of  the  insurance  indicator  are  higher  in  developed 
countries than in developing countries. However, the productivity growth is slightly larger in 
developing countries (1.6%) than in developed countries (1.58%), in contrast to theoretical 
prediction. The reason stems in the abnormally high productivity growth in China. Excluding 
China means productivity growth for developing countries is much lower than in developed 
countries.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                 
A: Full sample                
    Output growth  52  0.0194  0.0152  -0.0092  0.0814 
    Capital growth  52  0.0103  0.0239  -0.0364  0.0862 
    Productivity growth  52  0.0159  0.0099  -0.0008  0.0552 
    Insurance/GDP  52  0.0216  0.0224  0.0472  0.0928 
                 
B: Developed Countries                
    Output growth  25  0.0219  0.0106  0.0078  0.0574 
    Capital growth  25  0.0202  0.0120  0.0058  0.0626 
    Productivity growth  25  0.0158  0.0083  0.0062  0.0390 
    Insurance/GDP  25  0.0344  0.0202  0.0015  0.0735 
                 
C: Developing Countries                
    Output growth  27  0.0171  0.0184  -0.0092  0.0814 
    Capital growth  27  0.0012  0.0283  -0.0364  0.0862 
    Productivity growth  27  0.0160  0.0114  -0.0008  0.0552 
    Insurance/GDP  27  0.0098  0.0176  0.0004  0.0928 
                 
 
 
 
Table  4.3  presents  the  correlations  between  the  growth  and  insurance  indicator, 
computed by using panel  data (i.e. data averaged over 5-year interval). Two  observations 
emerge. First, the correlation between insurance and output growth are relatively small. They 
are 0.19, 0.12 and 0.17 for the full sample, developed and developing countries, respectively. 
Second,  the  correlation  between  insurance  and  capital  growth  is  larger  than  between 
insurance  and  productivity  growth.  The  same  pattern  appears  for  the  two  income  groups. 
However, correlation does not imply causation which is precisely the type of relation that we 
are interested in this study.   74 
Table 4.3: Correlation analysis  
Variable  Output  Capital  Productivity  Insurance 
         
A: Full sample         
Output growth  1       
Capital growth  0.68  1     
Productivity growth  0.93  0.39  1   
Insurance/GDP  0.19  0.39  0.06  1 
         
B: Developed Countries         
Output growth  1       
Capital growth  0.62  1     
Productivity growth  0.96  0.4  1   
Insurance/GDP  0.12  0.32  0.03  1 
         
C: Developing Countries         
Output growth  1       
Capital growth  0.71  1     
Productivity growth  0.93  0.43  1   
Insurance/GDP  0.17  0.21  0.09  1 
              
 
 
 
4.5  Empirical results 
 
In this section, we present and discuss the empirical results of the effect of insurance sector 
developments on growth (Tables 4.4 – 4.9). Table 4.4 and 4.5 reports the results from cross-
section regression, when insurance is instrumented by legal origins and estimation by 2SLS 
are used, respectively. The rest of the tables report the results for the GMM estimator when 
examining  (i)  the  effect  of  insurance  markets  on  output  growth  (Table  4.6),  (ii)  effect  of 
insurance development on capital accumulation and productivity growth (Table 4.7), (iii) the 
growth-effect of insurance across developed and developing countries (Table 4.8), and (iv) the 
robustness of findings, controlling for banking sector and stock market developments (Table 
4.9).   
 
 
4.5.1  Cross-section estimation 
 
The first part of our analysis is to estimate a cross-country growth equation using country 
averages over the full 25-year period. The legal origins are used as instruments for insurance 
indicator and the 2SLS estimation technique is applied to generate consistent estimates of   75 
coefficients. We consider legal origins as an exogenous ‘endowment’ since they were spread 
through conquest and imperialism. However, it is important to note that exogeneity is not a 
sufficient condition for economically meaningful instrumental variables. The legal origins must 
also  be  strongly  correlated  with  insurance  indicator  during  our  chosen  sample  period. 
Therefore, the first step of our cross-country analysis involves a regression of the insurance 
indicator (i.e. life insurance penetration ratio) on the dummy variables for English, French, 
German, and Socialist legal origins relative to Scandinavian legal origin (reference group). The 
results which are summarized in Table 4.4 show that the countries with a German legal origin 
have  better developed insurance sector  while countries  with socialist legal system tend to 
have less developed markets than the rest. More importantly, the p-value and F-test suggest 
that legal origins explain a significant fraction of cross-country differences in insurance activity. 
Thus, there is strong connection between legal origins and insurance sector developments. 
               
 
Table 4.4: Legal origins and insurance sector development 
 
  Coefficient  S.e  p-value 
       
Constant  2.671  0.736  0.001 
ENGLISH  0.321  0.963  0.740     
FRENCH  -1.642  0.776  0.040     
GERMAN  2.853  1.381  0.044      
SOCIALIST  -1.871  0.736  0.014     
       
Observations  52 
Prob(F-test)  0.000 
R-square  0.36 
   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the life insurance penetration ratio. S.e. are robust standard errors. ENGLISH = 
English legal origin. FRENCH = French legal origin. GERMAN =German legal origin. SOCIALIST = Socialist legal 
system. Scandinavian legal origin is the reference group.  
 
 
We  next  use  legal  origins  as  instruments  and  proceed  to  examine  the  impact  of 
insurance on growth using 2SLS technique. Table 4.5 presents our results. As shown in the 
table, the estimated coefficient for insurance is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level.  An  improvement  in  insurance  sector  by  1  percentage-point  would  lead  to  0.012 
percentage-point higher output. This suggests that there is a strong connection between the 
exogenous  component  of  insurance  sector  development  and  long-run  output  growth. 
Furthermore, the Hansen test suggests that the instruments are not correlated with the error 
term as the null cannot be rejected at the usual level. This finding together with instruments 
being highly correlated with insurance indicator (Table 4.4) provides evidence in favour of the 
validity  of  instruments.  Therefore,  the  strong  positive  effect  on  insurance  development  on   76 
output growth is not due to simultaneity bias. The estimated coefficient can be interpreted as 
the effect of the exogenous component of insurance sector development on output growth.
49  
 
With respect to other conditioning variables, we find that only initial GDP per capita, 
life expectancy and openness are statistically significant and enter the regression equations 
with the signs as predicted by theories. All other variables are insignificant. Our finding of no 
significant impact of government size on output growth is consistent Ram (1986) who argues 
that the government size can have both positive and negative impacts on the economy. A 
larger government size can be detrimental if government operations are inefficient, regulatory 
process impose excessive burdens on the economy and fiscal and monetary policies distort 
the incentives and lower the productivity of the economy. Meanwhile, government size can be 
beneficial through its roles in harmonizing conflicts between private and social interests. Also, 
it can secure an increase in productive investment and provide a socially optimal direction for 
growth and development. In the case of inflation rate, we find no  negative relationship as 
reported  by  some  studies  (Levine  et  al.,  2000).  Our  results  however  are  consistent  with 
Bekaert et al. (2005) who find that in three of four regressions, the coefficients on inflation rate 
are  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Only  in  the  case  of  Argentina  and  Brazil  which 
experienced hyper-inflation the coefficients are significant. Before, Barro (1997) find that the 
significant negative relationship between inflation and growth is primarily driven by a strong 
negative relation between very high inflation rate (over 15%) and economic growth.  Finally, 
the coefficient on black market premium is insignificant, in contrast to the results reported by 
Bekaert et al. (2005). However, it should be noted that our proxy of black premium is different 
from  Bekaert  et  al.  (2005)  and  the  results  may  not  be  completely  comparable.  Another 
explanation  may  be  due  to  a  strong  correlation  between  inflation  rate  and  black  market 
premium as suggested by Pinto (1989). The author argues that when a dual exchange rate 
system (i.e. official and black market) works as a tool for taxation, the increase in the deficit 
resulting  from  unification  of  black  and  official  exchange  rates  will  lead  to  higher  inflation. 
Increased inflation results from the government’s need to print more money to cover the gap 
between spending and revenues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 We have also estimated OLS regression and find that the impact of insurance on output growth is significant but 
with a smaller magnitude. Specifically, we find the estimated coefficient on insurance is 0.003 (s.e. 0.0008).   77 
Table 4.5: Two-stage least square estimation  
 
  Coefficient  S.e  p-value 
       
Insurance
 ΐ  0.012  0.005  0.011      
Initial GDP per capita 
ΐ  -0.090  0.025  0.000     
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.547  0.204   0.007      
Government size
 ΐ  0.001  0.024  0.959     
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  0.024  0.017  0.180      
Openness
 ΐ  0.028  0.016   0.087     
Black market premium
 ΐ   -0.012  0.008  0.131     
       
Observations  52 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.817(0.664) 
   
 
Notes: All data averaged over 1981-2005 (except initial income which is GDP per capita at the start of 1976) and the 
legal origins from LLSV (1999) are used as instruments for insurance variable  
ΐ and 
ΐ ΐ indicate variables are included 
as log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. 
 
 
 
An array of sensitivity analyses is carried out to gauge the robustness of our findings. 
Firstly,  estimation  results  excluding  China  and  South  Africa  show  that  the  identified  effect 
remains  intact  (see  Appendix  4.2).  Secondly,  to  formally  check  on  the  potential  impact  of 
outliers, we compute the Cook’s D statistic
50 to identify countries with high combination of 
residuals and leverage. The test suggests that China, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, South Korea, 
and the United States are potential outliers. Interestingly, the exclusion of these outliers did 
not alter the estimation results (see Appendix 4.4). Finally, the model is re-estimated using the 
cross-section  GMM  estimator.  The  moments  are  set  such  that  the  instruments  (i.e.  legal 
origin) are uncorrelated with the error term. The results show that the exogenous component 
of insurance development exerts a strong positive impact on output growth (see Appendix 
4.5).      
 
 
4.5.2  Panel estimation 
 
The second step of our analysis is to evaluate the impact of insurance sector development on 
output  growth  using  the GMM  panel estimator.  The results  are  reported  in  Table  4.6.  For 
comparison  purposes  with  the  earlier  literature,  the  first  panel  analysis  is  to  employ  the 
difference-GMM estimator and results are reported in column (i). The results show that the 
coefficient on the insurance indicator is statistically insignificant at the usual level. This is not a 
surprise because the difference-GMM estimator can be poorly behaved when the series are 
persistent, which is common in a short panel like our study.   
 
                                                 
50 Refer to Appendix 4.3 for further details about the Cook’s D statistic.    78 
  The next step of our analysis is to utilize the one-step system-GMM estimator which is 
commonly used in the literature. The results presented in column (ii) show that the coefficient 
on  insurance  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level.  Moreover,  all  other 
conditioning variables enter the regression equation with the expected sign and statistically 
significant,  except  for  government  size  and  inflation.  However,  the  number  of  instruments 
(which  is  greater  than  N)  suggests  possible  problems.  Although  this  does  not  affect  the 
efficiency of the one-step estimates, it nevertheless affects the consistency of the parameter 
estimates. Moreover, the over-identification test suggests that the null of joint validity of all 
instruments can be rejected at the 5 percent. Thus, these results are driven by simultaneity 
bias.  
 
We next apply the two-step system GMM estimator and correct the standard errors 
following  Windmeijer  (2005).  Results  reported  in  column  (iii)  show  that  the  estimated 
coefficient  on  insurance  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  at  the  5  percent  level. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of insurance effect is similar to the one-step estimate. The p-
values  of  both  serial  correlation  and  overindentification  tests  suggest  that  the  model  is 
correctly specified and the instruments are valid. However, the number of instruments of larger 
than N suggests possible biased parameter estimates and weakened Hansen test. Thus, the 
finding of a significant impact of insurance on growth obtained from the corrected two-step 
estimator could be spurious.  
 
Finally, we reduce the number of instrumental variables following a novel procedure 
suggested by Calderon et al. (2002). This is done by collapsing the instrumental variables 
matrix  and  results  are  tabulated  in  column  (iv).  We  find  that  the  coefficient  estimate  on 
insurance remains positive and significant but with a larger magnitude. We cannot reject the 
model  on  the  basis  of  either  Hansen’s  test  or  of  second-order  serial  correlation.  More 
importantly,  there  is  no  evidence  of  instrument  proliferation  as  the  number  of  instruments 
appears to be substantially smaller than N. Specifically,  we find that a 1  percentage-point 
improvement in insurance sector will increase output growth by 0.010 percentage-points. The 
magnitude of the impact is close to the cross-country estimates but two times bigger that the 
one-step and corrected two-step estimates.    79 
Table 4.6: Panel estimation: Insurance and economic growth  
  (i) One-step Difference GMM    (ii) One-step System GMM    (iii) Corrected Two-step 
System GMM 
  (iv) Alternative two-step 
System GMM 
  Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e
*  p-value    Coeff.  S.e
*  p-value 
                               
Insurance
 ΐ  -0.004  0.010  0.642        0.005  0.002  0.006    0.005  0.001  0.004    0.010  0.003  0.001 
                               
Initial GDP per capita 
ΐ  -0.088  0.020  0.000        -0.021  0.003  0.000    -0.020  0.007  0.005    -0.033  0.010  0.001 
                               
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.156  0.200  0.435         0.236  0.058  0.000    0.239  0.092  0.010    0.323  0.127  0.011 
                               
Government size
 ΐ  -0.191  0.077  0.014        -0.148  0.048  0.002    -0.155  0.061  0.012    -0.155  0.069  0.027 
                               
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  0.002  0.008  0.781        -0.009  0.004  0.046    -0.006  0.006  0.275    0.004  0.009  0.647 
                               
Openness
 ΐ  0.002  0.035  0.944        0.003  0.009  0.727    0.003  0.012  0.813    0.023  0.038  0.543 
                               
Black market premium
 ΐ   0.001   0.005  0.754        0.004  0.004  0.273    0.004  0.003  0.191    -0.005  0.010  0.579 
                               
               
Instruments   42    68    68    32 
Arrelano-Bond test for 
AR(2) (p-value) 
0.950    0.770    0.607    0.514 
Sargan/Hansen test  
(p-value) 
0.894    0.004    0.836    0.187 
               
 
Notes: s.e. is robust standard error. 
 * indicates standard errors corrected for finite samples following Windmeijer (2005). Alternative two-step GMM is performed by collapsing the 
instrumental variable matrix following Calderon et al. (2002. 
ΐ and 
ΐ ΐ indicate transformations of the variables as log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. 
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Several studies have assessed the impact of banks and stock markets development on 
the channels of growth: capital accumulation and productivity growth (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 
1998; Beck et al, 2000; Rioja and Valev, 2004). They generally find that the developments of 
both banking institutions and stock markets exert a positive impact on both capital accumulation 
and productivity growth. In line with this literature, Table 4.7 presents our empirical results of the 
impact of insurance on capital accumulation and productivity growth.
51 We find that insurance 
sector  development  has  a  significant  positive  effect  on  both  capital  accumulation  and 
productivity improvement. This is consistent with the above-mentioned studies that use bank 
and stock market indicators. 
 
 
Table 4.7: Panel estimation: Insurance and economic growth channels 
  Capital Accumulation    Total factor Productivity 
  Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e  p-value 
               
Insurance
 ΐ  0.018  0.007  0.016         0.004  0.002  0.097     
               
Initial value
 ΐ  -0.028  0.020  0.162        -0.031  0.013  0.021     
               
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.403  0.212  0.057        0.220  0.094  0.020      
               
Government size
 ΐ  -0.021  0.066  0.744        -0.141  0.075  0.061      
               
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  0.019  0.014  0.194        -0.001  0.009  0.943     
               
Openness
 ΐ  0.102  0.052  0.052        0.005  0.046  0.906     
               
Black market premium
 ΐ   0.002  0.007  0.760        -0.011  0.009  0.249     
               
Instruments   33    33 
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(2)  
(p-value) 
0.091    0.349 
Hansen test of (p-value)  0.109    0.175 
       
 
Notes:  S.e.  indicates  robust  standard  errors  and  corrected  for  finite  samples  following  Windmeijer  (2005).  The 
estimation is performed by collapsing the instrumental variable matrix following Calderon et al. (2002). 
ΐ and 
ΐΐ indicate 
transformations of the variables as log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. 
 
 
Our  next  analysis  is  to  examine  possible  differential  effects  of  insurance  on  growth 
across developed and developing countries. For this purpose, we classify countries into two 
groups: developed and developing countries.
52 We do not estimate a separate regression for 
each  group  because  this  will  exacerbate  biases  induced  by  the  proliferation  of  instruments. 
Instead, a dummy variable is created for developed countries (HIGH) with developing countries 
                                                 
51 For this purpose and subsequent analysis, we only use the alternative two-step system GMM estimator. 
52 Countries are divided according to 2005 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups 
are developing (i.e. middle- and low income) if GNI per capita is $10,725 or less and developed (i.e. high-income) if the 
GNI per capita is more than $10,725.   81 
serving as the reference group. HIGH is assigned a value of 1 for developed countries and zero 
otherwise. We then interact the HIGH dummy with insurance variable (INS) as follows: β1INS + 
β2INSxHIGH. With this specification, β1+β2 captures the effect of insurance sector development 
on  growth  for  the  developed  countries  while  β1  measures  the  impact  for  the  developing 
countries.   In column (i) of Table 4.8, the reported results show that the coefficient estimates for  
insurance are positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level for both developed and 
developing  countries.  However,  the  coefficient  estimates  for  developed  countries  is  larger 
(0.053) than the estimate for developing countries (0.011). The economic interpretation of these 
coefficients is that 1-percentage-point increase in insurance development (in logs) would lead to 
0.011 percentage-point increase in the growth rates  of developing countries. For developed 
countries, the impact is 0.064 (i.e. = 0.053 + 0.011). Since the p-values of testing for serial 
correlation (0.313) and of the Hansen overidentification tests (0.457) are high, the null of both 
tests  not  be  rejected.  Therefore,  serial  correlation  and  simultaneity  bias  should  be  of  no 
statistical concern. The results of estimating the capital stock equation can be found in column 
(ii).  The  estimated  coefficient  for  the  developing  countries  insurance  indicator  is  positive 
statistically significant though not significant for developed countries. The coefficient estimate 
for the developing countries is 0.014 which suggests that a 1-percentage-point improvement in 
insurance  sector  development  increases  the  per  capita  capital  stock  by  0.014-percentage-
points. Since the impact on capital stock for developed countries is measured by β1+β2, it also 
increases by the same magnitude. The specification tests suggest that there are no problems of 
serial  correlation  and  simultaneity  bias.  Finally,  the  results  of  estimating  TFP  equation  are 
reported in the last column, revealing that the TFP-effect of insurance sector development is 
only positive and statistically significant for developed countries. There, productivity growth is 
estimated to increase by 0.016-percentage-points if an insurance sector development improves 
by 1-percentage-point. Furthermore, the estimated model passes both serial correlation  and 
simultaneity bias specification tests. By and large, these findings suggest that the richer the 
country the higher the effect of insurance sector development on productivity growth, consistent 
with the theoretical results advanced by Acemoglu et al. (2006).  
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Table 4.8: Panel estimation: Insurance and growth across developed and developing countries   
  (i) Output Growth    (ii) Capital Accumulation    (iii) Total factor Productivity 
  Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e  p-value 
                       
Insurance - developing
 ΐ  0.011  0.004  0.005         0.014  0.006  0.016         0.003  0.007  0.607     
                       
Insurance - developed
 ΐ  0.053  0.028  0.061        0.003  0.010  0.765        0.016  0.009  0.074 
                       
Initial value 
ΐ  -0.047   0.011  0.000        -0.020  0.010  0.060        -0.046  0.014  0.001     
                       
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.347  0.183  0.058        0.318  0.134  0.018          0.111  0.144  0.437     
                       
Government size
 ΐ  -0.140  0.078  0.074        -0.138  0.081  0.090        -0.060  0.095  0.525     
                       
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  -0.015  0.012   0.215        0.010  0.012  0.423        -0.015  0.008  0.080     
                       
Openness
 ΐ  0.021  0.030  0.480        0.104  0.050  0.037         0.016  0.039  0.673     
                       
Black market premium
 ΐ   -0.020  0.009  0.032        0.005  0.007  0.460        -0.008  0.007  0.251     
                       
Instruments   37    37    37 
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
0.313    0.312    0.541 
Hansen test of  (p-value)  0.457    0.354    0.283 
               
 
Notes: S.e. indicates robust standard errors and corrected for finite samples following Windmeijer (2005). The estimation is performed by collapsing the instrumental variable matrix 
following Calderon et al. (2002). 
ΐ and 
ΐΐ indicate transformations of the variables as log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively.  
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Several papers (Levine and Zervos, 1998, Beck and Levine, 2004) have assessed the 
growth effects of bank-based measures of financial development along with stock markets (i.e. 
market-based). Although these studies find that the overall financial development, captured by 
the  joint  significance  of  banks  and  stock  markets  indicators,  has  a  positive  and  significant 
impact on growth, there is no clear evidence as to whether a bank-based or a market-based 
financial system exerts stronger effects on growth. In line with this literature, we include the both 
bank  and  stock  market  indicators  in  the  econometric  specifications  to  disentangle  the 
contribution of insurance sector development from bank or stock market development. 
 
Following the literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2000 and Levine et al., 2000), we use private 
sector (henceforth PRC) as a proxy variable of banking sector developments. PRC measures 
the value of credit issued by financial intermediaries to the private sector, expressed as a ratio 
to  GDP.  PRC  isolates  credit  issued  to  the  private  sector,  as  opposed  to  credit  issued  to 
governments,  government  agencies,  and  public  enterprises.  Furthermore,  it  excludes  credit 
issued by the central bank. Beck et al. (2000) convincingly argues why this measure reflects 
more accurately the efficiency of banks institutions in providing credit.  
 
We proxy the degree of stock market development by a broadly used measure of stock 
market liquidity: the total volume of shares traded divided by domestic GDP (henceforth TST). 
Since the number of available stock market indicators is limited among developing countries, we 
follow Rioja and Valev’s (2004) approach by using a dummy variable for the TST.
53 The dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the country's TST is larger than the observed median value of the 
sample and 0 otherwise. In so doing, we manage to pick up countries and time periods where 
stock markets are an "important" part of the financial system. Although this approach entails 
loss of information, it is still preferable to assuming that the countries excluded from the sample 
do not have a stock market at all or to only use the very restricted sample. The estimation 
results of adding PRC and TST are reported in Table 4.9. As shown in the table, the coefficients 
on PRC are positive and statistically significant in both the output and capital stock equations, 
while TST  is positive and significant only  in the productivity equation. More importantly, the 
inclusions of PRC and TST did not affect the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients 
for insurance. This implies that insurance sector developments exert independent influences on 
output growth, capital accumulation, and productivity improvement. 
 
                                                 
53 Data from the Financial Structure Database are only available for about 40 countries with limited time dimension.   84 
Table 4.9: Panel estimation: Adding bank and stock market indicators  
    (i) Output Growth     (ii) Capital Accumulation    (iii) Total Factor Productivity 
  Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e  p-value    Coeff.  S.e  p-value 
                       
Insurance 
ΐ  0.015  0.006  0.022         0.015  0.007  0.047         0.012  0.006  0.071     
                       
Initial value 
ΐ  -0.044  0.016  0.007        -0.026  0.021  0.208        -0.046  0.027  0.090     
                       
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.248  0.128  0.053         0.412  0.213  0.053        0.094  0.137  0.494     
                       
Government size
 ΐ  -0.174  0.086  0.044        -0.020  0.083  0.803        -0.169  0.091  0.062     
                       
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  -0.008  0.007  0.252        0.018  0.017  0.306        -0.014  0.007  0.050     
                       
Openness
 ΐ  -0.026  0.028  0.350        0.035  0.038  0.359        -0.017  0.032  0.588     
                       
Black market premium
 ΐ   0.006  0.006  0.354         0.001  0.004  0.805        -0.006  0.010  0.511     
                       
PRC 
ΐ  0.020  0.011  0.061        0.021  0.008  0.014          0.011  0.012  0.352     
                       
TST   0.009  0.007  0.210        0.004  0.008  0.604        0.026  0.011  0.023      
                       
Instruments     40        40        40   
Observations                       
Arrelano-Bond test for AR(2) 
(p-value) 
  0.300        0.123        0.438   
Hansen test (p-value)    0.175        0.184        0.448   
                       
 
Notes: S.e. indicates robust standard errors and corrected for finite samples following Windmeijer (2005). The estimation is performed by collapsing the instrumental variable matrix 
following Calderon et al. (2002). 
ΐ and 
ΐΐ indicate transformations of the variables as log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. PRC denotes private credits expressed as ratios to 
GDP. TST is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the number of shares traded is greater than the sample median and 0 otherwise.  
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4.6  Conclusions 
 
Although  the  finance-growth  nexus  has  been  heavily  researched  at  both  theoretical  and 
empirical levels, the impact of insurance development on growth has so far received much 
less attention. This paper provides empirical evidence in support of a robust positive effect of 
insurance sector development on growth, exploiting data from a panel of 52 developed and 
developing  countries  over  the  1981-2005  period.  Importantly,  its  impact  on  growth  is 
independent of bank and stock market development indicators. In addition, we quantify the 
relative importance of the different transmission channels (capital accumulation versus TFP 
growth) and discover that their relative importance in promoting growth varies with the degree 
of  development  of  the  countries  in  the  sample.  Consistent  with  the  theoretical  work  by 
Acemoglu  et  al.  (2006),  we  observe  that  in  developed  countries,  insurance  sector 
development enhances GDP growth through TFP, while in developing ones, insurance has a 
positive effect on GDP growth by facilitating capital accumulation. It thus appears that the 
strong contribution  of insurance development to productivity  growth does  not occur until a 
country  has  reached  a  certain  income  level,  roughly  in  the  range  that  defines  developed 
countries. Until then, most of effect occurs through capital accumulation.  
 
Methodologically,  we  use  several  variants  of  the  GMM  estimator  to  highlight  the 
danger of ignoring the proliferation of instruments, which appears to have an impact on the 
size of estimated coefficient. Should one ignore these problems, the impact of insurance on 
growth is underestimated approximately by half.  
 
These findings are strongly consistent with models that predict that well-functioning 
financial systems ease information and transaction costs, thereby improving the allocation of 
resources and economic growth. It is our hope that they also offer a new perspective on the 
finance and growth debate.   
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5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
Understanding what explains the wealth of nations is one of the oldest and most important 
economic quests in the entire discipline. As a result, empirical studies of economic growth 
have received lots of attention in the economic literature. Economists agree that economic 
growth and improvements in productivity are crucial for all countries. The process is however 
not yet fully understood, as there are many factors that can influence whether a country is able 
to  enter  a  period  of  rapid  and  sustained  growth.  One  major  (and  difficult)  problem  when 
dealing  with  the  empirics  of  economic  growth  is  to  identify  its  most  salient  determinants. 
Departing  from  this  base,  this  thesis  has  examined  and  conducted  an  empirical  inquiry 
regarding the influence of FDI, R&D, and insurance markets on economic growth. The findings 
of this thesis shed new light on these important issues.   
 
Chapter  2  has  examined  the  role  of  economic  freedom  on  the  impact  of  FDI  on 
economic growth. Here we argued that the positive impact of FDI on growth is contingent on 
the  level  of  economic  freedom  in  the  host  countries  and  only  countries  whose  level  of 
economic freedom is sufficiently high can benefit from FDI inflows. The proposed hypothesis is 
tested  exploiting  longitudinal  data  for  84  countries  over  the  1976-2005  period. 
Methodologically, we adopt a regression specification characterized by threshold effects, that 
allows  FDI  to  have  a  nonlinear  effect  on  growth,  We  can  therefore  accommodate  the 
economically appealing possibility that the positive impact of FDI on growth ‘kicks in’ only after 
host countries have reached a given threshold level of economic freedom.  
 
The estimation results show that FDI has no direct (linear) effect on output growth. 
However, there exists a non-linear pattern characterised by threshold effects, in which FDI 
contributes to output growth only after the level of economic freedom in the host countries has 
exceeded  a  certain  threshold  level.  Below  that  threshold  level,  FDI  has  no  real  economic 
benefits for the recipient countries. Several sensitivity analyses were implemented to measure 
the robustness of the findings. We are able to reproduce the results of the analysis for a 
different  sample  (1981-2005)  and  when  we  control  for  a  potential  endogeneity  bias.  This 
finding is consistent with the growing view that countries with better absorptive capacity are 
more likely to benefit from the presence of foreign capital. And more freedom seems to foster 
a healthy economic environment that facilitates the adoption and diffusion of new technologies 
fostered by FDI inflows, thereby nurturing the economic ingredients necessary to economic 
development.    87 
  
Accordingly, policy makers should formulate policies to promote long-term economic 
freedom. For instance, the security of property rights and legal structure can be improved by 
promoting judicial independence, establishing a trusted legal framework for private businesses 
to challenge the legality of government actions and reducing military interference in the rule of 
law and of the political process. Also, the participation of foreign banks in local markets is 
expected to improve the access to financial services and enhance the competition in the local 
banking  sector,  leading  to  a  lower  cost  of  financing.  Reducing  interest  rate  controls  and 
directing more credit to the private sector are also likely to facilitate technology spillovers. 
Promoting  freedom  of  exchange  across  borders  through  reductions  in  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers,  or  through  reductions  in  foreign  capital  ownership  controls,  is  also  expected  to 
enhance spillover effects. Yet another instance would be improving the regulations governing 
business  activity  by  easing  the  process  of  business  creation,  enhancing  labour  market 
flexibility, reducing the levels of bureaucracy, price controls and other rent-seeking activities. 
However, it is worth noting that the adoption of such policies may be politically unpopular in 
the  short  run.  The  long-run  economic  benefits  are  nevertheless  expected  to  outweigh  the 
short-run costs. 
 
Chapter 3 has tested empirically R&D spillovers from industrial countries to East Asian 
countries. Although innovative activities, such as R&D, are key drivers of productivity growth, 
only  a  few  industrialised  countries  appear  to  be  significantly  spending  in  R&D.  This 
observation has raised serious concerns regarding the extent to which developing countries 
are  benefiting  from their  R&D  activity. We therefore examine  the  impact  of G-5  countries’ 
(France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) R&D on the productivity of 
East Asian countries (China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). East Asian countries 
were chosen because they experienced spectacular an exceptional growth performance over 
the last three decades, and are relatively open to both trade and FDI. Using panel data over 
the 1984-2005 period, we analyse three potential channels through which foreign R&D may 
have spilled over, namely imports, inward FDI, and outward FDI. Our analysis involves three 
important exercises. First, pre-testing of a unit root was conducted for all series using both 
panel and univariate tests. We find that the series are generally non-stationary. Second, we 
examine whether the variables are cointegrated and we find strong support for cointegrating 
relationships between the variables. Finally and more importantly, we evaluate the impact of 
R&D (both domestic and foreign) on the productivity of East Asian countries using the DSUR 
estimator.  
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Four  important  conclusions  emerge.  First,  technology  appears  to  be  crucial  for 
productivity growth regardless of where it is developed, be it by a domestic or a foreign firm. 
Furthermore, domestic R&D activity becomes more important the further a country develops, 
suggesting that the strong productivity impact of domestic R&D does not occur until a certain 
level of average income is reached. Up to then, economic interactions with R&D leaders seem 
to matter for technology upgrading purposes.   
 
Second, imports are the most important spillover channel. In general, FDI does not 
seem to directly contribute to improve the technological base of the recipient countries. Inward 
FDI can crowd domestic firms out of markets and reduce the productivity of domestic firms. 
Moreover, technology sourcing via outward FDI is less efficient because the amount of FDI 
invested in industrial countries is relatively small. Up to now, a substantial fraction of East 
Asian countries’ FDI goes to other developing countries (for other reasons). This underlines 
the importance for the government of promoting trade liberalization, because the more open 
an economy to trade, the higher is the impact of foreign R&D on domestic productivity. One 
possible option is to sign a free trade agreement (FTA) or an economic partnership (EP) with 
R&D leaders. Several East Asian countries have recently signed FTAs or EFs with industrial 
countries, like the United States or Japan. These efforts should be made extant to other R&D 
leaders,  such  as  the  European  countries,  because  further  reductions  in  tariff  and  no-tariff 
barriers to trade are expected to further boost R&D spillovers in the region.  
 
Third, sufficient absorptive capacity of foreign technology must be available in the host 
countries.  The  ability  to  absorb  and  internalise  technology  developed  by  others  has  been 
highlighted  in  the  literature  as  an  important  pre-condition  for  benefiting  from  technological 
spillovers. Given that the impact of foreign knowledge on productivity complements the R&D 
efforts of domestic firms, it is also crucial for governments to promote domestic R&D activity, 
e.g., through grants, project funding or tax incentives, but also through the provision of public 
education targeted at the development of science, technology, and engineering skills.  
 
Finally, our results suggest that the United States is, in general, a stronger provider of 
technology  spillovers  than  Japan,  emphasizing  the  strategic  importance  for  the  region  in 
nurturing  economic  relations  with  the  United  States,  the  world’s  biggest  R&D  spender. 
Economic cooperation in the forms of FTAs and EPs can help to improve trade relations. For 
instance,  Singapore  has  concluded  an  FTA  with  the  United  States  in  2003  and  there  are 
ongoing discussions between the United States and other countries in the region to sign a 
similar  agreement.  Nevertheless  the  impact  of  economic  cooperation  beyond  trade  on 
technology  spillovers  should  not  be  underestimated.  Development  aid  and  other  kinds  of   89 
assistance programs are also critical for the formation of a country’s absorptive capacity. For 
instance, Japanese government has offered Official Development Aids (ODA) to the ASEAN 
member  over  the  last  few  decades  which  focus  on  the  training  of  skilled  workers  and 
technicians as well as on the promotion of human resources development in high value-added 
industries. These programs not only lead to greater acceptance of Japanese products but also 
promote the absorptive capacity for Japanese technology. Therefore, promoting interactions 
with other R&D leaders that go beyond trade and investment appears to be beneficial.   
 
  Chapter 4 examines the role of insurance sector development on economic growth. 
There are two opposing views on the role of financial markets on economic growth. One group 
argues  that  well-functioning  financial  markets  alleviate  information  and  transactions  costs, 
leading to more efficient resource allocations and higher output growth. Another group views 
financial development as a result of economic growth: it is the expansion of economic activity 
that  boosts  the  demand  for  financial  products/services  and  therefore  deepens  financial 
markets  and  institutions.  This  debate  has  received  much  research  interest,  generating  a 
sizeable empirical literature on the direction of causality between financial development and 
economic growth. The findings are essentially based on the role of banks, and are consistent 
with financial development leading economic growth. The literature is however almost silent on 
the role  of other financial  intermediaries such as  insurance  institutions. On this basis, this 
chapter examines the influence of insurance sector developments on output growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity growth. Exploiting a panel of 52 countries over the 1981-2005 
period,  we  implement  a  recent  GMM  estimator  to  tackle  pervasive  problems  in  estimating 
growth regressions (country-specific effects and simultaneity bias). It also deals with the issue 
of instruments proliferation due to the small sample size available to conduct the study.  
 
The analysis is undertaken in two steps. First, we examine the influence of insurance 
sector development on growth using a cross-section of countries, in the spirit of the earlier 
finance-growth literature. This serves as a benchmark for the subsequent panel data analysis. 
Following an insight from LLSV (1997, 1998), we use legal origins as instrumental variables 
for insurance sector development to expunge the endogeneity bias. We find that a country’s 
legal origin explains a significant fraction of the cross-country differences in insurance sector 
development. More importantly, the exogenous component of insurance sector development is 
found to explain cross-country differences in growth performance.  
 
  Second, we  implement a  dynamic panel GMM estimator that deals rigorously  with 
endogeneity issues while tackling other issues in estimating growth models, such as country-
specific  effects  and  weak  instruments.  The  main  findings  are  that  insurance  sector   90 
development (i) influences output growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth, and 
(ii) affects growth predominantly through capital accumulation in developing countries, while in 
developed countries it enhances productivity growth. Importantly, these findings are not driven 
by  biases  introduced  by  unobserved  country-specific  effects,  simultaneity,  or  potential 
problems  associated  with  weak  and  numerous  instruments.  They  remain  valid  even  after 
controlling for bank and stock market development. 
 
These findings suggest that insurance sector development facilitates and enhances 
economic growth. Policy makers should not neglect the role of viable insurance markets and 
institutions  in  delivering  long-run  economic  benefits.  Insurance  services  have  a  productive 
impact within an economy through the risk transfer and indemnification services they offer, 
helping  risk-averse  individuals  to  engage  in  new  (though  risky)  productive  activities.  With 
insurance coverage, these activities will generate positive externalities in terms of increased 
purchases, profits, employment, etc., ultimately leading towards higher growth.  
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Appendix 2.1: List of countries 
 
Country  Code 
EF 
Group  Country  Code 
EF 
Group 
           
Algeria  DZA  Low  Japan  JPN  High 
Argentina  ARG  Low  Kenya  KEN  High 
Australia  AUS  High  Madagascar  MAC  Low 
Austria  AUT  High  Malawi  MWI  Low 
Bahamas  BHS  High  Malaysia  MYS  High 
Bangladesh  BGD  Low  Mali  MLI  Low 
Benin  BEN  Low  Mexico  MEX  High 
Bolivia  BOL  Low  Morocco  MAR  Low 
Brazil  BRA  Low  Nepal  NPL  Low 
Burundi  BDI  Low  Netherlands  NLD  High 
Cameroon  CMR  Low  New Zealand  NZL  High 
Canada  CAN  High  Nicaragua  NIC  Low 
Central African Rep.  CAF  Low  Niger  NER  Low 
Chile  CHL  High  Nigeria  NGA  Low 
Colombia  COL  Low  Norway  NOR  High 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  ZAR  Low  Pakistan  PAK  Low 
Costa Rica  CRI  High  Panama  PAN  High 
Cote d`Ivoire  CIV  Low  Papua New Guinea  PNG  High 
Cyprus  CYP  High  Paraguay  PRY  High 
Denmark  DNK  High  Peru  PER  Low 
Dominican Republic  DOM  High  Philippines  PHL  High 
Ecuador  ECU  Low  Portugal  PRT  High 
Egypt  EGY  Low  Rwanda  RWA  Low 
El Salvador  SLV  High  Senegal  SEN  Low 
Finland  FIN  High  Sierra Leone  SLE  Low 
France  FRA  High  South Africa  ZAF  High 
Gabon  GAB  Low  Spain  ESP  High 
Germany  GER  High  Sri Lanka  LKA  Low 
Ghana  GHA  Low  Sweden  SWE  High 
Greece  GRC  High  Switzerland  CHE  High 
Guatemala  GTM  High  Syria  SYR  Low 
Haiti  HTI  High  Thailand  THA  High 
Honduras  HND  High  Togo  TGO  Low 
Hungary  HUN  High  Trinidad &Tobago  TTO  High 
Iceland  ISL  High  Tunisia  TUN  Low 
India  IND  Low  Turkey  TUR  Low 
Indonesia  IDN  High  United Kingdom  GBR  High 
Iran  IRN  Low  United States  USA  High 
Ireland  IRL  High  Uruguay  URY  High 
Israel  ISR  Low  Venezuela  VEN  Low 
Italy  ITA  High  Zambia  ZMB  Low 
Jamaica  JAM  High  Zimbabwe  ZWE  Low 
           
 
Notes: High and Low are countries with EF index above and below 5.6517, respectively.  
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Appendix 2.2: Robustness checks for the interaction specification 
 
  (i) excluding outliers    (ii) Adding FDI x PRC    (iii) Adding FDI x LIFE 
  Coeff  S.e.  p-value    Coeff  S.e.  p-value    Coeff  S.e.  p-value 
                       
Initial Income  -0.013  0.002  0.000        -0.014  0.002  0.000        -0.014  0.002  0.000     
                       
Population growth  0.426  0.151  0.006         0.416  0.160  0.012         0.400  0.161  0.016      
                       
Investment ratio   0.040  0.022  0.073        0.023  0.021  0.292        0.020  0.022  0.352     
                       
FDI  0.053  0.093  0.571        0.047  0.093  0.615        0.039  0.097   0.683      
                       
Life expectancy (LIFE)  0.062  0.008  0.000         0.060  0.008  0.000         0.060  0.008  0.000      
                       
FDI x LIFE                  -0.444  0.823  0.591     
                       
Economic Freedom (EF)   0.004  0.001  0.005         0.002  0.001  0.087        0.002  0.001  .090     
                       
FDI x EF  0.186   0.100  0.067         0.309  0.161  0.060        0.320   0.162  0.053     
                       
Private Credit (PRC)          0.004  0.001  0.035         0.004  0.001  0.033      
                       
FDI x PRC          -0.180  0.169  0.290        -0.114  0.225  0.613     
                       
Constant  -0.149  0.029  0.000        -0.139  0.027  0.000         -0.139  0.028  0.000     
                       
R
2  0.60        0.63        0.63     
Number of observations  78        78        78     
                       
 
Notes: All regression are carried out using a sample that exclude outliers countries - Dem. Rep. of Congo, Cyprus, Gabon, Haiti, Jamaica, and Rwanda – as identified by the DFIT 
statistic.  All interaction terms are orthogonalised to remove multicollinearity effects. Private credit is the log of average value over 1976-2005 period. See notes to Table 3 for the 
definition of remaining variables.  
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Appendix 2.3: Identification of outliers – DFITS statistic 
 
The  DFITS  statistic  identifies  observation  with  high  combination  of  leverage  and 
residual. The statistic is given by  ) h /( h r DFITS j j j j − = 1 , where  j r  is studentized 
residual given by   ) h s /( e r j ) j ( j j − = 1  with  ) j ( s  refer to the root mean squared error 
(s) of the regression equation with jth observation removed, and h is leverage statistic. 
Following Belsley et al.(1980), an observation is considered as outlier if the absolute 
DFITS statistic is greater than  n / k 2 , where k denotes the number of explanatory 
variables  and  n  the  number  of  countries.  The  test  suggests  Dem.  Rep  of  Congo 
(ZAR), Cyprus (CYP), Gabon (GAB), Haiti (HTI), Jamaica (Levin et al.), and Rwanda 
(Osterwald-Lenum) are potential outliers. The following figure shows the scatter plot of 
residuals vs. leverage statistic.  
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Appendix 2.4: Model selection 
 
  Regressors    Unadjusted  Adjusted
# 
Model with 5 regressors 
R
Y
P
C
7
6
 
I
/
Y
 
G
P
O
P
 
L
I
F
E
 
F
D
I
 
 
AIC  SBC  AIC  SBC 
1  *                -8.9493  -8.7178  -8.8492  -8.6177 
2     *             -8.9711  -8.7395  -8.8710  -8.6395 
3        *          -9.0104  -8.7789  -8.9103  -8.6788 
4           *       -8.9661  -8.7346  -8.8660  -8.6345 
5              *    -9.0258  -8.7943  -8.9258  -8.6943 
6  *  *             -8.9765  -8.7161  -8.8632  -8.6027 
7  *     *          -9.0628  -8.8024  -8.9495  -8.6891 
8  *        *       -9.0538  -8.7934  -8.9405  -8.6801 
9  *           *    -9.0247  -8.7642  -8.9114  -8.6509 
10     *  *          -9.0515  -8.7910  -8.9382  -8.6777 
11     *     *       -8.9627  -8.7023  -8.8494  -8.5890 
12     *        *    -9.0537  -8.7933  -8.9404  -8.6800 
13        *  *       -9.0554  -8.7949  -8.9420  -8.6816 
14        *     *    -9.0577  -8.7973  -8.9444  -8.6840 
15           *  *    -9.0408  -8.7804  -8.9275  -8.6671 
16        *  *  *    -9.0898  -8.8004  -8.9631  -8.6737 
17     *     *  *    -9.0470  -8.7576  -8.9202  -8.6308 
18     *  *     *    -9.0562  -8.7668  -8.9294  -8.6400 
19     *  *  *       -9.0402  -8.7508  -8.9134  -8.6241 
20  *        *  *    -9.0794  -8.7900  -8.9526  -8.6632 
21  *     *     *    -9.0936  -8.8042  -8.9668  -8.6774 
22  *     *  *       -9.0420  -8.7526  -8.9152  -8.6258 
23  *  *        *    -9.0521  -8.7627  -8.9254  -8.6360 
24  *  *     *       -9.0869  -8.7975  -8.9602  -8.6708 
25  *  *  *          -9.0559  -8.7665  -8.9292  -8.6398 
26     *  *  *  *    -9.0713  -8.7530  -8.9310  -8.6127 
27  *     *  *  *    -9.0720  -8.7537  -8.9316  -8.6133 
28  *  *     *  *    -9.0711  -8.7528  -8.9307  -8.6124 
29  *  *  *     *    -9.0713  -8.7530  -8.9310  -8.6127 
30  *  *  *  *       -9.0748  -8.7564  -8.9344  -8.6161 
31  *  *  *  *  *    -9.1643  -8.8170  -9.0101  -8.6629 
32                   -9.0093  -8.8357  -8.9352  -8.7616 
Model with 4 regressors                     
33  *                -8.7398  -8.5372  -8.6528  -8.4502 
34     *             -8.7010  -8.4984  -8.6140  -8.4114 
35        *          -8.7470  -8.5444  -8.6599  -8.4574 
36              *    -8.6943  -8.4917  -8.6073  -8.4047 
37  *  *             -8.7378  -8.5063  -8.6378  -8.4063 
38  *     *          -8.7312  -8.4997  -8.6311  -8.3996 
39  *           *    -8.7394  -8.5079  -8.6393  -8.4078 
40     *  *          -8.7238  -8.4923  -8.6237  -8.3922 
41     *        *    -8.7237  -8.4922  -8.6236  -8.3921 
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Appendix 2.4: Model selection (continued) 
  Regressors 
 
Unadjusted  Adjusted
# 
 
R
Y
P
C
7
6
 
I
/
Y
 
G
P
O
P
 
L
I
F
E
 
F
D
I
 
 
AIC  SBC  AIC  SBC 
42        *     *    -8.7502  -8.5187  -8.6501  -8.4186 
43     *  *     *    -8.7369  -8.4765  -8.6236  -8.3631 
44  *     *     *    -8.7334  -8.4729  -8.6200  -8.3596 
45  *  *        *    -8.7471  -8.4866  -8.6337  -8.3733 
46  *  *  *          -8.7279  -8.4674  -8.6145  -8.3541 
47  *  *  *     *    -8.9228  -8.6334  -8.7961  -8.5067 
48                   -8.7260  -8.5814  -8.6647  -8.5200 
49  *                -9.0183  -8.8157  -8.9313  -8.7287 
50     *             -8.9564  -8.7539  -8.8694  -8.6668 
51           *       -8.9996  -8.7971  -8.9126  -8.7101 
52              *    -9.0107  -8.8081  -8.9237  -8.7211 
53  *  *             -8.9993  -8.7678  -8.8993  -8.6677 
54  *        *       -9.0375  -8.8060  -8.9375  -8.7060 
55  *           *    -9.0535  -8.8220  -8.9534  -8.7219 
56     *     *       -8.9876  -8.7561  -8.8875  -8.6560 
57     *        *    -9.0338  -8.8023  -8.9337  -8.7022 
58           *  *    -9.0437  -8.8122  -8.9437  -8.7121 
59     *     *  *    -9.0564  -8.7960  -8.9431  -8.6827 
60  *        *  *    -9.0578  -8.7973  -8.9444  -8.6840 
61  *  *        *    -9.0563  -8.7959  -8.9430  -8.6825 
62  *  *     *       -9.0606  -8.8002  -8.9473  -8.6869 
63  *  *     *  *    -9.1069  -8.8175  -8.9801  -8.6907 
64                   -9.0028  -8.8581  -8.9415  -8.7968 
65  *                -8.8508  -8.6483  -8.7638  -8.5612 
66        *          -8.8837  -8.6811  -8.7967  -8.5941 
67           *       -8.8532  -8.6506  -8.7662  -8.5636 
68              *    -8.8958  -8.6932  -8.8088  -8.6062 
69  *     *          -8.8833  -8.6518  -8.7832  -8.5517 
70  *        *       -8.8944  -8.6629  -8.7943  -8.5628 
71  *           *    -8.8868  -8.6553  -8.7867  -8.5552 
72        *  *       -8.8716  -8.6401  -8.7716  -8.5401 
73        *     *    -8.8905  -8.6589  -8.7904  -8.5589 
74           *  *    -8.8875  -8.6560  -8.7874  -8.5559 
75        *  *  *    -8.9012  -8.6407  -8.7878  -8.5274 
76  *        *  *    -8.8992  -8.6388  -8.7859  -8.5254 
77  *     *     *    -8.9010  -8.6405  -8.7876  -8.5272 
78  *     *  *       -8.9080  -8.6475  -8.7947  -8.5342 
79  *     *  *  *    -9.1427‡  -8.8533  -9.0159‡  -8.7265 
80                   -9.0063  -8.8616  -8.9449  -8.8002 
81     *             -8.6851  -8.4825  -8.5980  -8.3955 
82        *          -8.7951  -8.5926  -8.7081  -8.5055 
83           *       -8.7686  -8.5660  -8.6815  -8.4790 
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Appendix 2.4: Model selection (continued) 
  Regressors    Unadjusted  Adjusted
# 
 
R
Y
P
C
7
6
 
I
/
Y
 
G
P
O
P
 
L
I
F
E
 
F
D
I
 
 
AIC  SBC  AIC  SBC 
84              *    -8.7091  -8.5065  -8.6220  -8.4195 
85     *  *          -8.8081  -8.5766  -8.7080  -8.4765 
86     *     *       -8.8268  -8.5953  -8.7267  -8.4952 
87     *        *    -8.7372  -8.5057  -8.6371  -8.4056 
88        *  *       -8.7766  -8.5451  -8.6766  -8.4451 
89        *     *    -8.8217  -8.5902  -8.7216  -8.4901 
90           *  *    -8.7853  -8.5538  -8.6852  -8.4537 
91        *  *  *    -8.8087  -8.5483  -8.6954  -8.4350 
92     *     *  *    -8.8128  -8.5524  -8.6995  -8.4390 
93     *  *     *    -8.8097  -8.5493  -8.6964  -8.4360 
94     *  *  *       -8.8114  -8.5509  -8.6981  -8.4376 
95     *  *  *  *    -8.8302  -8.5408  -8.7034  -8.4140 
96                   -8.6592  -8.5145  -8.5978  -8.4532 
Model with 3 regessors                     
97  *                -8.4490  -8.2754  -8.3749  -8.2013 
98     *             -8.4397  -8.2661  -8.3656  -8.1920 
99              *    -8.4782  -8.3045  -8.4041  -8.2304 
100  *  *             -8.4711  -8.2685  -8.3841  -8.1815 
101  *           *    -8.4769  -8.2744  -8.3899  -8.1874 
102     *        *    -8.4710  -8.2685  -8.3840  -8.1815 
103  *  *        *    -8.9110  -8.6795  -8.8109  -8.5794 
104                   -8.7382  -8.6224  -8.6894  -8.5736 
105  *                -8.5594  -8.3857  -8.4853  -8.3116 
106        *          -8.5586  -8.3850  -8.4845  -8.3109 
107              *    -8.5463  -8.3727  -8.4722  -8.2986 
108  *     *          -8.5600  -8.3574  -8.4730  -8.2704 
109  *           *    -8.5772  -8.3747  -8.4902  -8.2876 
110        *     *    -8.5713  -8.3687  -8.4843  -8.2817 
111  *     *     *    -8.6930  -8.4615  -8.5929  -8.3614 
112                   -8.5674  -8.4517  -8.5186  -8.4029 
113  *                -8.8871  -8.7135  -8.8130  -8.6394 
114           *       -8.8906  -8.7170  -8.8165  -8.6429 
115              *    -8.9180  -8.7443  -8.8439  -8.6702 
116  *        *       -8.9444  -8.7418  -8.8574  -8.6548 
117  *           *    -8.9362  -8.7336  -8.8492  -8.6466 
118           *  *    -8.9366  -8.7341  -8.8496  -8.6471 
119  *        *  *    -9.1026  -8.8711  -9.0026  -8.7711 
120                   -9.0131  -8.8974‡  -8.9643  -8.8486‡ 
121     *             -8.6658  -8.4922  -8.5917  -8.4181 
122        *          -8.6961  -8.5224  -8.6220  -8.4483 
123              *    -8.6686  -8.4949  -8.5945  -8.4208 
124     *  *          -8.6795  -8.4769  -8.5925  -8.3899 
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Appendix 2.4: Model selection (continued) 
  Regressors    Unadjusted  Adjusted
# 
 
R
Y
P
C
7
6
 
I
/
Y
 
G
P
O
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I
F
E
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D
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AIC  SBC  AIC  SBC 
125     *        *    -8.7161  -8.5136  -8.6291  -8.4265 
126        *     *    -8.6915  -8.4890  -8.6045  -8.4020 
127     *  *     *    -8.7988  -8.5673  -8.6987  -8.4672 
128                   -8.6173  -8.5015  -8.5685  -8.4528 
129     *             -8.7785  -8.6049  -8.7044  -8.5308 
130           *       -8.5867  -8.4131  -8.5126  -8.3390 
131              *    -8.6320  -8.4584  -8.5579  -8.3843 
132     *     *       -8.6164  -8.4138  -8.5293  -8.3268 
133     *        *    -8.7161  -8.5136  -8.6291  -8.4265 
134           *  *    -8.6148  -8.4122  -8.5278  -8.3252 
135     *     *  *    -8.7309  -8.4994  -8.6308  -8.3993 
136                   -8.8261  -8.7104  -8.7773  -8.6616 
137        *          -8.7089  -8.5353  -8.6348  -8.4612 
138           *       -8.7187  -8.5451  -8.6446  -8.4710 
139              *    -8.6676  -8.4940  -8.5935  -8.4199 
140        *  *       -8.7197  -8.5171  -8.6327  -8.4301 
141        *     *    -8.7171  -8.5145  -8.6301  -8.4275 
142           *  *    -8.7173  -8.5148  -8.6303  -8.4278 
143        *  *  *    -8.7661  -8.5346  -8.6660  -8.4345 
144                   -8.6710  -8.5552  -8.6222  -8.5064 
Model with 2 regressors                     
145  *                -8.4607  -8.3160  -8.3993  -8.2546 
146              *    -8.4607  -8.3160  -8.3993  -8.2546 
147  *           *    -8.7340  -8.5603  -8.6598  -8.4862 
148                   -8.5873  -8.5005  -8.5509  -8.4641 
149     *             -8.4235  -8.2788  -8.3621  -8.2174 
150              *    -8.4474  -8.3027  -8.3861  -8.2414 
151     *        *    -8.6213  -8.4476  -8.5471  -8.3735 
152                   -8.5639  -8.4771  -8.5275  -8.4407 
153        *          -8.4561  -8.3114  -8.3947  -8.2500 
154              *    -8.5418  -8.3972  -8.4805  -8.3358 
155        *     *    -8.6916  -8.5180  -8.6175  -8.4439 
156                   -8.5488  -8.4620  -8.5124  -8.4256 
157           *       -8.6413  -8.4966  -8.5799  -8.4352 
158              *    -8.6436  -8.4989  -8.5822  -8.4375 
159           *  *    -8.7467  -8.5731  -8.6726  -8.4990 
160                   -8.5866  -8.4998  -8.5503  -8.4634 
Model with 1 regressor                     
161              *    -8.6491  -8.5334  -8.6003  -8.4846 
162                   -8.5623  -8.5044  -8.5382  -8.4803 
 
Notes:
 # indicates adjustment for degree of freedom. * indicates that the variables are allowed to switch across 
regimes. Shaded boxes indicate that the variables are omitted. For instance, Model 5 includes all five regressors 
and only FDI is allowed to switch across regimes while all other variables are constrained to be linear.  In Model 
96, four regressors (i.e. investment ratio, population growth, life expectancy and FDI) are included as regressors 
and all of them are constrained to be linear. ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡       indicates the optimal models. 
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Appendix 2.5: Further split  
 
  Low-EF  group    High-EF group 
       
Threshold estimate   4.651     6.993 
       
LM-test for no threshold   25.248    15.242 
p-value  0.162    0.573 
       
Number of countries  40    44 
       
 
Notes:  The  bootstrap  p-values  for  the  threshold  estimates  were  calculated  with  1000  replications  and  10% 
trimming percentage. 
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Appendix 2.6: Bootstrapped p-values  
 
Threshold estimate: 5.651  Trimming percentage 
LM-test for no threshold: 29.145  10  15  20  25  30 
Bootstrap Replications:           
1,000  0.024  0.022  0.019  0.016  0.011 
5,000  0.022  0.019  0.017  0.015  0.012 
10,000  0.021  0.018  0.016  0.014  0.011 
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Appendix 2.7: Threshold regression (1981-2005) 
 
  Low-EF (EF≤5.674)    High-EF (EF>5.674) 
  Coeff.  s.e  t-stat    Coeff.  s.e  t-stat 
               
Initial income  -0.010  0.002  -4.852    -0.010  0.003  -2.952 
Population Growth  -0.486  0.374  -1.301    0.859  0.187  4.602 
Investment ratio  -0.021  0.027  -0.769    0.127  0.024  5.300 
Life Expectancy  0.065  0.011  5.746    0.045  0.023  1.959 
FDI  -0.381  0.192  -1.983    0.329  0.092  3.568 
               
Threshold estimate   5.6740          
LM-test for no threshold  
(p-value) 
33.212  
(0.0030) 
 
 
     
 
               
Number of countries  37        47     
R
2  0.56        0.61     
               
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1981–2005). Initial income is the logarithm of per 
capita income in 1981. All other regressors are the average values over 1981-2005 period. Life expectancy is in 
the  logarithmic  form.  EF  is  the  index  of  economic  freedom  used  as  a  threshold  variable.  p-value  was 
bootstrapped  with  1000  replications  and  10%  trimming  percentage.  Standard  errors  (s.e)  are  corrected  for 
heteroskedasticity. There are 37 and 47 countries in the Low-EF and High-EF group, respectively.  
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Appendix 2.8: Threshold regression (1976-2005) – EF growth as a threshold variable  
 
  Low-EF growth (EF≤0.0117 )    High-EF growth (EF>0.0117 ) 
  Coeff.  s.e  t-stat    Coeff.  s.e  t-stat 
               
Initial income  -0.010  0.002  -5.030    -0.034  0.002  -14.433 
Population Growth  0.335  0.172  1.949    0.419  0.247  1.699 
Investment ratio  0.051  0.026  1.991    0.192  0.030  6.361 
Life Expectancy  0.049  0.007  6.841    0.151  0.016  9.423 
FDI  0.304  0.134  2.269    0.197  0.110  1.785 
               
Threshold estimate   0.0117          
LM-test for no threshold  
(p-value) 
32.9350 
(0.011) 
 
 
     
 
               
Number of countries  61        23     
R
2  0.54        0.84     
               
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1976–2005). Initial income is the logarithm of per 
capita income in 1976. All other regressors are the average values over 1976-2005 period. Life expectancy is in 
the logarithmic form. The growth rate of the EF index is used as a threshold variable.  p-value was bootstrapped 
with 1000 replications and 10% trimming percentage. Standard errors (s.e) are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
There are 61 and 23 countries in the Low-EF growth and High-EF growth groups, respectively.  
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Appendix 2.9: Threshold regression using EF index from the Heritage Foundation (1976-
2006) 
 
  Low-EF (EF≤64.60)    High-EF (EF>64.60) 
  Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat    Coeff.  s.e.  t-stat 
               
Initial income  -0.011  0.002  -5.492    -0.010  0.005  -1.965 
Population Growth  0.096  0.221  0.434    1.191  0.410  2.907 
Investment ratio  -0.020  0.034  -0.583    0.136  0.041  3.324 
Life Expectancy  0.071  0.012  5.746    0.047  0.058  0.808 
FDI  -0.245  0.163  -1.503    0.385  0.162  2.370 
               
Threshold estimate   64.60         
LM-test for no threshold  
(p-value) 
23.206 
(0.086) 
 
 
     
 
               
Number of countries  55        29     
R
2  0.48        0.66     
               
 
Notes: The dependent variable is average real GDP growth (1976–2005). Initial income is the logarithm of per 
capita income at the beginning of 1976. All other regressors are the average values over the 1976-2005 period 
except for the EF index which is averaged over the 1996-2005 period. Life expectancy is in the logarithmic form. 
p-value  was  bootstrapped  with  1000  replications  and  10%  trimming  percentage.  Standard  errors  (s.e)  are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
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Appendix 3.1: ADF tests 
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
 
Panel A: Model with intercepts         
   TFP  -0.4207 
(-3.0521) 
-1.6737 
(-3.0123) 
-0.6848 
(-3.0123) 
-0.4814  
(-3.0123) 
-1.8334  
(-3.0206) 
   S
d  3.2134 * 
(-3.0206) 
 3.3237 * 
(-3.0299) 
-0.4724 
(-3.0206) 
 2.4583  
(-3.0299) 
 1.1247  
(-3.0206) 
   S
fm    0.5296 
(-3.0123) 
-0.9107 
(-3.0123) 
-0.6244 
(-3.0123) 
-1.0201 
(-3.0123) 
-0.7595 
(-3.0123) 
   S
ff  -1.2739 
(-3.0206) 
-2.6011 
(-3.0123) 
-1.5575 
(-3.0521) 
-1.4907 
(-3.0123) 
-1.1481 
(-3.0123) 
   S
ft 
 n/a 
-3.5447 * 
(-3.1199) 
-1.7192 
(-3.1199) 
-1.5093 
(-3.1753)  n/a 
           
Panel B: Model with intercepts and linear trends 
   TFP  -3.6269  
(-3.6908) 
-2.4304 
(-3.6449) 
-1.6913 
(-3.6449) 
-1.8762  
(-3.6449) 
-2.3319  
(-3.6584) 
   S
d   0.5994 
(-3.6584) 
-0.0673 
(-3.6736) 
-2.9505 
(-3.6908) 
-2.4338 
(-3.6736) 
-0.9416 
(-3.6584) 
   S
fm  -4.1522 * 
(-3.6584) 
-3.1290 
(-3.6584) 
-1.5270 
(-3.6449) 
-1.0767 
(-3.6449) 
-2.5577 
(-3.6584) 
   S
ff   -1.4375 
(-3.6584) 
-4.1908 * 
(-3.7104) 
-3.7873 * 
(-3.6908) 
 1.7885 
(-3.7104) 
-0.9503 
(-3.6449) 
   S
ft 
 n/a 
-3.6664  
(-3.8289) 
-1.3401 
(-3.7911) 
-2.6035 
(-3.9333)  n/a 
           
 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the 5% critical values, following MacKinnon’s (1996) simulation procedure. * 
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.  n/a indicates data unavailability. Optimal lags were chosen 
based on the AIC.  
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Appendix 3.2: Johansen cointegration tests 
 
  Null  Alternative 
max λ   trace λ  
Panel A:  [ TFP, S
d, S
fm, S
ff ]              
   China  r=0  r=1   68.29 *   131.59 * 
  r≤2  r=2   44.83 *   63.29 * 
  r≤3  r=3   12.31   18.46 
  r≤4  r=4   6.15   6.15 
         
   Korea  r=0  r=1   51.85 *   102.78 * 
  r≤2  r=2   23.69 *   50.92 * 
  r≤3  r=3   19.71 *   27.22 * 
  r≤4  r=4   7.51   7.51 
         
   Malaysia  r=0  r=1   38.90 *   89.31 * 
  r≤2  r=2   23.61 *   50.41 * 
  r≤3  r=3   18.37 *   26.80 * 
  r≤4  r=4   8.42   8.42 
         
   Singapore  r=0  r=1   35.24 *   69.44 * 
  r≤2  r=2   18.07   34.20 
  r≤3  r=3   9.67   16.12 
  r≤4  r=4   6.45   6.45 
         
   Thailand  r=0  r=1   58.58 *   111.33 * 
  r≤2  r=2   28.90 *   52.75 * 
  r≤3  r=3   14.71   23.84 * 
  r≤4  r=4   9.13   9.13 
         
   95% Critical values  r=0  r=1   28.58   54.07 
  r≤2  r=2   22.29   35.19 
  r≤3  r=3   15.89   20.26 
  r≤4  r=4   9.16   9.16 
         
Panel B:  [ TFP, S
d, S
ft ]              
   Korea  r=0  r=1   29.26 *   55.14 * 
  r≤2  r=2   15.43   25.88 * 
  r≤3  r=3   10.44   10.44 
         
   Malaysia  r=0  r=1   27.55 *   45.80 * 
  r≤2  r=2   12.74   18.25 
  r≤3  r=3   5.51   5.51 
         
   Singapore  r=0  r=1   36.04 *   52.27 * 
  r≤2  r=2   12.04   16.23 
  r≤3  r=3   4.18   4.18 
         
   95% critical values  r=0  r=1   22.29   35.19 
  r≤2  r=2   15.89   20.26 
  r≤3  r=3   9.16   9.16 
         
 
Notes:  r  is  the  number  of  cointegrating  vector.  Critical  values  were  taken  from  Osterwald-Lenum  (1992).  * 
indicates significant at 95% level. 
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Appendix 3.3: R&D spillovers (1990-2005) 
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
           
Panel A: R&D spillovers via import channel 
 
Domestic RD:           
   S
d  0.353* 
(0.006) 
0.433* 
(0.012) 
0.024* 
(0.008) 
0.202* 
(0.003) 
0.103* 
(0.015) 
Foreign RD:           
   S
fm (import channel)  -0.028* 
(0.007) 
0.046* 
(0.015) 
0.510* 
(0.007) 
0.424* 
(0.003) 
0.393* 
(0.014) 
           
           
Panel B: R&D spillovers via inward FDI channel 
 
Domestic RD:           
   S
d  0.307*   
(0.017) 
0.758*  
(0.042) 
0.137*   
(0.011) 
0.594*   
(0.067) 
0.722*    
(0.093) 
Foreign RD:           
   S
ff (inward FDI channel)  0.078*   
(0.004) 
-0.084*   
(0.004) 
0.082*   
(0.003) 
-0.166*   
(0.032) 
-0.233*   
(0.030) 
           
 
Notes:  All  variables  are  in  logarithmic  form.  Figures  in  parentheses  are  robust  standard  errors.  *  indicates 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 3.4: R&D spillovers (1984-2005): sensitivity to different rates of depreciation  
 
  China  Korea  Malaysia  Singapore  Thailand 
           
Panel A: 7 percent 
 
Domestic RD           
   S
d  -0.174*   
(0.044)    
0.336 *  
(0.038)    
0.062 *  
(0.004)    
0.236 *   
(0.010)    
0.079 *    
(0.011)    
Foreign RD           
   S
fm (import channel)  0.365 * 
(0.027)    
0.098 * 
(0.010)  
0.011  
(0.008)    
0.344 * 
(0.006)  
0.226 *    
(0.016)    
           
   S
ff (inward FDI channel)  0.094  * 
(0.010) 
-0.038 * 
(0.009) 
0.046 * 
(0.003) 
-0.067 * 
(0.004) 
0.021 *   
(0.007) 
           
Panel B: 10 percent 
           
Domestic RD           
   S
d  0.116 * 
(0.033)    
0.304 * 
(0.013)    
0.058 * 
(0.004)    
0.239 *   
(0.006)    
0.073 * 
(0.004)    
Foreign RD           
   S
fm (import channel)  0.055 * 
(0.035)    
0.071 * 
(0.007)   
0.032 * 
(0.010)    
0.293 * 
(0.008)   
0.320 *   
(0.007)   
           
   S
ff (inward FDI channel)  0.113 * 
(0.011) 
-0.021 * 
(0.004) 
0.035 * 
(0.004) 
-0.026 * 
(0.006) 
-0.044 * 
(0.004) 
           
 
Notes:  All  variables  are  in  logarithmic  form.  Figures  in  parentheses  are  robust  standard  errors.  *  indicates 
significant at the 5% level. 
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Appendix 4.1: List of countries 
 
Developed Countries:    Developing Countries: 
Country  code  Legal Origin    Country  code  Legal Origin 
             
Australia  AUS  English    Algeria  DZA  French 
Austria  AUT  German    Argentina  ARG  French 
Belgium  BEL  French    Brazil  BRA  French 
Canada  CAN  English    Chile  CHL  French 
Cyprus  CYP  English    China  CHN  Socialist 
Denmark  DNK  Scandinavian    Colombia  COL  French 
Finland  FIN  Scandinavian    Dominican, Rep.  DOM  French 
France  FRA  French    Egypt  EGY  French 
Greece  GRC  French    Hungary  HUN  Socialist 
Israel  ISR  English    India  IND  English 
Italy  ITA  French    Indonesia  IDN  French 
Japan  JPN  German    Iran  IRN  French 
Korea, Rep.  KOR  German    Kenya  KEN  English 
Netherlands  NLD  French    Malaysia  MYS  English 
New Zealand  NZL  English    Mexico  MEX  French 
Iceland  ISL  Scandinavian    Morocco  MAR  French 
Ireland  IRL  English    Nigeria  NGA  English 
Norway  NOR  Scandinavian    Pakistan  PAK  English 
Portugal  PRT  French    Panama  PAN  French 
Singapore  SGP  English    Peru  PER  French 
Spain  ESP  French    Philippines  PHL  French 
Sweden  SWE  Scandinavian    South Africa  ZAF  English 
Switzerland  CHE  French    Thailand  THA  English 
United Kingdom  GBR  English    Tunisia  TUN  French 
United States  USA  English    Turkey  TUR  French 
        Venezuela  VEN  French 
        Zimbabwe  ZWE  English 
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Appendix 4.2: Two-stage least square estimation - excluding China and South Africa  
  Coefficient  S.e  p-value 
       
Insurance
 ΐ  0.009  0.003   0.003      
Initial GDP per capita 
ΐ  -0.054  0.012    0.000     
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.263  0.089  0.003      
Government size
 ΐ  0.014  0.014  0.319     
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  0.012  0.010  0.207     
Openness
 ΐ  0.023  0.011  0.037      
Black market premium
 ΐ   -0.002  0.004  0.650     
       
Observations  50 
Hansen test (p-value)  1.074 (0.584) 
   
 
Notes: The cross-country regression uses data averaged over 1981-2005 and the legal origins of countries from 
LLSV (1999) are used as instrumental variables for insurance activity. 
ΐ and 
ΐ ΐ indicate variables are included as 
log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. 
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Appendix 4.3:  Identification of outliers – Cook’s Distance statistic 
 
Cook’s distance statistic (Cook’s D) is used to identify observation with high combination of 
residual and leverage. Data points with large residuals and/or high leverage may distort 
the outcome and accuracy of a regression. The statistic tells how much influence the i
th 
data has upon the model. The statistic is calculated as follows: 
 
MSE p
) Y ˆ Y ˆ (
D
) i ( j j
i ⋅
−
= ∑
2
 
 
Algebraically, the above formula can be expressed as follows: 
 


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where  ii h  is the i
th diagonal element of the Hat matrix  ( )
T T X X X X
1 −
,  i e is the residual (i.e. 
the difference between the observed value and the value of fitted by the proposed model), 
p is the number of parameters in the model and MSE is the Mean Square Error. The 
convention cut-off point is 4/n, where n is number of countries. According to this rule, the 
potential outlier countries are China, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, South Korea and the United 
States. The following figure presents the scatter plot of residuals vs. leverage.     
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Appendix 4.4: Two-stage least square estimation – excluding outliers 
  Coefficient  S.e  p-value 
       
Insurance
 ΐ   0.004     0.002  0.036   
Initial GDP per capita 
ΐ  -0.057  0.015  0.000     
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.338  0.112   0.003      
Government size
 ΐ  0.013  0.009  0.172     
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  -0.000  0.005  0.952     
Openness
 ΐ  0.017  0.005   0.002      
Black market premium
 ΐ   0.001  0.005  0.833     
       
Observations  46 
Hansen test (p-value)  5.384 (0.067) 
   
 
Notes: The cross-country regression uses data averaged over 1981-2005 and the legal origins of countries from 
LLSV (1999) are used as instrumental variables for insurance activity. 
ΐ and 
ΐ ΐ indicate variables are included as 
log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. The outlier countries are China, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, South 
Korea, and the United States.    
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Appendix 4.5: Cross-section GMM estimation  
  Coefficient  S.e  p-value 
       
Insurance
 ΐ  0.014  0.004  0.002      
Initial GDP per capita 
ΐ  -0.101  0.021  0.000      
Life expectancy
 ΐ  0.640  0.169  0.000      
Government size
 ΐ  -0.002  0.023   0.924     
Inflation rate
 ΐ ΐ  0.029  0.016  0.072     
Openness
 ΐ  0.032  0.015  0.041      
Black market premium
 ΐ   -0.014  0.007     0.060      
       
Observations  52 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.817 (0.664) 
   
 
Notes: The cross-country regression uses data averaged over 1981-2005 and the legal origins of countries from 
LLSV (1999) are used as instrumental variables for insurance activity.  
ΐ and 
ΐ ΐ indicate variables are included as 
log(variable) and log(1+variable), respectively. 
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